When we study history, we often see clear analogies from one era to another. This book is such an exercise in analogy: it is an analysis of the post-Napoleonic world order used as a specific study tool to grapple with the post-World War I world order.
Today's readers can use this book as analogy too, to better understand events in our day. It's excruciatingly obvious that the leadership throughout the entire West is profoundly ignorant of history. And if it's true that those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it, then those of us who do know our history--and can see various analogies and parallels to the past--may well figure out what's going to happen well before they do.
I'll explore a few of these analogies in this essay. One immediately visible example is the various interlocking suzerainty/vassalage arrangements in place in any given geopolitical landscape, and how rapidly they can shift when there's a disruption among the dominant states. For smaller nation-states, the choice of suzerain can be existential. When things started going downhill for Napoleon, minor states all across Europe had to re-choose sides. The vassal/suzerain choice also runs the other way around: see for example how after Napoleon's final defeat, Russia--in an oddly familiar move--wanted to create a newly independent Poland as a buffer state against Western European aggression.
We can analogize the suzerainty/vassalage dynamics of prior eras to today's Middle East. See, for example, how Saudi Arabia suddenly "flipped" as they realized a direct peace treaty with Iran serves them far better than phony assurances that the USA will defend them--when it clearly won't and likely can't. Imagine: the anchor tenant of the old petrodollar world order switched to a different team! Of course, the world's most disturbing suzerain/vassalage arrangement might be the inverted, codependent-abusee relationship between the USA and Israel, where the top (the USA) is actually the bottom; the apparent vassal state (Israel), is actually the suzerain.[1]
Another parallel, depressingly characteristic of all eras, is how statesmen and elites care absolutely nothing for the peoples of the various states they direct. Just as we saw arbitrary and even bizarre divisions of territory in the post-Napoleonic era, we saw the same exact thing with the new world orders arranged after WWI and WWII. See for example the hilarious straight-line borders drawn all across the Middle East as France and England sliced up the post-WWI Ottoman Empire like a pie. Or see after WWII, where it meant everything--literally everything--to you and your family if you happened to be in this or that part of Korea, or this or that zone in Germany... but in reality, you and your land were just chits on your elites' negotiating table.
The same was true for the statesman of the Quadruple Alliance, who divided up Europe with a similar level of concern and care for the people involved. Our man Charles Kingsley Webster once again uses his pen like a railgun, describing for example how "the populations of Germany were transferred from one monarch to another, with scarcely the slightest reference to their wishes." One can't help but think of the same analogy today in places like Lebanon, or Ukraine.
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All of this brings us to questions of sovereignty, a topic this blog returns to frequently. In order to maximize your country's sovereignty, you have to be able to leave an alliance that's contrary to your country's safety. You have to make sure your national sovereignty isn't fragile to some warmongering dictator in Berlin, Paris, Washington, DC, ...or Jerusalem. It really gets you thinking about who is allied with whom in the modern era, and whether that alliance will end up being an asset or a catastrophic liability.
A final irony: Webster's goal with this book was to make sure the "peace architects" of his own day knew about all the mistakes made in the post-Napoleonic era. An optimist, he hoped his elites would avoid repeating them. His work was largely ignored then, and it is largely ignored now. Our leaders do not know their history.
Footnote:
[1] I've been scouring my own limited historical knowledge for an analogy for this strange Israel/USA arrangement: perhaps the relationship between Genoa and the Byzantine Empire in the 13th and 14th centuries fits here. It did not go well for the Byzantines.
[Readers, what follows are my notes and quotes from the text: I include them to help me better remember what I read. Feel free to skim or skip.]
Notes:
Introduction by P.A. Reynolds:
10ff Short, admiring bio of Webster, then a discussion of this work and how it came to be, and how it was meant as a sort of warning of the various procedural mistakes made at the Vienna peace conference that Webster wanted shared with the statesmen and diplomats negotiating the 1919 Treaty of Paris. Ironically, it had little effect on the conference itself.
11ff "His prime concern was with the procedures and mechanisms by which these problems were to be discussed and settled." Later, Webster wrote "the methods by which we try to attain our ends are second in importance only to the ends themselves." Reynolds here (writing in 1962) comments on how skillfully the Soviets "have used procedural devices to advance their purposes." Finally, comments on how a discussion of methods and procedures of the Congress of Vienna ought to be a "dull" subject but Webster somehow succeeds in infusing "a sense of high drama." [I'm not sure I'd call it high drama but he makes it far more interesting than you'd expect.]
Preface:
13ff Reference here to the World War I peace conference: "It is a surprising but none the less authentic fact that there is no standard history of the Congress of Vienna. We thus stand on the threshold of a new Congress without any adequate account of the only assembly which can furnish even a shadowy precedent for the great task that lies before the statesman and peoples of the world... So far, indeed, as any precedents are provided by this period of history, they may probably be considered useful rather as warnings than as examples; and the book will have served its purpose if it draws attention to some errors of statesmanship, which we may hope will be avoided at the present day."
Preface to the Second Edition of 1934:
15 Cute comment here indicating the moral aesthetics of the author: "This little book has long been out of print and secondhand copies have been sold for absurd prices... I am therefore grateful to H.M. Stationery Office for permission to reprint it." Also note these self-effacing comments about how this document was used, saying it produced little effect "except on the waste-paper baskets"; and then a bit of a withering comment about President Wilson, as Wilson was responding to a delegate who had referred to the Congress of Vienna. Wilson replied, "The present enterprise was very different from that undertaken at Vienna a century ago, and he hoped that even by reference no odour of Vienna would again be brought into their proceedings." The author then says "Nor so far as I know was any introduced--by reference." [Meaning (probably) that nobody actually read this work!]
Chronological Table
16ff See photos below, this is a useful timeline:
Introduction:
19ff "The object of the present paper is to describe in some detail the course of the negotiations in the years 1814 and 1815, and specially to show the motives which determined the policy of British statesman during the period and the methods by which they tried to obtain their ends. During these years, by a series of treaties concluded at Paris and Vienna, the frontiers of almost every country in Europe were to be redrawn, and the overseas possessions of the Continental Powers were to be reallotted on a new basis. The military despotism of Napoleon had completely transformed Europe while the French, Dutch, and Danish colonies had been conquered by Great Britain. The destruction of the Napoleonic empire, therefore, necessitated both the construction of a new Europe and a new distribution of colonial power; the parallel between the problems of that age and those of the present day is in some respects an exceedingly close one."
Part One: The Preparation of the Congress
21ff Comments on the situation of Europe in late 1813, where essentially all of Europe had united against Napoleon--and not just governments, but also now the peoples of Europe: see for example how the people of Spain, Russia and Germany had arisen against Napoleon, and Napoleon's entire empire "had been dissolved in the course of a single year." Also the disaster of 1812 in Russia led to Prussia and then Austria joining forces against Napoleon. The problem here was the Allies were not in agreement about how to deal with the various problems raised by Napoleon's defeat. Also comments on how the "three great Continental powers" [by this he means Russia Austria and Prussia I assume?] were all autocratic monarchies, where policy was decided mainly by one man.
