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Discourses on Livy by Niccolo Machiavelli

"The wise are wont to say, and not without reason or at random, that he who would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has been; since all human events, whether present or to come, have their exact counterpart in the past."

It's both encouraging and depressing to see that all the incompetence and institutional decay of our era have direct parallels--over and over and over--across history. Wherever you look in history you'll see greed, corruption, and truly horrible leadership. It's the rule not the exception in every era, and it makes me (slightly) less ashamed of my country's leadership in mine. 

The Discourses often meanders in an enjoyable way (just like Montaigne's essays), but it also at times meanders in an annoying way (also just like Montaigne's essays). Still, it's fascinating to hear Machiavelli draw historical parallels from Rome to his own era (the 15th century Italian city-state period) which had its own range of problems. The reader is the winner, getting a simultaneous review of major figures from the Roman era, Livy's historical comparisons from prior Greek eras, and Machiavelli's historical comparisons from his. 

One thing this book brings to mind is the scale problem in modern nation-states, with smaller nations of tens of millions of citizens ranging up to truly huge nations of hundreds of millions or even billions of citizens. Little works well at this scale: institutions become faceless bureaucracies, governments and leaders become removed, graft-prone and out of touch, and the people become atomized, easily divided and easy to control. 

The Roman Empire operated far better at a far smaller scale: when its population peaked at some 60m in the 1st Century AD (a vast multi-ethnic state of a scale and scope not to be seen again in the West for another millennium), it was already sclerotic, largely corrupt and in decline. Rome then entered a multi-century, slow-motion collapse, giving us the ultimate historical example of "gradually then suddenly." 

It makes me wonder if our collapse, which would begin at a far greater level of scale and complexity, will look the same--or not be slow-motion at all. 

[Another friendly warning: my notes below are long, much too long to bother reading.] 

Notes: 
Book One: Concerning the various methods followed by the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their City. 
1) On Dinocrates the architect: it never crossed his mind how the people would live--a failing of architects in our era too, as they design "promenades" that no one walks and hideous structures that aren't for living: 

"When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a city, Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build it on Mount Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could be handled that the city built there might present a semblance of the human form, which would be a thing strange and striking, and worthy of so great a monarch. But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to live, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Whereupon, Alexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it stood, built Alexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of the Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their abode."

2) I realize Rousseau is a lot less original than I thought when I see Machiavelli say the same things 300 years earlier. His history of the formats and forms of government is something Rousseau probably borrowed (plagiarized?).

3) The three forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy; elements of each existing together in the same city-state, "each of the three serves as a check upon the other." See Lycurgus framing the laws of Sparta. Contrast with Solon and his Athenian direct democracy which didn't scale and quickly devolved into the despotism of Pisistratus.

4) Rome structured as a power-sharing agreement between the elites and commoners, with checks and balances on each, not a democracy but a more sustainable form of government. A "perfection reached through the dissentions of a commons and the senate."

5) Founders must assume that all men are bad when they structure a government. Something we are clearly forgetting as we send more power and money to the centralized authority in our country. 

6) The Tarquins: referring to Rome's monarchy period, leading up to Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, who "was the legendary seventh and final king of Rome, reigning 45 years until the popular uprising that led to the establishment of the Roman Republic." (Wikipedia)

7) The dissentions between the Senate and Commons made Rome more free.

8) Interesting history of the government of Venice: consisting by chance of "gentlemen" (gentiluomini): they had enough population to require a government, and then at a given point in their history they had enough people involved in the government to properly manage their political existence--and then the Venetians simply closed the right to vote! "They closed the entrance to civil rights against all who came afterwards to live there, not allowing them to take any part in the management of affairs." Thus anyone else who came there to live couldn't vote. All others were plebians (popolani).

9) "And he who looks carefully into the matter will find, and in all human affairs, we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running into another. So that if you would have your people numerous and warlike, to the end that with their aid you may establish a great empire, you will have them of such a sort as you cannot afterwards control at your pleasure; While should you keep them few and unwarlike, to the end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable, should you extend your dominions, to preserve them, and will become so contemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you."

