In-depth (and surprisingly interesting!) analysis of the shifting public and government opinion on Russia during late 18th and early/mid 19th century England, plus a useful (and telling) exploration of the various propaganda and media narratives used to drive these opinions.
I've written before on this site, many times, that history rhymes, it doesn't repeat exactly, so you have to know your history--and by this I mean know your actual history, not your country's preferred propaganda narrative of history--in order to see that rhyme to make useful, accurate predictions.
It is fascinating to see England in the 1800s applying various forms of the same propagandized and manufactured Russophobia that we see in the United States today. England went from a literal alliance with Russia (against Napoleonic France) to a state of paranoid loathing of Russia in a matter of decades; the USA likewise went from "aren't they our friends now?" after the Soviet collapse to a similar paranoid loathing--now it seems like anything going wrong in the US gets blamed on "Russian interference."
It's worth remembering that England's journey from amity to enmity with Russia culminated in the astoundingly pointless and foolish Crimean War.
This book offers readers excellent context for a period of European history that I know embarrassingly little about. You'll learn about the so-called Quadruple Alliance that "stabilized" Europe after Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo (although in reality this was just another control mechanism to keep the existing elites, mostly monarchies, in power). You'll learn quite a lot about Russia's long and fractious history with Turkey/the Ottoman Empire, as well as their long involvement in Poland, the Levant, Afghanistan, and many other neighboring -stans. Don't feel bad if you don't know this history well: today, nobody else does either--including our best political "experts" deciding US foreign policy. Nobody reads history, nobody knows their history.
One final thought. Note that when a country's elites "need" an enemy, they can be quite good at manufacturing one via propaganda, false flag events and other forms of manipulation. What's disturbing and horrifying about this is the enemy was never there in the first place, but yet the people, believing and credulous, made it so. Enmity between countries can be easily groomed and cultivated, and that enmity will be fought out by you and me, the common people. Please remember this when your country experiences a "suddenly cultivated" enmity towards another country.
[As always, a friendly warning: don't bother to read any further. The rest of this post contains my notes and thoughts on the text--they are here to help me better remember and integrate the ideas in the book. Life is short and this post is already too long! Go and do something else more valuable.]
Notes:
Preface:
vii: This is a "survey of Anglo-Russian relations and British policy toward Russia between 1815 and 1841."
vii: Amusing comment here about the author working through the major British newspapers of the period: "It is possible that some significant articles may have escaped me, but it seems unlikely since his characteristic of newspapers that they all deal with all the major questions of the day and hence the topics, though not the attitudes, of their columns are nearly identical." [Note that this is a 1950s book referring to newspapers of the early 1800s. Plus ça change, plus la même chose... ]
Chapter I: Policy and Opinion -- Russophobia
1: "Within the United Kingdom there developed early in the nineteenth century an antipathy toward Russia which soon became the most pronounced and enduring element in the national outlook on the world abroad." Note that there was only one actual military conflict, the Crimean War, and in the other major conflicts of the modern era Great Britain depended on Russia's military power to escape defeat; note also a geopolitical nuance here: in the colonial era countries who were [geographically] distant from each other found themselves "transformed into neighbors."
2: The collapse of the Ottoman empire leaves a power vacuum; both Russia and England wanted an independent and weak Turkey as sort of a buffer state.
4ff: Discussion of how to identify public opinion: directly or indirectly, from the historical record, from media, books and pamphlets, from government policy decisions, etc.
7: Reference here to propaganda as an important element of public opinion, also a reference to Walter Lippmann's seminal work Public Opinion, which is required reading for any modern who wants to grasp what's going on today.
Chapter II: England and Russia Prior to 1815
9ff: "Serious Anglo-Russian hostility began in 1791." Russia had captured a Prussian fortress on the Bug and Dneiper Rivers, Britain, under PM William Pitt, wanted it restored. Then the author dials back even further, to 1553 and the first direct contact between Russia and England: trade via the formation of the Muscovy Company in 1555, the first of the Great British joint stock trading organizations; also on Peter the Great and his naval architecture studies in England circa 1698.