22ff Comments here on Tsar Alexander I: he believed himself to be an instrument of God, he was of great intelligence "with a keen eye for the interests of his country." One of Alexander's key interests was creating a united, pseudo-autonomous Kingdom of Poland over which Russia would rule. Poland was to be created out of the Duchy of Warsaw, an entity that Napoleon more or less formed from the Prussian and Austrian shares of divided Polish territory. Alexander also had the support of the Polish nobility. Interesting comment here about how almost of the men Alexander turned to for advice on affairs of state were of non-Russian blood. Also a foreshadowing mention here of Nesselrode, the Germanic foreign secretary of Russia who later became a channel that [Austria's] Metternich and [England's] Castlereagh used to thwart the wishes of the Tsar.
24ff Now on to Metternich, of the Austrian Empire, and the second most important figure of the Alliance, he was increasingly alarmed at Alexander's plans and wanted to figure out a way to keep him in check. The author calls him "a timid statesman, though fertile in diplomatic expedients, he was an opportunist pure and simple." He was concerned about Russian designs on Poland as much as he was concerned about Prussian designs on Saxony, but he considered Alexander's goals the more dangerous of the two. His plan was to try and build up an alliance against him, in part by detaching Prussia and other German states from Russian influence; Metternich also recognized that Great Britain and her influence "would determine the character of the settlement." The author essentially describes Metternich as in control of Austrian policy as his emperor, Francis II, let Metternich "act as he thought fit."
25 Then on to Prussian policy, directed by Chancellor Hardenberg under the King of Prussia, Frederick William III. Frederick William was "weak and sensitive" and "devoted to [Russia's] Alexander" while "his generals had views and objects of their own." Note that Hardenburg came under the influence of Metternich and later of Castlereagh.
25-6 [Fascinating long quote here on all of the minor states in Europe, and their various positions and situations. It's interesting to see all the various interlocking suzerainty/vassalage arrangements in those days and how rapidly they can shift when there's a disruption among the main dominant powers. It's also interesting to compare this dynamic to the today's Middle East, and watch, as an example, Saudi Arabia suddenly discover that they need to stop depending on the US to defend them (when it can't and won't anyway), and thus default to a direct peace treaty with Iran, in total contravention of the prior petrodollar arrangement! And then of course some countries are absolutely delusional: see for example Spain during the post Napoleonic era, hallucinating that it would have any real power after all this was settled out... while at the very same time she was losing all of her New World colonies to independence movements.] "Of the minor powers, Sweden was now ruled by the French Marshal Bernadotte, who obtained notoriety by his designs on the French throne, which were supported by Alexander. Denmark had suffered like Saxony, though not in the same degree, for her support of Napoleon. Hanover was represented by Count Munster, who was the trusted confidant, not only of the Prince Regent of England, but also of Castlereagh. But, though a skilled and shrewd observer, he did not contribute very much to decisions except those affecting the interior politics of Germany. Bavaria, who changed sides in the nick of time, Baden, and Wurttemberg hoped to gain as much from the destruction of French power in Germany as they had obtained by their subservience to Napoleon. Holland was controlled by British policy. Spain, with her colonies in open revolt, and impotent outside the Peninsula, was too proud to admit her weakness, and hope to re-establish her influence in Italy. Portugal, whose Court was in Brazil, depended, like Holland, on Great Britain. Sardinia-Piedmont had a policy of its own; but Sicily was, at this date, controlled by Great Britain. The minor States, both of Germany and Italy, were, in fact, pawns at the disposition of the Great Powers. The Pope had only just recovered his personal liberty, and had lost practically all influence. The Sultan also had been, to a great extent, outside the orbit of European affairs since the Peace of Bucharest (1812) with Russia. All the minor States knew that the Great Powers could do what they liked with the Napoleonic empire if only they remained united. But, as has already been indicated, the Great Powers were far from being united."
26ff Discussion here of all the various disputed territories all over the continent; on the wide range of treaties signed between different nations, many made purposely vague: see for example the treaty of Kalisch in 1813 between Prussia and Russia, where Russia had guaranteed by a secret article to restore Prussia to its political position prior to 1806, while at the same time Russia intended to retain all of Prussian Poland. A few other treaties were signed between various entities reconstructing Austria and Prussia to their possessions in 1805, but dissolving the Confederation of the Rhine and Napoleon's other state creations; also Hanover was to be "restored," the duchy of Warsaw would be created, and then Austria would recover her provinces on the Adriatic Sea. The only country that really got what it wanted was Sweden, which got the promise of Norway via an agreement with Russia and Great Britain signed in a subsidiary treaty a year later in 1813. But basically all the rest of Europe was still in dispute.
28-29 Comments here on the policy of the British government and the character and aims of Castlereagh: on England essentially being ignored at first, as the various continental polities drew up treaties and then later would "inform" British representatives what had been done. On the Earl of Aberdeen, England's ambassador to Austria, directing things for England here, and how he was not taken particularly seriously; also on England's interests in Spain, Sicily and even in nearby Netherlands/Belgium were kind of up in the air at this point. "At the end of 1813, the Alliance appeared to be dissolving into fragments. It had neither military nor diplomatic unity. It had neither decided to overthrow Napoleon nor devised any method either of obtaining peace or of prosecuting war." The author claims here that it was Lord Castlereagh who "created the machinery" that bound the Allies closer together so that they could act in unison against Napoleon.
29ff "The character and achievements of Castlereagh, Foreign Minister since 1812, were long misunderstood, owing to party prejudice and the lack of scientific research. More recently justice has been done to his career by historians, as the Foreign Office papers have been more closely studied... For courage and common sense he has rarely been equalled among British diplomatists." Also note this comment: he became "one of the least insular of British Foreign Ministers." "...he was hated and despised by the growing liberal forces in England." "Throughout his career he found little support in his Cabinet. The Tory Ministry of Liverpool contained few men of much intelligence; and they knew little, and cared less, about the affairs of Europe."
32 Comments here on how Castlereagh wanted Napoleon dethroned and wanted France confined within her ancient geographical limits, and specifically saying that Antwerp should not be left in French hands. [Note here that Belgium revolted from the Netherlands in 1830]. Finally on the problems of diplomacy among the various powers becoming significant enough that Castlereagh himself had to go to the continent, carrying his policy largely to "a successful conclusion during the next two years."
33ff On the memorandum of December 26th, 1813, a document written by Castlereagh with instructions for his policy goals. The first step was undoing Aberdeen's mistake to put British maritime rights on the negotiating table; first England got Austria, Prussia and Russia to agree to not discuss at all British Maritime rights during these negotiations: "Aberdeen's negligence at Frankfurt thus being repaired." Note that at this very moment England was actually at war with the United States because of disputes over maritime rights doctrine.