10) On the need for safety valve, a form of impeachment to bring down nobles or an emperor or any citizen that oversteps his bounds in some way, see the example of Coriolanus and the reaction to a famine in Rome. See also contra-examples in Florence in Macchiavelli's day of Francesco Valori as well as the fall of Piero Soderini, because there was no accusal or impeachment mechanism, ultimately driving violence and loss of stability in the state). Because Rome in those days had the safety valve of an impeachment mechanism, no citizen or partisan group sought help from a foreign power to achieve redress.

11) On calumny: how you must have both the power to impeach and a punishment for calumniators: in Rome you were forced to make your calamity public in front of everyone else along with proof (basically you were forced to become a true accuser) otherwise you were thrown in prison. In Florence there was no mechanism like this, thus everyone spread rumors and this led to factionalism and ruin.

12) I think you can also make a strong case that modern "cancel culture" is a type of calumny (You're racist/sexist/misogynist/etc) and it leads to the same factionalism Florence experienced.

13) On how new institutions "must be the work of one man... so would be one man that must give a State its institutions, once given they are not so likely to last long resting for support on the shoulders of one man only, as when entrusted to the care of many, and when it is the business of many to maintain them." See as examples Romulus founding Rome, also Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, etc. Intriguing how the United States is an exception to this rule.

14) Romulus created Rome, killed his brother, and then immediately created a Senate from whom he took counsel. Then later reserved no power beyond command of the army and the right to assemble the Senate.

15) Agis, King of Sparta, trying to revive the original spirit of Lycurgus, but killed by the Spartan Ephori; then Cleomenes tries to do the same thing, but first executed the Ephori "and all others likely to throw obstacles in his way" and then put in place measures that would have brought new life to Sparta if it were not for the later invasion of the Macedonians.

16) "...that for the deaths of Remus and Tatius, Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed."

17) On founding things vs undoing things; founding an Empire versus causing an Empire to fail. 

18) On historians/commentators loving Caesar because they're corrupted: "Let him see also what praises they lavish upon Brutus, because being unable, out of respect for his power, to reproach Caesar, they magnify his enemy." One key takeaway here is you can use the hysteria of the media as a contraindicator of who actually is right and laudable.

19) Emperors need protection proportionate to their evil or incompetence. The five good emperors had no Praetorian cohorts, but Caligula and Nero needed tremendous personal defense cohorts.

20) Bad governments are succeeded to the throne by birth, good ones by adoption: "From the study this history we may also learn how a good government is to be established; for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth, except Titus, were bad, all were good who succeeded by adoption; as in the case of the five from Nerva to Marcus. But so soon as the empire fell once more to the heirs by birth, its ruin recommenced."

21) On the importance of religion in the maintenance of a civil society, on holding religion in reverence: "And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman history, how much religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the people, in keeping good men good, and putting bad men to shame; it disciplines the army, unites the people, keeps good men good and puts bad men to shame."

22) Numa: introduced religion to Rome, a step even more important than Romulus founding it. "The observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the greatness of a State, so their neglect is the occasion of its decline."

23) On the decay of the various regions of Italy because of the corruption of the Roman church in Machiavelli's day: "The church, therefore, never being powerful enough herself to take possession of the entire country, while, at the same time, preventing anyone else from doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under one head; and has been the cause of her always living subject to many princess or rulers, by whom she has been brought to such division and weakness as to have become a prey, not to barbarian kings only, but to any who have thought fit to attack her."

24) On not showing respect to auspices and augurs (e.g.; generalized respect to all religions and traditions).

25) On freedom: "should a people accustomed to live under a prince by any accident become free... we know from numberless instances recorded in ancient history, how hard it will be for it to maintain that freedom.... It is speedily brought back under the yoke, and often under a heavier yoke than that from which it has just freed its neck."

26) States garner more enemies by becoming free because the oligarchs want to return to the power that they drew from the prior tyranny and also regain their former importance. "I repeat, a State which has recently become free, is likely to have bitter enemies and no warm friends."