11ff: Note William Pitt's failed effort to produce antipathy between England and Russia in 1791 over the fort controversy on the bug River that Russia captured from Prussia. The idea was to frame Russia as a threat, but the problem was that in those days nobody (not the media, the people, nor even political elites) in England knew anything about Central Europe, much less anything about this particular fortress. Note here also at this time England was purchasing a lot of commodities, especially timber, from Russia (England's forests had been depleted in this era).
Chapter III: Aftermath of Vienna
15ff: Note that after the Peace of Vienna (that era's "new world order" after Napoleon's final defeat), England was struggling with a poor economy, experiencing high unemployment thanks to the Industrial Revolution (which per the author was "still unrecognized" at that time, interestingly). Note also the Increasingly repressive laws England's elites put in place to control the people: limits on the right of assembly, limits on press freedom, suspension of habeas corpus, etc.; see also the passage of the Corn Law which protected English agricultural interests from competition from the Continent.
17ff: On the Quadruple Alliance, which established the geopolitical environment after Napoleon's defeat; see also Secretary Castlereagh, who helped establish this geopolitical order. Note also that Russia attempted to establish more control over Eastern Europe, especially over Poland, but was beaten back by the other powers at the Congress in Vienna.
23ff: The beginnings of understanding and knowledge about Russia, the Near East and Central Asia, thanks to various travel guides mass-published in England at the time; per the author most of these guides framed Russia as a despotic country, framed Russia as a potential threat to England's India colony, etc. [It is worth noting how hilarious the idea of Russia being a "threat" to India becomes once you take a look at a map. There's an insight in there: the more clueless and hypocognized your people, the easier it is for your elites to impose fear, paranoia... and war.]
26ff: Note the large balance of trade in favor of Russia between England and Russia after the defeat of Napoleon. Again, England was buying large amounts of commodities from Russia.
32ff: More commentary here about Russia's attempt under Tsar Alexander to acquire a hegemony over Eastern Europe; this led to distrust from Castlereagh, the chief architect of the post-Napoleonic Quadruple Alliance. This distrust later evolved into a desire to resist Russian influence in the Near East even more so than in Poland.
37ff: Comments on Persia, which became more significant to England thanks to Napoleon's "Egyptian expedition" but then later seen as another front to control Russia's power and expansion in the Near East; see also Russia's annexation of Georgia in 1800, and an "abortive plan of 1808 for a Franco-Russian expedition against India" which fueled distrust and antipathy between England and Russia; note however Central Asia was seen as too remote to be significant to England in these days.
42ff: Rumors that Spain had ceded Mediterranean islands in return for help from Russia in South America where it's colonies were revolting against Spanish rule; this turned out to be massively exaggerated via "fantastic" rumors in the Press, what really happened here was Russia sold some naval ships to Spain.
45: Interesting comment here about the eventual evolution of the Quadruple Alliance and the European international system architected by Castlereagh, how it devolved into "a league to suppress revolution" per the work of Webster in his history of Castlereagh. The author also refers here to the Greek Revolution and a slow growth of distrust and suspicion between Russia and England.
46ff: As revolutions were suppressed in Spain, Naples and also Austria, there became kind of a distinction between despotic and representational governments, a division between these two types of countries, dividing Europe into two ideological camps. In England's media at the time Russia was seen as despotic, with a tendency toward aggrandizement, disparaged for its aggressive designs on Poland, etc.
48-9: The author notes a standard propagandist attack against Russia where "her ancient sins were perennially resurrected to give her latest crime a more vicious setting."
51: Another example here of another propaganda technique where Russia was blamed for meddling in certain monarchical marriages ["Russian interference" all over again!]. See for example the prevention of a projected marriage between Crown Princess Charlotte of England and the Prince of Orange (basically this was a failed Anglo-Dutch negotiation), which was blamed on Russia attempting to solidify influence upon the continent.
52ff: The author cites here another writer, Robert Wilson, and his work A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817, which noted Russian expansion beyond Poland to acquiring Finland, certain islands that brought it close to Stockholm, also expansion close to Constantinople; this frmed Russia as an expansionist regime and an increasing threat. [It's interesting here to see the manufactured revulsion and paranoia about Russia that rhymes so clearly with American perspectives on Russia today.] This author cites the positive critical reception of this work across the English media of the day, which further created a still mild, but growing climate of fear or uneasiness about Russia. "...the evolution of Russophobia in England had advanced."