34ff England was prepared to cede a large portion of the French, Dutch and Danish colonies which she held, but if anything negatively impacted main British policy goals these conquests would be retained as a security against the goal of controlling French power, and specifically to exclude France from Antwerp Spain and Portugal. In return Britain was prepared to negotiate over all her conquests from France (with certain exceptions, like Malta, Mauritius, The Bourbon Isles, Guadalupe, etc). Also note regarding Holland, England wanted to establish a dynastic connection with Holland by having the Prince of Orange marry Princess Charlotte of Wales. England also was willing to sign a peace treaty with the United States, but separately from any points in dispute in Europe. England also supported the restoration of the ancient states of Italy; finally England wanted to continue a collective alliance against France even after peace had been made. "This project was the origin of the Quadruple Alliance" created to protect against French aggression in the future.
36ff On some of the unstated goals of England, like the dethronement of Napoleon and the geographical confinement of France to her "ancient limits," but these were not a priori goals, and Castlereagh knew that he couldn't write these out publicly as definite "instructions" from the beginning. Finally some comments here on various disputes over Poland and Saxony between Austria and Russia, and Castlereagh's need to devote as much of his attention to those disputes as he did to any of the various disputes with the actual "enemy," France. "It was [Castlereagh's] opinion that a lasting peace could only be obtained if a real balance of power were established in Europe; and he was afraid that the plans of [Tsar] Alexander might make this impossible."
37ff On the "first conferences" at Bâle and Langres: on various arguments where Austria and Germany were upset with Alexander's "intrigues" with Jean Bernadotte's pretensions to the throne of France [Bernadotte was a French Marshal who ended up being elected/adopted King of Sweden], Austria was prepared to renounce any dynastic connection with Napoleon in favor of the Bourbons, but there was no way they would let a different French general be placed on the throne of France, especially with Alexander's help. Also on a decision here to exclude Napoleon from settling the future balance of Europe and the disposition of territory conquered from France; Alexander even wanted to refuse Napoleon all information on the subject but the English thought this was too great an insult to French pride [the English may dislike the French but they at least are capable of understanding them...]. These various disputes had in aggregate a second-order effect: it meant that the Allies had to sort out their own disagreements over territory first, so they could then present a complete scheme to France. But at this time "none of the Powers realised that the problems before them were so complex that they would take eighteen months to solve."
40ff At this point Metternich and Castlereagh had established "harmonious relations": Metternich "was completely won over" by Castlereagh [if this author's turns of phrase here are in any way deliberate he would probably be a great guy to enjoy a beer with], and was ready to continue his war against Napoleon. "He also flattered himself that Castlereagh had fallen under his influence. In this, however, he was mistaken." There's a footnote here where Castlereagh himself writes back to Prime Minister Liverpool that Metternich "is constitutionally temporising; he is charged with more faults than belong to him, but he has his full share..." Then these Castelreagh and Metternich proceed to thresh out the details with Alexander I at Langres. Also Alexander wanted to continue to militarily press on to Paris at all costs, but everyone else felt "it was better to get a good peace while they could" because complete military victory over Napoleon was not certain at this point. The four powers made a written agreement, the Langres Protocol, saying basically that military operations would continue under [Austrian field marshall Karl Philipp] Schwartzenberg as he saw fit, that France would be limited to her ancient limits, along with a specific mention here of the restoration of Holland, which was a key element of Castlereagh's goals.
43ff The Châtillon Conference: at this conference "Napoleon was represented by the sincere and devoted Caulaincourt, whose eager desire for peace stands out in marked contrast to the cynical attitude of the Allied plenipotentiaries. But his master never yielded entirely to the entreaties of his Minister; and thus the exact course of the negotiations need not be entered into, since for the most part the conferences were without real substance. This Conference, however, provides an interesting precedent for a Peace Conference sitting while hostilities are still proceeding. The disposition of one side or the other to compromise depended to a great extent on the position in the field." [We see quite a lot of similar changes in disposition going on in the Ukraine-Russia conflict as well as the Iran-Epstein Alliance conflict: movement on the battlefield drives intransigence at the negotiation table.] At this point Napoleon had had some victories in February, then some setbacks in March, but either way "he could not bring himself to sign a peace which would leave France smaller than he found it."
44ff On the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont, on March 9th, 1814; but then negotiations were broken off as Napoleon produced a new crisis with his battlefield successes [which? I think the author is likely referring to battles on February 8th-10th over Prussian field marshall Blücher, and then further victories on February 17th 18th and 21st against Schwarzenberg: see page 47 where he belatedly fills in the needed context]; the Allies could not agree among themselves on questions over Germany and Italy, at the same time Alexander still thought that he could March his armies all the way to Paris and place a government in France himself [this would probably end up looking just like Napoleon's 1812 error made exactly in reverse...], despite Castlereagh arguing the impossibility of it. Negotiations essentially broke off with France, leaving Castlereagh with the task of trying to keep the Alliance together.
48ff Comments here on Schwartzenberg--with the agreement of Alexander and the King of Prussia--wanting to ask for an armistice rather than risk a decisive battle against Napoleon. This was on February 18th right in the middle of the Alliance's military setbacks against Napoleon. Castlereagh made an indignant protest to Metternich after learning about it, also Castlereagh was running out of patience dealing with various recriminations between Austria and Russia at this point, as Austria was eager for peace and Alexander felt the Austrians had betrayed him, while each believed the other was trying to keep its army intact to influence "the division of the spoils." [The best war to fight is one where you fight the other country to the last man, not your country. This might be why proxy wars are so popular these days...] Ultimately Castlereagh managed to strengthen the Alliance's military position and show the Allies that Great Britain held the key to peace: "He told the Allies that Great Britain would never restor her [colonial] conquests [recall this was the key bargaining chip that Britain held over everybody, see p. 34 above] unless she got a peace on the Continent such as she desired." This managed to reconstruct the alliance.
50ff On the treaty of Chaumont and the construction of the Quadruple Alliance: on March 9th, 1814, this treaty was signed and the four powers agreed "to continue the war until their objects were attained" which were defined in secret articles: a confederated Germany, an independent Switzerland and Italy comprised of separate independent states, a free Spain under the Bourbons, and an enlarged Holland where the Prince of Orange would be sovereign. [There we go again with "secret articles"! It makes you wonder what are the various secret articles accompanying all the other treaties one's country is party to.] And then a final point that Castlereagh had secured: the alliance was to continue for 20 years after the war ceased, thus protecting the signees against any attempts by France to upset these peace terms. "This was the origin of the Quadruple Alliance which was to dominate European politics for thirty years and far outlast its purpose." Its object was "the balance of power" and this idea persisted throughout the entire settlement process. The author describes it "to be a League of Nations against France, to which all Powers, great and small, could look for protection. This device, invented by Castlereagh himself, and forced by him on the allies, is perhaps his greatest achievement and title to fame."