27) Why it is always necessary "to slay the sons of Brutus": see Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, who slew all nobles to satisfy the fury of the people. Of course he didn't give them their freedom.

28) You have to satisfy the "barely forty or fifty citizens [who] have any place in the direction of affairs; who, from their number being small, can be easily reckoned with" and then give everyone else general security so the people "soon begin to live happily and without anxiety." This is enough to basically control a populace.

29) On the near-impossibility of regaining freedom after living under tyranny: Rome was very lucky after the Tarquin monarchy, they weren't yet fully corrupted as they were at then end of the Julian tyranny. With city-states it's even less likely: freedom happened twice in Syracuse under Dion and Timoleon, the people gained freedom but lost it again as soon as each ruler died (see also Thebes under Epaminondas). Further, once the people are corrupted freedom is over forever (see the USA, which likely is irreversibly corrupted now).

30) Rome was so corrupted at the death of Caesar that Brutus, even backed by all the legions of the East, could not rouse a corrupt people to maintain their (brief) hold on freedom.

31) On the "unusual and very violent remedies" required to remove corruption.

32) Once a society becomes corrupted, magistrates begin being chosen not for their worth but for their influence, a process reached gradually. Political appointments given due to favor or political obedience rather than competence. See parallels here with the current incompetence of USA agencies and federal bureaucracies. 

33) "After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no kingdom can stand a second."

34) King David left a well run state to Solomon which could be sustained even though he was unskilled in the arts of war, but Solomon could not transmit this to his son Rehoboam, "who neither resembling his grandfather in valour, nor his father in good fortune, with difficulty made good his right to a sixth part of the kingdom."

35) The Horatii vs the Curiatii: instead of fighting a full war, the two peoples each sent their three best to fight three vs three, and thus Alba became subject to Rome. "We should never peril our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces."

36) On a tangent now with military strategy: on guarding defiles and passes, etc.

37) On the Romans trying Horatius (after the Horatii victory) for killing his sister, the wife of one of the Curiatii, finding him innocent, to their blame. "...no well-ordered republic should ever cancel the crimes of its citizens by their merits; but having established rewards for good actions and penalties for evil ones, and having rewarded a citizen for good conduct who afterwards commits a wrong, he should be chastised for that without regard to his previous merits."

38) On retaining a semblance of the old ways when reforming the institutions of a state. People are often touched more by appearances than by realities, and "novelty disturbs men's minds."

39) A new tyrant, however, has to make everything new: "like David when he became King, exalt the humble and depress the great." "... So that there shall be neither rank, nor condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor can refer to any but him [the new Prince]." See Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander. Also explains how the Soviets and the Chinese consolidated power as well in the 20th century. "These indeed are most cruel expedients."

40) "That men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad." On Giovanpagolo Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia, failing to kill/capture the Pope despite being a bad guy...this extra step was too much even for him, thus he could not be "wholly bad."

41) On greater cynicism of the Greek peoples, because their liberty had been taken away by elites multiple times, unlike in Rome. "A people which has recovered its freedom, bites more fiercely than one which has always preserved it."

42) On "temporizing" (waiting and not doing anything) when a threat arises against an institution or the state: if you take action, especially violent action, you induce a response from the threat itself, this may strengthen it (basically hormesis). Often it is better to just wait it out and let the threat go away. See for example Cosimo de Medici when Nicolo da Uzzano attempted to crush him and banish him from Florence, it merely caused him to gain more power.

43) On Rome creating a (temporary) dictatorship very early on in its Democratic era to deal with attacks from neighboring countries, how this was a good not a harm, and how centuries later it was wrongfully blamed for Caesar usurping the government. "It is not those Powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State." "Videat consul ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat." (Let the consul [dictator] take care that the republic may not suffer any harm.)

44) "Power may readily give titles, but not titles power."

45) The creation of the Decemvirate: the power was given to the ten by the people, but with no limits, no checks and no term period. This was the error. See for a contra-example the Spartans with their kings and the Venetians with their doges, both of whom were controlled by various checks.

46) More on the Decemvirate: Appius being two-faced and nominating himself as well as nine friends in his effort to install a tyranny in Rome. How easily men are corruptible, not merely Appius but also the people he bought with his favors.