Chapter IV: The Greek Revolution
57ff: England had been mostly non-interventionist on the European continent, it didn't interfere in the repressive activities of Metternich nor of Tsar Alexander; but when the Greek revolt happened England saw Greece as a protectorate and considered the Levant region to be strategically important. [Note that the author assumes context for this revolt that at a minimum this reader doesn't have! This was an 1821 revolt of Greece against Ottoman/Turkish rule, Russia, Britain, and France decided to intervene, sending their naval squadrons to Greece in 1827.]
60ff: It appears here that England was concerned that the Greek revolt would weaken Turkey relative to Russia, and would thus encourage Russian aggrandizement, either in Greece, or Turkey, or both. Allegedly Catherine had a scheme to enthrone her second grandson Constantine at Constantinople. This also would afford Russia its "long-standing desire to gain unimpeded access to the Mediterranean." See also pro-Grecian and Christian sentiment in England in support of intervening in Greece.
64: Fascinating quote here on British aims during a possible Russo-Turkish war, written out by Stratford Canning, England's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire: "To preserve the peace of the world is the leading object of the policy of England. For this purpose, it is necessary, in the first place, to PREVENT, to the utmost of our power, the breaking out of new quarrels,--and the second place, to compose, when it can be done, by friendly mediation, existing differences, and thirdly, where that is hopeless, to narrow as much as possible their range, fourthly, to maintain for Ourselves, an imperturbable neutrality in all cases where nothing occurs to affect injuriously Our interests or Our honor." [England clearly hadn't (yet) figured out yet how profitable war is.]
67-8: 1821: First translations of Russian verse into English; note also it wasn't "until the second half of the nineteenth century that the work of the great Russian novelists begin to modify the common and natural belief [in England] that Russia was a cultural desert." Also in 1824 the birth of a new influential quarterly, The Westminster Review, "antipathetic" to Russia. A quote from one article: "She sits like a huge incubus upon the rest, disposing kingdoms at her will, directing and controlling the fate of nations..."
71ff: 1825: death of Tsar Alexander in December; also The Decembrist revolt; English media generally viewed Alexander as a despot and viewed his life negatively upon his death, but also it doubted Russia would be any serious threat to England the time.
74ff: It's weird, here you'd think England should be allied with Russia since Turkey/the Ottoman Empire is equally a threat to Russia as well as to Greek Independence, but England was threatened by Russia taking unilateral military action against Turkey. England was concerned about a breakdown of the established political order as well as an increase of Russian power in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean.
76: 1826-7: Then there was an actual brief hot war: a group of soldiers from the Persian frontier made an incursion into the Caucasus; Tsar Nicholas promptly declared war, routed the Persians and acquired two border provinces in Persia. This was hardly covered in the English press.
83ff: The battle of Navarino [1827 naval battle during the 1821–1829 Greek War of Independence in Navarino Bay (modern Pylos) on the west coast of the Peloponnese peninsula, in the Ionian Sea. Allied forces from Britain, France, and Russia defeated Ottoman and Egyptian forces trying to suppress the Greeks, this basically led to Greek Independence]: this victory was entirely unexpected, some concern from some media in England that Russia might seize Turkish territory. The diplomatic issues here seem kind of geek and abstruse.
95ff: Basically it's just England's concern that Russia would expand its power and territory at Turkey's expense and thus mess up the balance of power with Austria, France and the other European nations; but this is all balanced with England's visceral cultural dislike of the Islamic Ottoman Empire and the idea that the Ottomans might expand their power on the other side of the fence here.
Chapter V: The Polish Revolution
107ff: The rise of Louis Philippe in France, he ruled from 1830-1848, the so-called "Citizen King"; Note also the unrest in the Belgium/Netherlands region at this time; Russia under Tsar Nicholas, which had a horror and revulsion of revolution, stood ready with its military to assist England if necessary with complete cooperation, presumably to put down any revolution that might get out of hand on the continent.