52ff The problem of Napoleon's conquered territories: even though the boundaries of France had been largely determined, there was nothing done yet in settling the various competing claims of the three Continental Powers. On the agreement to have a Congress in Vienna to settle these issues, partly because Vienna was centrally located. A key side deal here was a verbal agreement between Metternich and Hardenberg that Austria would agree to Prussia's claims on Saxony if Prussia would unite with Austria to defeat Alexander's plans for the creation of a Polish Kingdom. Comments here on Castlereagh's distrust of Russia which he "inherited from Pitt" [the author doesn't say this--likely because it would be self-evident to any half-awake statesman of his day--but this is a reference to William Pitt the Younger, who was Prime Minister for an extended period beginning in 1783], This caused Castlereagh made this agreement the foundation of his diplomacy as well: he wanted also Prussia to be a strong and united state that would provide "territorial equilibrium" and also to keep Russia as far as possible from Central Europe. The problem was Alexander "regarded the creation of a Kingdom of Poland as already settled." Also Alexander had promised Alsace to Austria if they would give him the whole of Galicia [whch was in southeastern Poland, but now I think is part of Ukraine].
55ff On the question of whether Napoleon would remain on the throne, and if not, who would succeed him: Castlereagh as well as the French cabinet wished for the Bourbons to return to power, but the French people had no clear will of their own to dethrone Bonaparte or welcome back their old monarchy.
56 Interesting to see this quote: "By now Bordeaux had proclaimed its adhesion to the Bourbons." [I had no idea that there was this kind of factionalism in the various regions of France that recently. Many of the nation states we have today really are cobbled together from very diverse regions that probably never wanted to get sucked into dependency to a centralized power structure. I guess I can add France to my working (and lengthening) list of examples of countries (including Spain, Germany, Italy, the UK, the former Yugoslavia, the USA, Canada, the USSR, etc.) all of which are countries more or less "unified by force" over and against the various wills of their peoples.]
57ff Now "at the final stage of the fight with Napoleon" as "under the energetic leadership of Castlereagh the Coalition had survived, and even profited from, a period of defeat." The Allies sent a manifesto to the French nation on March 25th, then five days later the Allies were at the gates of Paris with Napoleon's generals defected. Then Russia's Alexander, accompanied by Prussia's Frederick William, entered Paris as a conqueror, while Castlereagh, Metternich and Austrian emperor Francis II remained in Dijon. "Francis II was not eager to appear as conqueror in the capital of his son-in-law." [!!!] Also note here that Nesselrode, Alexander's advisor/representative was all along in contact with France's Talleyrand, ready to check any move of Bernadotte or the Bonapartists; note also the footnote here that Talleyrand "planned the whole matter and convinced Alexander" that the Bourbons were active and that Alexander had no alternative but to bring back the Bourbons to the French throne--even though Alexander detested them.
58-9 Comments here on how Castlereagh stayed out of Paris at this point; he didn't want to take a prominent role in the proclamation of the Bourbons and he also didn't want to be party to the treaty of Fontainebleau which exiled Napoleon to Elba, in part because he didn't want to give any opportunities for criticism to the opposition party in the British Parliament back home, also it is plausible that he saw things would play out this way anyway so he didn't need to be directly involved. Also note this quote where Castlereagh talks about how Paris was "a bad place for business," meaning all the dinners and parties and fêtes distracted the sovereigns and their ministers "from more serious work." Comments here also on Talleyrand wanting to obtain as much prestige as possible from the treating negotiations "both for himself and the restored monarchy."
60-61 Comments here on disputes over the abolishment of the slave trade: England wanted France to also abolish the slave trade [note, this is the slave trade, not slavery, a rather important difference] after the British colonies already had done so, but the French position here was now that England already had stocked all of her colonies with slave labor, she thus wanted to prevent other powers from doing the same. [Again, this was never about abolishing slavery per se, just the capture, transport and sale of slaves.] Eventually France agreed to abolish the trade after a five-year delay.
61ff All of this wrangling still didn't settle the "conquered territories problem" which still divided the Allies; a key issue here was a deadlock over the Polish question and what Poland's boundaries would be: how much of its territory would go to Austria, how much to Prussia, and how much of it would remain part of an independent Poland that would be more or less under Russia's control indirectly. Also a dispute over the Mainz territory between Prussia and Austria. [You can see why Russia did what it did in the final stages of World War II, they wanted de facto control of a huge amount of territory between their border and Germany. They didn't want "pretend control" or some kind of "we can maybe agree to this later" kind of pseudo-control that could be revoked.]
63ff Ultimately the Peace of Paris only settled a small portion of the disputes; basically it only settled the incorporations of the Low Countries into Holland, the restoration of the King of Sardinia to Piedmont which would then incorporate Genoa as a free port, and then it settled the division of territories on the left of the Rhine, which would go to Holland, Prussia and the German States. Plus there was "an agreement to have a later agreement" by sending representatives to Vienna for a General Congress... to settle the arrangements that were yet to be settled. Once again also there was yet another secret article in this treaty where France agreed that the disposition of her territories would be dealt with at this future Congress by the Allied Powers "amongst themselves" [meaning here not among any of the various other minor states of Europe who were party to the Peace of Paris treaty, like Portugal, Sweden or Spain]. This Peace of Paris treaty was really just a stage in transactions leading up to the future Congress in Vienna.
65ff Next were preliminary discussions held in London with Russia, Prussia and Austria. The author argues that Alexander really blew it here by antagonizing the English political establishment: he sent his sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, ahead of him and "she flouted all social conventions, and, what was even worse, cultivated the Whigs rather than the Tories." The author surmises that Alexander thought he would win better support for his plans for Poland by striking up an alliance with England's opposition party, as he thought the Tories would not remain long in power. "If these were his motives, never was a greater political mistake committed." The Tories ended up remaining in power for the rest of Alexander's lifetime and "the effects of this visit were never eradicated." [It would be interesting to go back and revisit The Genesis of Russophobia in England to review its comments on this, in particular Chapter 3.] Metternich was more savvy, he never interacted with the opposition at all. Also note that Alexander realized that the Vienna Congress was going to last longer than expected, and so he wanted to go back to Russia first, but he only announced this after he was already on his way back to the continent, and this forced everybody else to postpone the whole thing until September.
67 "The four Powers were also now faced with the fact that they had to meet Congress without having obtained a decision on the principal points in dispute." [Already things are off on the bad foot.]
68 Note the comment here about a secret meeting of the ministers of the four Powers before the Vienna Congress to determine a sort of roadmap for the conference; there's an interesting footnote here about how these protocols were unpublished, and these "hitherto unpublished" records were the only direct evidence that these meetings even happened; the author thinks that these meetings were mainly informal. [But it makes good sense to have a secret meeting ahead of the actual meeting to make sure that the meeting goes the way you want it to go: anyone who's ever been to a few HOA meetings quickly figures this out.]
70ff Mention here of [France's] Talleyrand and his instructions for the Congress: "a brilliant and deservedly famous document" that sought to base the settlement of Europe on the principle of legitimacy; Talleyrand was well aware that France could be a possible ally with any of the great powers, although it turned out that he had looked to England first, with the idea that France and England should act together at Vienna "as the only two disinterested powers." England saw the advantages of Talleyrand's support as well, and France also offered its full support to the Polish question, and even allowed Castlereagh to be the agent to express the French government's views until Talleyrand's arrival. "The special influence which he [Castlereagh] had thus acquired he was to use with advantage at the Congress in the course of the next few months.