47) On how an effective state must arm its own people: mercenaries are not worthwhile fighters.

48) "That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury and then to injure others."

49) See Florence in 1494 where the society was corrupt and in decay: people would claim they planned to "clean up the mess" but as soon as they rose into government and obtained power, they would alter their views and conduct, and perpetuate the system. Sounds sadly familiar...

50) Freedom as an almost impossible condition, highly unlikely for cities beginning in freedom, impossible in cities begun in subjection.

51) Some really good, pithy pieces of wisdom here: "What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem to be done by Choice."

52) Once the people want something, it is very difficult to persuade them otherwise, even if what the people want leads to ruin--such as desire for war, to attack someone irrationally, etc. See Rome rashly attacking Hannibal multiple times, see Greece wanting to attack Sicily despite the tremendous disadvantages. ("In Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that most grave and prudent statesman, Nicias, could not convince the people that the proposal to go and attack Sicily was disadvantageous; and the expedition being resolved on, contrary to his advice and to the wishes of the wiser among the citizens, resulted in the overthrow of the Athenian power.")

53) If 1500 century Italy is totally corrupted per Machiavelli, who are we to think that our era would be any less so?

54) On the fundamental weakness of individuals: "For often a people will be open mouthed in condemning the decrees of their prince, but afterwards, when they have to look punishment in the face, putting no trust in one another, they hasten to comply."

55) Likewise the fundamental weakness of a headless mob "once its first fury has somewhat abated"... "Each man sees that he has to return to his own house, all begin to lose heart and to take thought how to ensure their personal safety, whether by flight or by submission." A mob must be united and controlled by a head chosen "from among its own numbers."

56) Can you trust an alliance with a commonwealth or with a prince? Which is more stable and safer to count on? While a Commonwealth must move slower, therefore making it harder for it to resolve or break faith, thus a commonwealth is more to be trusted.

Book Two
[Book two discusses what the Romans did to spread their empire.]
57) Interesting discussion on why men condemn the present and commend the past, basically we look back on the past with not the whole truth, but with rose-colored glasses, a haze of positive memories, while the present tends to move us by fear or envy which are feelings that are canceled in the "past because the past can neither do us hurt nor afford occasion for envy." Great point here. 

58) Machiavelli himself asking whether he renders "excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans while I censure our own."

59) Was Roman fortune due to luck or valor? Luck from the standpoint of Plutarch and Livy, valor from the standpoint of Machiavelli. For Plutarch and Livy, Rome was lucky in that it never had to fight two great wars at the same time, they took on the Latins, the Samnites and the Etruscans one at a time; had any of these united Rome probably would have been vanquished... 

60) Some harsh (but valid) comments on Christianity in here "Accordingly, while the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity, bodily strength, and all those other qualities which make men brave, our religion [Christianity] places it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the things of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do." This has led people in Machiavelli's "modern" era towards enfeeblement, and caused them to tolerate worse treatment: "This manner of life, therefore, seems to have made the world feebler, and to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they please; since the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into Paradise, think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them." 

61) Rome being more open to immigration and intermarrying with non-Romans, contrasted with Lycurgus not allowing Spartans to intermarry or allow foreigners to become citizens. "Under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that state could never much increase." Of course the question in the (our) modern era is to what extent you permit immigration, not that you do or don't permit it at all. 

62) Why did the Etruscans totally disappear? See how Christianity nearly blotted out so many ancient beliefs, "burning the works of poets and historians; breaking images; and destroying whatsoever else afforded any traits of antiquity." Things replace and erase what was there before.

63) The Roman way of making war: low cost, and making their wars "as the French say, great and short." Also Consuls had 12-month terms so they were eager to bring wars to an end rapidly so "they might enjoy the honors of a triumph." Obtaining plunder, taking over new territory and planting colonies also enriched Rome.

64) Gaul became overpopulated so they sent people away under leaders to find new territory in Italy. Three separate Gallic invasions.