109ff: Then, however, Wellington's Parliament lost to Lord Grey and the new Whig Parliament pledged itself to liberal reform; Also note the Polish Rebellion to overthrow Russian control of Poland began in November 1830, Russia successfully suppressed it. Public opinion was sympathetic towards Poland in England. [Once again, the author is writing as if the reader has much more context for this era than I certainly have.]
114: Tsar Nicholas "had too many nations subject to his power to allow him the option of permitting unpunished or unrestricted revolt [in Poland]. The example would be too contagious."
116ff: Note the repressive, even barbaric, policies pursued by Russia after the Polish rebellion was suppressed, including closing the University of Warsaw, abolishing school instruction in Polish and French, confiscation of property, torture, transferring to Russia the contents of Polish libraries and museums, etc. This horrified liberals as well as "Romantic movement" exponents in England at the time; see also a rise in subscriptions and banquets offered to support the Polish cause, as well as various pro-Polish societies created during this time.
124ff: This is followed by speeches and political activity in Parliament as well as a carefully and strategically planned campaign to arouse public enthusiasm for Poland and against Russia, using Russia's post-revolution repression as a catalyst. See also calls for outright engaging in war with Russia in defense of the Polish people; see some of the speeches given at a Polish meeting that the author considers "typical" held in Manchester: "This meeting is further evidence of the readiness of responsible men to express publicly the most violent sentiments." [This of course rhymes very much with today in Ukraine: remember that there are appalling outrages committed all over the world all the time, and any can thus be "chosen" to justify engaging in covert--or overt--war. And remember, war is very profitable.]
129: Note however that the English government "had already abandoned the Polish cause." The situation was somewhat delicate, as England was involved in negotiations for a settlement and separation of Belgium from the Netherlands and Russia was involved in these discussions as well.
130: Interesting blurb here on diplomatic communications between Russia and England; whereas Russia believed that the English government could have restrained public opinion [which was extremely pro-Poland] "if they so wished." [You could call this "diplomatic solipsism": thinking that a country like England could repress stuff just like your state could!]
134: Note that after the Polish Revolution, the tone changed in England, now there was media coverage of all the atrocities of the Russians, and all the suffering of the Poles. Likewise the stereotype of Tsar Nicholas evolved: he was viewed as more monstrous, more ambitious, etc. "Poland had contributed the essential element of the innocent and noble victim of savage tyranny to the rapidly crystallizing English hatred of Russia." [Again, remember: there are always bad things that happen all around the world. But which ones are brought to your attention by your (state-sponsored) media? Those are likely brought forth for an ulterior reason. And note the secondary meta-question: which things are hidden from you and not talked about, and why?]
Chapter VI: The Crisis of 1833
135ff: On the Near Eastern crisis in 1833, where the Egyptian armies experienced startling success against the Ottoman Empire, the advance of the Russian military to the Bosporus, and a Russo-Turkish alliance: these all "constituted a major transformation in Near Eastern affairs" although "there was little immediate appreciation of their significance" in England at the time.
139ff: Discussion here of why England failed to put together any kind of policy or strategy in response to the situation; partly it was because the region was so far away and information was suspect and slow to arrive; also England's government was "so preoccupied with several fateful problems in the west of Europe that they did not appreciate the real import of the events in the Near East." [Here referring to settling a delicate squabble over the Belgian problem with France among the other things that the author doesn't mention: once again, you'd have to have context for this historical era, which I don't.]
146ff: 1833: Turkey and Russia sign an alliance [the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi] while the other key European nations (France, England and Austria) objecting because the treaty altered the European balance of power; yet Russia and Turkey argued that they had a right as independent states to make such an alliance. See also how the Austro-Hungarian Empire would tolerate or even pander to Russia; according to England, Austria didn't object strenuously enough to this treaty, and this really rattled England.