Part Two: The Organization of the Congress of Vienna
73ff On the problems and personalities of the Congress; on the notion that the citizens of the various countries involved had a much different idea of this Congress than the statesmen actually running it: "They had vague historical recollections which carry them back to the treaties of Westphalia" thinking this would be some sort of body which would settled off the principles of justice after twenty years of war. The various "dispossessed princes and potentates" across Europe wanted to restore their stolen rights, while various governments of smaller states wanted to win over "long-coveted cities and counties." "But the peoples as a whole expected something more." Comments here on the Germans, whose nationality had been awakened by the struggle against Napoleon; on a similar phenomenon in Italy; in England the people were hoping for the abolition of the slave trade; in general there was sort of a hope that there would be some means to prevent the recurrence of the evils of the past generation. "It has been seen how little the statesman who were directing the affairs of Europe were occupied with these matters." [Ouch, but generally in situations like this cynicism sadly tends to be more predictive than optimism...]
74 More cynicism: lots of statesman from all kinds of countries of all sizes came to Vienna thinking they might have their vague aspirations satisfied, but there was "no machinery by which they could be made into a coherent body. No appreciable difference would have been made in the final settlement at Vienna if the large majority of the plenipotentiaries had never appeared there at all. They merely acted as a picturesque and expensive background to the real Congress of Vienna."
74ff The author will go into the various results of the Congress, but he gives a brief summary here "in order to render what follows more intelligible." The primary example here is the fact that Poland and Germany, and all the territorial changes to be made for both of these nations--affecting some 32 million inhabitants--were not even mentioned in the wording of any of the treaties. Also the settlements over Poland, Saxony and Germany were contingent on each other. And this didn't even count all the other issues, like a newconstitution for Germany and Switzerland, issues of the slave trade, international river navigation agreements, plus various other territories that were still in dispute. [Then again, honestly, how could you manage to even hash any of this out in a public forum? Perhaps it has to be done in a back room.]
76ff Long discussion here of all the various staff and assistants that each of the governments brought; on who represented each of the various countries and powers there; even the Pope had a representative; and even representatives of the order of St. John [Rulers of Malta before this conflict] were there, still with "hopes of compensation for Malta."
79ff On Talleyrand immediately thwarting some of the efforts of the four Powers to take over much of the decision making; he also leaked certain verbal discussions as well; he wanted to add more members to the underlying power structure.
87-8 For all of Talleyrand's wranglings, he didn't really accomplish much at this point: "...the real business of the Congress was already being carried on in informal meetings of the Ministers of the four Powers and private correspondence between them and Alexander; from these momentous discussions Talleyrand was entirely excluded."
89ff Yet another postponement was agreed to, then the full "Committee of the eight" met in October; Castelreagh flattered Talleyrand by requesting he furnish a plan to submit to this body, Talleyrand brought forth a new scheme to create a Commission générale with representatives of all the sovereigns, including the Pope, and this body would nominate subcommittees to discuss Poland, Saxony, Switzerland and Italy, and then report to the Commission générale, which would then report to the Congress. This "ingenious" plan (the author's words) was also more or less rejected. The author also argues that Talleyrand saw that he would gain more by an alliance with Castelreagh and Metternich than by trying to influence the Congress directly.
91ff On the Polish-Saxon question, the four Powers "drifted into open opposition, which grew daily more and more irreconcilable." Note also that Metternich and Castlereagh were giving Talleyrand more confidence as a counterweight to the Prusso-Russian Alliance. [There certainly developed some unusual bedfellows in these days: Prussia agreeing with Russia, England agreeing with Austria, it's like the exact opposite of World War I.]
92ff On the "Committee of Five," essentially the real Congress: "This rapprochement between France and Great Britain and Austria was soon to receive more formal expression" as "Castlereagh and Metternich acquiesced" to include France on the main committee determining territorial distribution, even though this was not their original intention in any way. At this point Alexander wanted to bring Poland and the Polish question out into the open--in other words, out of the secret discussions which "had reached a complete deadlock"--and at the first discussion about this issue, Castlereagh insisted that France should be represented. The author discusses the "explosion that ensued" later, on pages 125-134. The result was to turn the Committee of Four into a Committee of Five. "Thus, at last, Talleyrand had won his way into the real directing Committee." The author argues that it was not due to any effort or intrigue on his part, but just to the fact that the four Powers couldn't agree and "had, in fact, come to the verge of war." Also interestingly once Talleyrand got inside "no more was heard of the rights of the small Powers." [!!! The rights of the "small Powers" that Talleyrand insisted upon were just a mechanism for him to get in on the action: once he was on the inside, he was all like "fuck those small Powers, man, I'm on the inside now!"]
94 "The truth is, that at last the natural and normal organ of work had been found. The Committee of Five represented the force that governed Europe." Also note here that Spain is now clearly, totally left out, leading to a general, blatant recognition that Spain was no longer a great power. Now finally we had the "real" Congress of Vienna. At this point the work started to proceed rapidly on the German and Polish territories. "The exception was the situation created by the return of Napoleon." [I guess we'll hear about this shortly, as Napoleon came back into power for some 100 days.] Note that the Committee of Eight (which included Spain, Sweden and Portugal) still existed at this point, but it was used to resolve questions of international rivers, the slave trade, and "as the organ of declaration of March 13 against Napoleon." [This was a response to Napoleon's escape from Elba and return to France, where the Powers declared him an "outlaw."] Also when the final treaty was prepared, the Committee of Five had prepared it and brought it to the Committee of Eight for its signature. Finally, the constitution of Germany was not completed until the final meeting at Vienna five years afterwards.
96 "It is seen, therefore, that the Congress of Vienna as a Congress of all Europe was never constituted. It remained a Congress of the great powers, who for their convenience had summoned the smaller powers of Europe to meet them." Essentially the "great" powers of Europe considered themselves "Europe," and they "asserted successfully the ascendancy of the Great Powers. The smaller States were only to be admitted at such times and on such terms as suited those who had great resources and armies at their command."
98ff On the dispute as to whether there should be one great treaty, or--as Russia wanted--each of the separate transactions recorded in their own treaties; also Castlereagh wanted to appear distant and uninvolved from any Polish partition; ultimately multiple treaties were signed on each of the questions at issue. Note also that Talleyrand wanted a grand public treaty with Louis XVIII's name signed on it. Ultimately a treaty with 121 articles was drawn up, with a debate about who exactly would sign. Note the footnote here: "It took twenty-six secretaries, working from morning to night, to prepare a copy of the treaty." On a last minute controversy, as Alexander's ministers wanted Alexander himself to see it in its completed form before they could sign, eight days later the Russians received permission to sign and the treaty was finally completed June 26th.
101 "A general instrument had thus been created which served as a basis for the international life of Europe for nearly fifty years." "...in the end, practically the whole of Europe acceded to the treaty... The Pope and the Sultan were, of course, exceptions, both for rather petty reasons, and both, ultimately, much to their own disadvantage."
102ff On the idea formally brought forth by Castlereagh, and welcomed by Russia, of making their agreements permanent: something more than just a treaty but a special guarantee that basically said the Four Powers would unite their influence to uphold l'ordre établi [the established order], and if necessary use their arms against any power that attempted to disturb the agreement.