65) What led to war between the Romans and the Samnites? it was accidental: the Samnites were at war with the Campanians, who threw themselves under the protection of the Romans. Thus Rome ended up having to defend them against the Samnites. 

66) "Contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War" "...war is made with iron and not with gold, another coming with more iron might carry off his gold."

67) This work really meanders: from one section on money and how to fund an army, to how artillery works or doesn't work, to different types of behavior and personalities and governments etc.

68) How decadent countries, once conquered, infect the conquerors: they "avenge themselves on their conquerors without blood or blow."

69) Capua and how it was better ruled under Rome at a distance with some level of self-government; ultimately the Capuans asked Rome to send a praetor; had Rome wished to send one initially or had they imposed one unrequested, the Capuans would have resisted. "Men, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority over them, grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands."

70) "That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss." Pope Leo X going along with this advisors to wait until the French and Swiss fought over Italy and then attack the winner; this was a terrible idea from the start because usually the winner of any conflict doesn't lose that many men and thus remains strong after the conflict, in this case the French routed the Swiss.

71) How the Romans avoided half measures: see how they treated Latium, either incorporating cities into Roman privileges... or razing them to the ground, depending. "A subjugated people is either to be caressed or crushed."

72) Governments and rulers are maintained "by the attachment of their subjects and not by the strength of their fortifications."

73) Spartans not only abstained from building fortresses, they "would not even suffer their cities to be enclosed with walls; desiring to be protected by their own valor only, and by no other defense. So that when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens, he answered 'that they were fine walls if meant to hold women only.'"

74) Rome was divided and arguing amongst itself such that the Veientines attacked them, which simply caused the Romans to reunify... The better path would be "gaining the confidence of both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter so long as they do not come to blows; but when they resort to open violence, then to render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to plunge them deeper into hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their forces without being led by you're putting forth an excess of strength to suspect you of a desire to ruin them and remain their master." Now that is Machiavellian... in fact, that is precisely what we in the USA are doing to ourselves: exhausting ourselves in partisan rage while a two faction uniparty takes more and more authoritarian control... 

75) Also: "The city of Pistoja [Pistoia]... Was won over to the Florentine Republic by no other artifice than this. For the town being split by factions, the Florentines, by now favoring one side and now the other, without incurring the suspicions of either, brought both to such extremities that, wearied out with their harassed life, they threw themselves at last of their own accord into the arms of Florence."

76) Taunts, insults, and abuse "are weapons which wound those who use them."

77) On avoiding throwing away a victory in hopes of something still greater: see the Carthaginians after defeating the Romans at Cannae: they should have sued for peace from this position of strength but didn't, with terrible results. Likewise, Alexander the Great overran the entire Mideast with the exception of the city of Tyre, after 4 months of siege Alexander perceived he was wasting his time and offered terms, but the Tyrians, overconfident, not only refused the terms but put to death the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged by this, Alexander destroyed the city and made slaves of its inhabitants. In other words: quit while you're ahead.

78) "Fortune, doubtless, when she seeks to effect great ends, will often choose as her instrument a man of such sense and worth that he can recognize the opportunities which she holds out to him." Gotta be ready just in case. 

Book Three:
[Various "Machiavellian" ideas on statecraft, on revolution, on the nature of governments, etc.]

79) On returning a state or a commonwealth to its original form, getting back to its roots when it begins to decay or show corruption. See Rome after the original invasion of the Gauls. Likewise the same is true for religion, this is a bit of an argument for fundamentalism. For example: Catholicism brought back to its original condition by Saint Francis or Saint Dominic, a return to the voluntary poverty (and other aspects) of the Life of Christ.

80) On Brutus "feigning folly" so he could stay near Caesar and achieve his ultimate aim of recovering the freedom of Rome.

81) The idea of slaying the sons of Brutus: "That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the sons of Brutus... he who sets up as a tyrant and slays not Brutus, and he who creates a free government and slays not the sons of Brutus, can never maintain himself long." [ironically in Arthur Kessler's book Darkness at Noon the frontispiece contained this exact quote.]