149ff: Discussion of David Urquhart and his book Turkey and Its Resources, various commentaries on it in the English intellectual media at the time, which signaled the first sort of inflammatory policy of thinking of Turkey as a buffer state for Russia rather than Austria or other regions; also to look at Turkey/the Ottoman Empire as more of a friend than enemy; discussion of David Urquhart and his background, his magnetic personality, how he got his start enlisting in the fight for Greek independence, how he was personally accepted into Ottoman Empire circles in spite of his Christian faith; etc. [Urquhart will play a major role in actively inflaming tensions between Russia and England throughout the rest of this book.]
156ff: David Urquhart is then sent to Turkey under the guise of a merchant, but was involved in discussions with England's ambassador there to identify and curb Russian power in both Turkey and Central Asia. [You can see a bit of a germ here of some of the stories like Greenmantle and others discussing various aspects of "the Great Game"]; he and the ambassador there wanted to maintain Turkey as a buffer state, ironically Russia wanted the same: both England and Russia were equally afraid of each other! Both countries wanted to preserve the Ottoman Empire, the so-called "sick man of Europe."
161ff: At this point Russia started attracting "much less notice" in English journals and media after 1833, compared to when Nicholas began his reign. "That her great increase of strength threatened British welfare was an almost unchallenged opinion, but few commentators were so alarmed as to advocate an immediate retaliatory enterprise."
Chapter VII: David Urquhart--The Vixen
164ff: The author cites a bit of a political and media debate about the appointment and then resignation of an anti-Polish diplomat to St. Petersburg, the Marquess of Londonderry, the author cites this as a "strong, if still latent, hostility toward Russia" in the English press at the time.
168ff: A list here of various trade statistics between England and Russia from the 1830s: what's interesting here is how Russia's largest trading partner by far was England all throughout this period, something like 50% of Russia's trade was with England despite all of their geopolitical frictions! Flax, hemp and tallow added up to about 70% of Russian exports to Great Britain. Note also at the same time Russia was becoming less and less important to England as England's trading partner as many other countries grew their trade with England. The author argues here that the trading relationship was evolving from a complementary one into an antagonistic one. Note also this comment from the author that at that time one half of Russia's exports went to England but in return Russia represented only one twentieth of England's exports.
172ff: Internal government documentation at this point indicating that Russia's military power was greatly exaggerated, their power was solely defensive, etc., this helps the government counteract a "barrage" of the opposite view from Urquhart, who argued that Russia's major purpose was control of Constantinople and the Bosphorus Straits; Per the author, Urquhart was gifted in using excellent, persuasive rhetoric but with little actual proof.
176: 1835: Urquhart is appointed as Secretary of the embassy in Constantinople by the British government, around the same time he publishes a series of papers based on Russian diplomatic documents taken from Warsaw during the attempted Revolution against Russia; they reflected very badly on Russia in their policies towards Poland at the time; soon all of the English press "reverberated" with anti-Russian sentiment in reaction to these papers.
180: [Interesting here that Urquhart's anti-Russian propaganda essentially argued that the safety of England (and of Europe) hung upon the fate of Turkey, as if Russia (after taking over Turkey) would then take over all the rest of Europe. Incredible how much this rhymes with the paranoid rhetoric we're fed about Russia today.]
181ff: Various examples of an intellectual clique that formed around Urquhart, various pundits publishing papers. pamphlets, articles and editorials with increasingly alarmist anti-Russian propaganda. "Urquhart's propagandist campaign in the periodical press was important because it maintained the expression of anti-Russian sentiments in England at a time when lack of event had produced a hiatus in the diatribes of the newspapers. A precise measure of his influence cannot be made, but his stimulus must certainly be given credit for the otherwise inexplicable increase of attacks upon Russia." [You don't need any "event" at all, you can manufacture an enemy easily with a compliant intellectual lapdog class and the megaphone of the media. It works in any era!]
183ff: The author offers the "common sense" contra-argument at the time, from Richard Cobden, making the case that free trade benefited England and anything but a strictly defensive war would be folly; furthermore England's experience with Ireland and Russia's experience with Poland show that trade was a source of wealth and power, not territory. Also neither India nor British trade were at risk from Russia, and Cobden noted that Russia defended against Napoleon only with difficulty and that her navies were easily locked up in either the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea. Basically, Russia should not be taken seriously, and there was no benefit in them engaging militarily at all with Russia anywhere. Unfortunately Cobden's work was not nearly as widely read as Urquhart's. [It never is.]