103ff Note also Castlereagh's idea to add a guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire to the treaty as a quid pro quo for Russia's new possessions in Poland; this is interesting because Alexander couldn't really refuse because it would reveal that he didn't believe in the treaty's goals in the first place. Unfortunately this agreement didn't get accepted, but it did lead later to giving Alexander the idea of the so-called "Holy Alliance," which the author calls a "strange document." [The Holy Alliance was a symbolic coalition of European monarchs proposed by Tsar Alexander I of Russia to govern their nations according to Christian principles as well as suppress revolutionary movements.]
105ff Discussion here on the method of business and the what the day-to-day activity looked like; comments here on Metternich's "idleness"; on how Castlereagh would never let a document be exchanged between the powers on the Polish-Saxon question without preparing the way for it, or "smoothing away difficulties by personal explanations." A list here of the various people most actively involved, and then an extended discussion of various subcommittees that reported to the Committee of Eight.
110ff Comment here on espionage and secret police: "At Vienna there was in existence the most completely organized secret police in Europe; not even Napoleon, with the help of Fouché, possessed a machine of such efficiency." [Once again the idea that we're not under the surveillance of a secret police today is hilarious: it's a feature not a bug of modern nation states, just as it was a feature not a bug of nation states back then.] Comments here on how a large number of new agents in every class of society, as well as volunteers, were enlisted; the wastepaper baskets "provided a rich store of material." "Every letter that came through the post was, of course, opened. This was the usual custom, and known to all diplomatists. If they sent anything by post which they did not wish to be read, cipher was always used."
111 Comments here in a footnote about a plot to kidnap Napoleon, which was discovered via secret police efforts in Vienna: the report was written in "sympathetic ink" between the lines of an ostensibly commercial report, it was torn up and thrown into the wastebasket, but then secured and pieced together by secret agents. [!!!] Also "the inner motives of Talleyrand's campaign were fully known to the Austrians." The author says this was likely useful to Metternich and the game of intrigue he played in the settlement of the Italian question. The author here is also careful to compliment Castlereagh for being "better guarded" than the other countries, England used its own couriers, it burned wastepaper, they warned their entire staff about "the dangers of Vienna social life," etc. Also note this quote: "...a certain amount of indiscreet conversation was due to the presence of so many women."
113 Comments here on the generally unsuccessful attempts to influence the course of the Vienna Congress by applying pressure through public opinion or through home governments. Note this quote especially: "...the populations of Germany were transferred from one monarch to another, with scarcely the slightest reference to their wishes." Various examples of articles inserted into the press in different countries: on efforts to use British public opinion to influence Castlereagh, specifically here Russia directly approached opposition journalists in England, although per the author "The total effect of all this was not great... As for public opinion in England, it was never sufficiently instructed and organised to produce any effect except in the question of the slave trade." [Tell your people to focus on the bouncing red ball right here, not on this other stuff over here...]
116 "The truth was that nearly all that was most powerful in Europe was concentrated at the Congress, and distances were too great and the means of communication too slow for much effect to be produced by action elsewhere." [One takeaway for us in the modern era is to recognize that communication is fast and distances are no longer great, thus anyone can interfere with anything from anywhere. Expect interference.]
Part Three: The Work of the Congress
117ff More discussion here of the Poland-Saxony problem and the failure of Castlereagh's first plan; Castlereagh and Metternich wanted to prevent Poland from falling under Russian indirect rule, preferring it to be partitioned among the three powers; Metternich appear to be willing to agree to all of Saxony going to Prussia in return for this, and thus there would be territory to trade in the west of Germany in return for portions of Poland. Castlereagh's goal here was just to have an equilibrium where Central Europe was strengthened compared to France and Russia, and this meant not only a strong Prussia, but also an alliance between Prussia and Austria. He saw Russian dominion over Poland as a real threat to Central Europe's security. [You can see a clear analog here for the United States playing policemen in various regions of the world; here England is playing policemen in places on the continent that will later draw them into needless conflicts like the Crimean War.]
119 Interesting here how Alexander attempts to control the dialectic here by saying he wanted Poland to have a constitution, which put Castlereagh in a situation where he would have to veto a Polish constitution, making it look like it would be his fault; but Castlereagh flipped it and said you can grant them a constitution but you also have to reestablish a free Poland. The emperor then answered that he was "in possession" of the land already. Note Russia also here being "menacing" in tone with Talleyrand and Metternich, unwilling to make concessions.
120ff Subtleties on a the Austria-Prussia alliance: Castlereagh wanted the two countries to work together in opposition to Russia on the Polish question, but neither Metternich nor Hardenberg were willing to commit to this, and neither wanted to join in opposing Alexander. Prussia's Hardenberg in particular absolutely did not want to risk a rupture with Russia, "lest he should be left without an ally." Thus nobody wanted to oppose Alexander's threats here. Finally Castlereagh engineered a proposal of guaranteeing Saxony to Prussia, as well as a promise of Mainz to Bavaria/Germany, followed by an alliance between Austria and Prussia, and he got both sides to agree to it. Thus now there was a united refusal against Alexander "to recognize his Polish acquisitions." "The suggestion of an independent Poland on a large scale was to be made, but this was not seriously intended. A partition of the Duchy of Warsaw between the three Eastern Powers was the real objective." [And of course there was no mention or even notice taken of the Polish people here.]
122ff On Castlereagh's "fatal mistake": he was not himself present when the plan was disclosed to Alexander, who then used his personal influence over the Prussian King to scuttle this deal. Castlereagh commented to his Cabinet that unless Russia could be brought to a more moderate position "the peace which we have so dearly purchased will be of short duration." Then Castlereagh made certain concessions like allowing Alexander's plans for a Polish client state as long as certain Polish territories were ceded, like making Krakow or Thorn [this is the former German name for the Polish city of Torun] into free cities, but Metternich could not accept such a proposal because it was linked with giving Saxony to Prussia without what he wanted for Poland's Independence as well, this also escalated tensions between Austria and Prussia. This compromise proposal was withdrawn, "and a complete deadlock ensured" and even "military preparations were begun by all the Great Powers."
125ff On the "Secret Treaty" of January 3rd, 1815, between Austria, Great Britain and France: here Castlereagh was called to construct an entirely new combination now that he was "beaten" on the Poland question. Per the author, what he did next probably was "in defiance of the wishes of his Cabinet." Note also comments here that Castlereagh's and PM Lord Liverpool's main goal here was to keep England out of war.
127ff Basically this entire negotiation over Poland was kind of lost; so the next thing Castlereagh did is withdraw the offer of Saxony to Prussia, telling Prussia's Hardenberg that there was no way Austria could expect to give up on her Bohemian frontier "now that she had lost her line of defence in Poland." Hardenberg "flared up and talked of war" but then Castlereagh asked him "How could Prussia expect to govern Saxony unless she had the consent of Europe?" Hardenberg settled down and listened to a new Austrian proposal.
128 Note the comment here from the author about how Hardenberg and Metternich "were both surrounded by soldiers and officials exasperated by what they considered the weakness of their chiefs." [Just as butchers want to butcher, just as surgeons want to cut, soldiers want to fight.]