82) "That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it: From what befell the elder Tarquin at the hands of the sons of Ancus, and Servius Tullius at the hands of Tarquin the Proud, we see what an arduous and perilous course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and yet suffer him to live on, hoping to conciliate him by benefits."

83) On learning to live content under whatever government Fortune has assigned you: quoting Cornelius Tacitus: "the past should have our reverence, the present our obedience, and that we should wish for good princes, but put up with any."

84) Conspiracies are attended by danger at three stages: before, during and after. (lol)

85) If you perform a conspiracy at the last minute with no advance warning you can eliminate the "before risk" (the "before risk" is that your plant will be found out by betrayal or loose lips): see how the Italians under Alasamenes rid themselves of Nabis the Spartan tyrant, among other examples. Never communicate the design of the plan until the moment when it is to be executed. "For I have heard it shrewdly said that to one man you may impart anything, since, unless you have been led to commit yourself by writing, your denial will go as far as his assertion."

86) On how certain revolutions or transitions of power are violent, while some are not: see the expulsion of the Tarquins in Rome, no one was banished save Tarquin himself, likewise the overthrow of the Medici in Florence in 1494, "no injury was done to any save themselves."

87) "A bad citizen cannot work grave mischief in a commonwealth which has not become corrupted." See Spurious Cassius, or Manlius Capitolinus.

88) "It is no less arduous and dangerous to attempt to free a people disposed to live in servitude, than to enslave a people who desire to live free." I suppose this is our problem in the modern era, we are disposed to live in servitude. 

89) "To enjoy constant food Fortune we must change with the times." See Fabius and his caution which helped him keep Hannibal at Bay, but then Scipio needed to be much more aggressive to pursue Hannibal to Africa.

90) "We cannot act in opposition to the bent of our nature.... When a man has been very successful while following a particular method, he can never be convinced that it is for his advantage to try some other. And hence it results that a man's Fortune's very because times change and he does not change with them." Heh just like investing styles: if you can't iterate your investing style you're going to have periods of atrocious underperformance. 

91) Using "necessity" to your advantage: Measuring the difficulty of your task by inferring how necessary it is for your opponent to defend it, like taking a city will only be as difficult as it is necessary for those in the city to maintain hold of it, the idea is to use their "necessity" to your advantage. Examples might be "burning the ships" thus making it so that your soldiers have only one option, etc. More importantly, you want to leave your defenders with options because if you leave them only extremities/extreme options (e.g.: fight or die) you will render them stubborn. Thus you'll want to promise them pardon, give them an avenue for retreat, etc. Great insights here. 

92) Vectius Mescius of the Volskians to his soldiers when surrounded by the Romans: "...and necessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives us the advantage."

93) Likewise: "Camillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman commanders, when he had got within the town of Veii with his army, to make it surrender easier and not to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out to his men, so that the Veientines might hear, to spare all whom they found unarmed. Whereupon the defenders throwing away their weapons, the town was taken almost without bloodshed. And this device was afterwards followed by many other captains."

94) On Hannibal, using harshness and cruelty with his army, versus Scipio who was known for a generous temper. Scipio conducted his successful campaign in Spain with generous and humane conduct, while Hannibal conducted his successful campaign in Italy with violence and rapine, yet both achieved the same results.

95) Likewise contrasting Manlius T and Valerius Corvinus: one severe, the other gentle, but with both achieving the same success against the enemy, "though the commands of Manlius were of such severity that any order of excessive rigor came to be spoken of as a Manlian order."

96) Livius, on Valerius: "meeting victory or defeat with an unruffled temper and an unchanged countenance." 

97) Why Camillus was banished from Rome: appearing haughty and not giving up spoils to his men. 

98) Extending the term of military command causes captains to gain "so much influence and ascendancy over their soldiers that in time they came to hold the Senate of no account, and looked only to him." This drove the beginnings of the ruin of Roman democracy, and it is what ultimately "enabled Caesar to overthrow the liberties of his country."