185: [Very notable comment here where this author Cobden cites "...colonies, which are but the costly appendage of an aristocratic government," and wars, "which have been but another aristocratic way of plundering and oppressing commerce..." This is extremely interesting when you think about how the governing elites typically benefit from diluting their country's workforce with low-cost labor (this can be done either by exporting the work to a colony or importing mass immigration at home), or by sending "regular people" citizens off to war while you sit at home and become wealthier and wealthier. Either way, as an elite, you are enriched at the expense of your own citizens!! Gross on every level.]
191ff: Urquhart gets relieved of duties and then goes rogue in Central Asia/the Caucasus, fomenting conflicts against Russia; 1837: he comes up with the idea of sending in a ship, the Vixen, loaded with salt into a port where salt was a prohibited commodity per Russian regulations. The plan failed and was resolved by the English and Russian governments amicably. Urquhart's activities draw further ire from Lord Palmerston [who was England's foreign secretary, directing basically all of English foreign policy at the time]; Urquhart is fully recalled, his diplomatic career in tatters, and he told his confidantes that he believed Palmerston is "a traitor, probably in the pay of the Russian government"--a paranoid and ridiculous claim if there ever was one.
198ff Ironically the drama with the Vixen brought the two countries closer together and into a state of detente! Russia and England basically settled almost all their major disagreements shortly afterwards. However Urquhart kept up his attacks (both on Russia and on prime minister Palmerston) in the media, the bulk of media in the era seem to pile on along with him: various examples given at the end of this chapter. [Note in particular a nuance here pertaining to Russia's attempts to subdue Circassia (this was a region/people living along the Black Sea, which by 1864, some 25 years later, Russia actually did finally subdue Circassia and ultimately genocided some 90% of their people); note however most of the media reports in Urquhart's day which were trying to get mileage from Circassia were predicated on a misbelief that it was close to India--the idea here was to keep English people fearful of Russian designs on their most important colony. Once again, we can see how easily truth and fiction can be mingled, then combined with the average person's inability to look at a map, and result in fooling a whole society into a war.]
Chapter VIII: The Navy--Afghanistan
205: 1837: Persia attacks Herat, a major city in modern Afghanistan, claiming suzerainty there and doing so potentially under the encouragement of Russia; this rattles England; tensions escalate; India threatens to intervene in Afghanistan. [Note that India and Afghanistan are actually close to each other!]
214ff: Change of topic here to naval power, discussions between England and Russia to reduce its equipped naval forces, various propaganda arguments about the English Navy not being strong enough to control Russian aggression, etc.
221-2: An interesting policy document here from 1938 discussing how if Russia actually did march toward India, as hilariously unlikely as such a thing would be, before they ever got close the English fleet could have "laid Petersburg in ashes." In other words the document shows that this was first not anything to worry about and second the consequences would be terrible for Russia.
222: [A throwaway blurb here about "an insurrection in Canada," which sent me down quite a rabbit hole learning about the 1837-1838 rebellions in Upper Canada and Lower Canada, crushed by Loyalist forces, which led to a unification of Canada and ultimately in the 1860s the creation of the modern Confederation of Canada.]
223ff: Citing various influential books published in 1837 and 1838; the author concludes that most of the fear or anxiety England had about Russia "could be traced" to propaganda activities from "the friends of Poland" or "the school of Urquhart."
Chapter IX: The Near Eastern crisis, 1839-1841
226ff: On the "Turko-Egyptian problem" where in 1838 pasha Mehemet Ali of Egypt declared "his intention to effect his independence" from the Ottoman Empire; England did not want a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; then in 1839 Turkey invades Syria; England here wanted to make sure it had a route to India through this region, they also didn't trust Egypt's institutions, military or economic, under the pasha; also according to England Russia benefited from these internal conflicts that kept the Ottoman Empire weak, thus it would be "less and less able to resist" Russia.