129ff The German and Austrian sides were still hopelessly divided, and this was Talleyrand's opportunity; note that at this point Castlereagh was using Wellington to keep Talleyrand out of things with "some success." But once the Polish negotiations broke down Castlereagh started to bring Talleyrand more into the conversation. Likewise Metternich began to bring Talleyrand into his confidence as well.
132ff Finally, Alexander asked for a formal conference on the Polish question. Austria and England demanded Talleyrand be admitted to this formal conference over Prussia's vehement objection--because they knew that bringing in Talleyrand "meant the end of Prussian hopes of obtaining all Saxony" and likewise they knew "Alexander was weakening." So, before it was too late, the Prussians attempted to force a settlement in their favor using very "trucculent language," to which Castlereagh responded very negatively. But essentially it was clear the Prussians were organizing their army and fortifying Dresden, and thus Castlereagh signed a secret treaty on January 3, 1815 with Talleyrand and Metternich "making provision for war in case of attack by Prussia."
133ff "When it is remembered that Castlereagh's last official instruction had definitely forbidden him to involve his country in war, the boldness of this action will be realized... Castlereagh showed how great was his courage and decision of character in moments of great emergency. In a few days all danger of a rupture was over." Note also as of January 1st news arrived of the signing of the peace of the War of 1812 in America.
134ff On the final settlement of the German and Polish territorial questions; here Hardenburg was intimidated and more or less gave in to let Talleyrand join the meetings; also Alexander had learned about the secret agreement between France, Austria and England and thus he became more "compliant" as well. "In these circumstances the settlement of the Polish question advanced quickly."
136ff Note here now the Austrians then got kind of uppity and started making demands, but Castlereagh put the kibosh on this too. "In the final stage of the negotiations, therefore, Castlereagh was engaged more in combating the extravagant pretensions of all sides than in merely supporting his own special allies. The construction of a powerful Prussia was, in his eyes, one of the essentials of the equilibrium of Europe; and it was largely by his assistance that she obtained so great in extension of territory."
137-8 Also on final details that Castlereagh had to settle, including Prussian demands for Leipzig which he traded for having Hanover and Holland give up some territory to Prussia in return.
139 "All this bargaining produced the settlement in Central Europe which almost entirely subordinated considerations of nationality to the idea of the balance of power... Though Posnania [now Posnan in modern-day Poland] and the outlet to the sea at Dantzig remained in Prussian hands and Galicia was retained by Austria, Cracow remaining a free city, the mass of Polish territory remained intact under Russian sovereignty; and, though the idea of associating with the Duchy of Warsaw any portion of the old Polish territories now incorporated in the Russian Empire was abandoned, the rest was made into a kingdom which was soon to be endowed with a Constitution. Further, all the Powers had found themselves forced to recognize in theory the principle of Polish independence, though they had never the slightest intention of sacrificing their national interests to it." [Cynical realpolitik to the end... note also I think the author might be overstating the amount of sovereignty Poland actually had during this time.]
140 Some other idiosyncratic things that happened here: Luxembourg, the ancient province of Belgium, was severed from Belgium here; the greater part of it was given to Prussia, but the town of Luxembourg itself was made a federal fortress under Prussian garrison; also the idea of creating a greater Hanover was abandoned but it was "raised to the dignity of a kingdom."
141 Other various territorial disputes elsewhere across Europe still remained: "This individual bargaining was, indeed, never fully completed, and produced some strange compromises on the map of Germany."
142ff On the Italian problem, as well as Murat, Spain and Portugal: "The Italian States were the subject of an intricate and sustained diplomatic duel between Talleyrand and Metternich, in which the former suffered heavy defeat." This issue resolved around Murat, the king of Naples, whose throne was guaranteed by Austria in a treaty of January 1814 after Murat deserted Napoleon [even though Murat was Napoleon's brother-in-law: this is a really good example of a vassal/client state who "flipped"! Although note that things did not work out well for Murat at the end...]; this ended up being part of a complex agreement over various territories in Italy; also reference here to the Treaty of Fontainebleau in April of that year that "granted" Napoleon rule over the island of Elba in return for abdicating the throne of France [kind of like how the USA "grants" African or Latin American dictators a McMansion in Florida plus a Swiss bank account in return for "abdicating."] Disputes over the fate of Tuscany and other principalities remained undecided; the Pope was restored to Rome with the Papal State around it; On the Italian demand of the overthrow of Murat and the restoration of Ferdinand of Sicily in his place. Also interesting here that Murat was sort of a pawn of various sides even inside France: as Napoleon's brother-in-law, it was intolerable to Louis XVIII that he ruled Naples, but Talleyrand wanted him there as part of a general policy to increase French influence in Italy at the expense of Austria. England saw a "Napoleonic regime" like Murat's to be a threat to her control of the Mediterranean. Nobody else really cared or had much interest in protecting Murat, including Russia or Prussia or Spain.
145 Eventually it was collectively agreed that Murat should be overthrown, but then suddenly "Napoleon broke up all these combinations" when he returned to power briefly. [Here's another good example of how this history is taken for granted by elites of the early 20th century but is lost on readers today, nobody--including me, until I read a full biography of the man--knows that Napoleon escaped from Elba and took over France all over again, albeit temporarily.] At this point Murat organized troops, and marched north, and was virtually at war with Austria; England also declared war but the Neapolitan army failed entirely, Murat fled [and was ultimately captured and executred], and Ferdinand's restoration was accomplished."
146 Note here the author's reference to a "dubious incident" and "one of the greatest blots on Castlereagh's conduct" [I think the author is talking about a secret deal between England and Austria to arrange control over the Kingdom of Naples by getting Murat out and Ferdinand in, although this was sort of obviated by events that happened soon after anyway as Napoleon escaped Elba and returned to power.]
146 "With Talleyrand impotent, the rest of Italy was partitioned to Metternich's liking."
147 "For much of the rest, neither Spain or Portugal received any recognition of their efforts in the struggle against Napoleon." [If you're a minor, peripheral client state and you don't have any leverage over anything, nobody cares about you and nobody's going to give you anything.]
147ff Now on to the German Confederation and the Swiss Constitution: the German Confederation was "a mere mockery of the hopes of German patriots. The truth was that there was not yet a sufficiently organised body of public opinion strong enough to overcome Prussian militarism, Habsburgism, and the selfishness of the smaller monarchs of Germany." [Interesting to see the word "selfishness" used here: why would any monarch, small or otherwise, just subsume himself to a larger, centralized state... unless forced to?]