99) On the poverty of Cincinnatus: Cincinnatus plowing in his small 4-acre field when messengers sent by the Senate told him he had been made dictator. On the voluntary modesty, even poverty, of these men and "their contentment under it." "We have to remark on the magnanimity of these citizens, who when placed at the head of armies surpassed all princes in the loftiness of their spirit, who cared neither for king nor for commonwealth, and whom nothing could daunt or dismay; but who, on returning to private life, became once more so humble, so frugal, so careful of their slender means, and so submissive to the magistrates and reverential to their superiors, that it might seem impossible for the human mind to undergo so violent a change."

100) See also Paulus Emilius, "while enriching Rome by his triumphs, himself remained poor. And yet so greatly was poverty still esteemed at this time, that when Paulus, and conferring rewards on those who had behaved well in the war, presented his own son-in-law with a silver cup, it was the first vessel of silver ever seen in his house." (!!!)

101) "For the weakness of the present race of men (the result of their enfeebling education and their ignorance of affairs), makes them regard the methods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly impracticable. Accordingly, they have their own newfangled ways of looking at things, holy at variance with the true." 
--Machiavelli, ca. 1517

102) "My courage came not with my dictatorship nor went with my exile." 
--Camillus, per Livy

103) "A great man is constantly the same through all the vicissitudes of Fortune; so that although she change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains unchanged, and retains always a mind so unmoved, and in such complete accordance with his nature as declares to all that over him Fortune has no dominion."

104) "The Romans, as they lost not heart on defeat, so waxed not insolent with success." Machiavelli contrasts them with the Venetians who "came to dream of founding an empire like the Roman."

105) On "making peace impossible": leaders who fear that punishment might fall on their heads incite the multitude to take up arms to protect them from that punishment. [You can certainly see this in the behavior of global leaders after the COVID malfeasance was exposed.] See for example Spendio and Mato, who were leading a mutiny against the Carthaginian army, but who then tortured and executed Hasdrubal who was sent to mediate with them, thus all of the mutineers collectively were doomed to permanent hostility with the Carthaginian leadership. Otherwise Spendio and Mato would have experienced their punishment alone.

106) A well-disciplined, high-functioning soldiery must know one another, "These conditions are only to be found united in soldiers born and bred in the same country." Again, can a multi-ethnic empire really survive in the long term?

107) Asymmetry: On avoiding suggesting some grand plan or major change that, if it didn't work out, you would be get all the downside for its failure. In Rome they would banish citizens who promoted various measures that turned out badly. Instead, avoid this danger by giving advice discreetly, and do not not identify yourself with the measure you would see carried out. Support it "temperately and modestly, so that if the prince or city follow it, they shall do so of their own good-will, and not seem to be dragged into it by your importunity." "For your danger lies in many having opposed to you, who afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine to ruin you."

108) Also if "your advice has not been taken, should other councils prevail and mischief come of them, your credit will be vastly enhanced."

109) You also can't wait until after to explain all the mistakes that your prince, or organization made! See Perseus the Macedonian King who, when defeated, was told by one of his subjects all of the things that he had done wrong, "whereupon Perseus turning upon him said, 'Traitor, hast thou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things?' and so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such was the penalty incurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken, and who spoke when he should have been silent."

110) "For whether the means be honorable or ignominious, all is well done that is done for the defense of our country."
-- Lucius Lentulus, after Rome's defeat by the Samnites

111) "The wise are wont to say, and not without reason or at random, that he who would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has been; since all human events, whether present or to come, have their exact counterpart in the past."

112) "That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind." It might be a trap. 

113) Re modern mass immigration: "From the readiness wherewith the Romans conferred the right of citizenship on foreigners, there came to be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed so large a share of the suffrage, that the government itself began to alter, forsaking those courses which it was accustomed to follow, and growing estranged from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance." Quintess Fabius, while Censor, caused all those new citizens to be classed in four tribes, reducing their power and limiting any violent change to the Republic, thereby Fabius gained "the well-deserved name of Maximus."

To Read: 
Sallust: Catiline's war; The Jugurthine war; Histories
Machiavelli: Treatise on Princedoms
Xenophon: The Complete Works
Herodian: History of the Empire

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