230ff: Palmerston had a plan to suppress the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi [recall this was the alliance between Russia and Turkey] by using this Near East crisis to merge it into a more general treaty which would leave the Ottoman Empire independent of an alliance with Russia; see also another view that England should ally with Egypt because Turkey was doomed to succumb to Russia anyway, this would maintain a passage to India and compensate for Russia's increased strength.
235ff: Various contemporary historical events discussed here indirectly that I have no context for: the outbreak of war with Syria; the settlement and alliance signed in London in 1840 which the author says "need not be recapitulated here"; the surrender of the Turkish navy to the Egyptians; Egypt invading Syria; Russia and England found themselves in a "common course of policy" and Russia formed a sort of alliance with England, and at the same time England found itself at increased tensions with France. Thus an 1839 we see a "complete reorientation" of English government policy toward Russia where a quasi-war in Central Asia was replaced by entente and a formal alliance.
240ff: Extended discussion here of the position of various media in England in the wake of the surprise rapprochement between England and Russia: examples of both support of the rapprochement or continued alarmism against Russia, depending on the paper; also on H.H. Parish, a disciple of Urquhart writing under the pen name "Anglicus" and his articles expressing "his horror at the prospect of a Russian alliance which would make England the dupe of the crafty diplomats" of that country. [Again, see how a dedicated propagandist can craft an argument out of anything.]
245ff: The first "Opium Wars" between China and England break out, 1839-1842. Also Russia unsuccessfully tries to conquer Khiva in 1839 [this was a sultanate approximately where modern Uzbekistan is today]; on the conflicts over the sale of sulfur which almost precipitated war between England and Naples; and yet another Spanish civil war. Examples here of various press editorials continuing to beat the drum of Russophobia, as they interpreted Russia's invasion of Khiva as duplicitous after its alliance with England.
256: The author argues that Palmerston's made a tremendous diplomatic coup by forming this treaty with Russia; it was brilliant policy, but the media outlets continued to heap abuse on Russia, reinforcing and self-sealing their prior opinions by assuming Palmerston was "incapable of such a work of genius and Russia could not have opposed her own interests." [Thus the pundits get to "postdict" (predict after the fact) and be right either way, and Palmerston can't win! It reminds me of the famous quote from Mickey Mantle when he said "You don't realize how easy this game is until you get up in that broadcasting booth."]
DONE TO HERE
259ff: Urquhart continues attacking Palmerston, claiming that he's a traitor, that he's in the pay of the Russian government, etc. Then Urquhart runs for Parliament, and, improbably, wins; later he comes into contact with Chartist revolutionary leaders and was appalled by their policies, their violence, and their admitted connections to Russia; Urquhart decided to combat this new threat to English security. Offhand comment here about the "rising at Newport" a violent conflict between Chartists and British soldiers in Wales in 1839; Urquhart tries to "wean the Chartists from their subversive activity" as well as from their sympathies for Russia.
260ff: Various examples of media outlets throughout England, especially in the northern provinces that came over to increased Russophobia and the assumption that Palmerston was a traitor, that his treaty was Russian treachery, that Russia had its hand in all sorts of events all over the world, etc., even advocating for war against Russia. [This sounds, again, just like today with all the allegations of Russian collusion in the election, Russian hackers attacking different companies here, etc.] Note here however that as Urquhart became more and more paranoid and events showed that his paranoia wasn't justified as more information came out about the Treaty--including the fact that as part of the treaty Russia left Constantinople--then Urquhart's paranoid anti-Palmerston and anti-Russian views became embarrassing; he was taken much less seriously at this point.
268: "The uniformly inimical tenor of the plethora of propagandist literature..." [I can't tell whether this is good or bad writing--probably bad--but it is hilarious.]
Chapter X: Russophobia
272: "The peaceful dénouement of the Near Eastern crisis of 1839-1841 robbed the development of British Russophobia during its first phase of the satisfying logical outcome which a war between the two Powers would represent." The author then goes meta here and asks whether his book should end here on an outbreak of friendliness between England and Russia in July 1841, or should it continue to the outbreak of the Crimean War [in 1853]?
272: Also in 1841 the Whigs lost to the Tories and Robert Peel takes over as prime minister from Palmerston.
273: "Anglo-Russian cordiality here reached its highest point during the 19th century."
273ff: Other relevant historical events during the late 1840s: Austria annexes the free city of Krakow, the "last vestige of an independent Poland"; also the revolutions of 1848 across Europe "rendered acute the latent antagonism of the liberal and autocratic elements in Europe" and Russia moved its army into Hungary to suppress an independence movement there. The irony here is that this is a new escalation in Anglo-Russian tensionss and yet anti-Russian propaganda in England "was very much reduced" at this time, this is deeply ironic. Also, David Urquhart was elected to Parliament in 1847 and enjoyed significant prominence in the years that followed, although he was writing on other topics, not anti-Russian propaganda, again, interesting.
274: Upon the onset of the Crimean War crisis in 1853 however "the presses began again to pour forth articles and pamphlets," Urquhart got back into the Russophobia business, etc.
274: The author considers the Crimean War "only an episode and indeed a highly inconclusive one" that didn't really change most of the geopolitical status quo, most of which remained in place until 1914.
276ff: Interesting blurb here, where the author cites B. Kingsley Martin's The Triumph of Lord Palmerston as a reason for stopping his work here, because Martin catalogs the Russophobia that emerged before, during and after the Crimean conflict--the one instance where Russophobia actually did "eventuate in war." But the examples from the 1850s look exactly like two decades before where this author describes them. "The full degree of similarity becomes apparent from a reading of The Triumph of Lord Palmerston."
277ff: Comments from the author here on the near unanimity of media Russophobia in 1840. Also interesting comment on the widespread illiteracy in England in these days, and how few people actually read the newspaper at all; documentation on circulation statistics showing that the total number of readers was "a very small fraction of the population." Also that government policy by this time was firmly anti-Russian as well. "Russophobia had matured during the 1830's and by 1840 was pragmatically complete."
281ff: Interesting point here where the author argues that Russia underestimated the force of public opinion related to the risks to the holy Land, as well as its diplomatic intention to support Turkey in 1853 when it engaged with England, thinking that England would not be as bellicose as they ended up being. Thus Russia was less conciliatory than it was in the 1839 Near East crisis.
Vocab:
Ukase: an edict of the Russian government
Casus foederis (or casus fœderis): derived from the Latin for "case for the alliance," describes a diplomatic situation in which the terms of an alliance automatically come into play, such as one nation being attacked by another
Flagitious: criminal; villainous
Metempsychosis: the supposed transmigration at death of the soul of a human being or animal into a new body of the same or a different species
Démarche: (take steps) a political step or initiative; "foreign policy démarches"
Supererogation: the performance of more work than duty requires
Euxine (Sea): archaic name for the Black Sea
The Porte: an alternate name for the Ottoman Empire
Quondam: that once was; former; "quondam dissidents joined the establishment"
Dragoman: an interpreter or guide, especially in countries speaking Arabic, Turkish, or Persian
Quousque tandem: From Cicero's first speech In Catilinam to the Roman Senate regarding the conspiracy of Catiline: Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? ("For how much longer, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?"); today the phrase would be used to criticize an overbearing or tyrannical leader
Point d'appui: a support or prop; a strategic point
Mougik: a Russian peasant (today: muzhik)
Mortmain: literally "dead hand" the status of lands or tenements held inalienably by an ecclesiastical or other corporation
To Read:
Eugene Schuyler: Peter the Great
Thomas Babington Macaulay: History of England
Charles Kingsley Webster: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815
Charles Kingsley Webster: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822
H.W.C. Davis: The Great Game in Asia
Élie Halévy: History of the English People
C.W. Crawley: The Question of Greek Independence
Samuel A. Dunham: A History of Poland
Michael Zagoskin: The Young Muscovite (trans. Frederick Chamier)
***David Urquhart: Turkey and its Resources
Arthur Connolly: Journey to the North of India through Russia, Persia and Afghanistan
Thomas Raikes: A Visit to St. Petersburg in the Winter of 1829-30
B. Kingsley Martin: The Triumph of Lord Palmerston