148ff "The factors of this intricate and obscure diplomacy reach back into the mediaeval history of Germany. Napoleon had substituted the Confederation of the Rhine for the worn-out shell of the Holy Roman Empire, which, in the hands of the Habsburgs, had been the only bond linking together the multitude of petty states, princes, and free cities which constituted Germany. The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine by Napoleon's defeat, and the reconquest of the territory which had been Incorporated in France, raised the question as to what was now to be created in Germany." There were certain vestigial democratic movements hoping for representative institutions, there was also a sort of collective wish for "German unity," but the various princess had no intention of sharing sovereignty with their peoples or subordinating to a common Germany. Also, for that matter, their sovereignty was guaranteed by the treaties signed previously when they joined the Grand Alliance [against Napoleon]. Also there were some partial efforts [the author, amusingly, uses the phrase "ill-digested proposals"] to create some sort of German constitution, but division between Austrian and Prussia over the Poland/Saxony question made it so that this effort never really got traction. Also discussion here of the possibility of Austria presiding over a sort of Germanic Empire with the exclusion of Prussia. The author comments here that there was no consensus on which to build a constitution, and likewise there were no genuinely great statesmen or people of political genius among these various German states and principalities.
151ff On the creation of a Federal Diet which was to be the "central organ" of thirty-eight Germanic states. Note here how Talleyrand wanted to increase dissension in Germany and also between Great Britain and Russia, as to him a united Germany was a threat to France, while to Britain and Russia's a united Germany was to be another power to balance out France and form a better equilibrium on the Continent. [Ironic, just as Talleyrand weaseled his way into the Alliance, he starts working his own angles...] Castlereagh thought of a united Germany "as a fundamental necessity for the equilibrium of Europe." Finally the author blames the Germans themselves for producing what turned out to be an "emasculated Constitution." "The institutions under which Germany had now to live were really quite inadequate to solve the problems raised by the Napoleonic upheaval, and contain the seeds of a generation of war and revolution."
153ff Now on to Switzerland: "The affairs of Switzerland, though complicated and full of intrigue, were settled without serious friction among the Great Powers, whose fundamental interests were not in conflict. A new Constitution was drawn up which modified the Act of Mediation of 1803, one of the most successful emanations of Napoleon's genius; and by the addition of Geneva, Valais and Neuchâtel a Confederation of twenty-two cantons was formed." It was accepted by the Swiss Diet, followed up by a promise of the guarantee of neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of its territory. "This established a new principle in the public law of Europe, and may be considered as one of the most important results of the period, for the Great Powers had definitely recognized that their own interests, as well as those of all Europe, were best served by the exclusion of a small State from participation in future conflicts." [I never really knew about this "origin story" of Swiss neutrality. After all, if you're some European despot who loses a war you'd be asking yourself: "Where will I store all my gold?" Et voila, a place to launder your money to when your empire collapses!]
153ff Final comments on the abolition of the slave trade, driven largely by English public opinion, and making Castlereagh's job at brokering all these various agreements more difficult, because the other Powers thought he had a specific interest in abolition for reasons of England's self-interest [see p60-61 above]. Also an interesting use of economic power as a peacetime weapon here: there was an article inserted in the agreement to exclude from trade products from colonies still using slaves [maybe you could think of this like a proto-sanctions kind of thing], although this was never actually put into force. Note, however, it actually was later used by Alexander to attempt to put pressure on the revolting Spanish colonies. [The author does not explain this or give details, but Alexander believed in the absolute power of legitimate monarchs, thus he supported the Spanish Crown over her rebellious colonies.]
Part Four: The Completion of the Congress
155ff The author comments here on how "the position of Napoleon" was one of the first points discussed among the four Powers; on of the danger of leaving Napoleon at Elba, all the other countries could do was just watch his activities "by an elaborate system of espionage, and rely on British ships to prevent his escape. These precautions failed, and Napoleon was eagerly welcomed by a France that had already learned to distrust and despise the Bourbons." The Powers responded by unanimously calling for Napoleon's immediate overthrow, they denounced him as a public enemy, "and the huge forces of the Coalition were set in motion once more." Note that most of the forces were already committed elsewhere by now (!), English troops were still in America, Austria forces were occupied in Italy, Russia's army had retired to Poland, etc. It turns out the British, Austrian and Prussian forces in the Netherlands was enough to destroy Napoleon at this point: the four Powers didn't really need their full armies.
156 "The Waterloo campaign made Wellington and the Prussians masters of Paris at the critical moment"; Louis XVIII was brought back to make terms with the conquerors. Note all the arguments about recriminations, as well as negotiations/reparations ideas from the various conquering victorious allies ranging from dismembering France territorially, to charging huge indemnities, to taking land like Flanders, Alsace-Lorraine, etc. Only Russia and England really wished well to France and didn't have revenge and rage driving them; thus they insisted on moderation and security, not revenge. Note also the comments here on the brutality of Prussian soldiers occupying France, with systematic pillage and plundering.
160ff Finally an agreement was arrived at, Louis XVIII had forced Talleyrand's resignation at this point; basically France surrendered some territory to the Netherlands, some territory to Prussia, had to pay 700 million francs, and an army of 150,000 men would occupy northern France for five years. And then private claims were submitted from Prussia and various German states in the amount of 1.2 billion francs; ultimately the matter was settled for 240 million francs. Note also that this was a simple quid pro quo, since Napoleon had made Europe pay for the wars he had waged. [These claims were easily payable reparations as France didn't have heavy debts at this point (per the author, "Napoleon had left France without a debt") which is extremely interesting.]
161 Comments here on how the balance of power had permanently been modified with France's weakened state; the male population of France was "seriously reduced in numbers" and while there was still an aggressive faction in the French nation, this conflict "produced a permanent effect on the national spirit, which was to influence events in 1830, 1840, and even during the revival of the empire under the third Napoleon."
162ff Now on a renewal of the Quadruple Alliance: an agreement to not interfere in the internal affairs of France except to exclude Napoleon or any of his family from the throne; see also the agreement to a new system of diplomacy where the ministers of these great Powers met at frequent intervals to discuss international affairs. "This was a real recognition of the advantages of a permanent Concert of the Great Powers... But unfortunately the Continental Powers were to use these reunions to assert the rights of legitimacy against liberal and constitutional ideas." [He doesn't say, probably because it would be obvious to a literate reader in this book's day, but probably here the author is referring to the Spring of Nations democracy movements of the mid 19th century across Europe. Which brings me to another thought: the EU as it is now formed is sort of a bureaucratic mechanism to likewise thwart democracy all over the continent too! See how the EU basically reached in and impacted or annulled elections in Romania and Hungary, how it has centralized both regulatory power and both fiscal and monetary policy in Brussels, etc. If you have a centralized power structure you can more easily thwart the will of decentralized peoples.]
164 Comments here on how few of the statesmen thought there would be a lasting peace after this treaty was signed. [It turned out that large-scale war was avoided until the 1850s, when the Crimean War happened.]
164ff Final comments here on criticisms of the Congress of Vienna, in particular the idea of "a dozen statesemen and transferring 'souls'" by the millions from one sovereign to another came under much criticism, but the author argues this was not the main object of the statesmen of the day; rather, they wanted to overthrow the Napoleonic Empire completely, and they were much more successful than they expected. The author thinks that had there been any effort to include "the vague principles of nationality and democracy so imperfectly understood alike by the peoples and the statesmen, the results would certainly have been disastrous. The primary need of Europe, once the Napoleonic tyranny was overthrown, was a period of peace; and this the statesman of Vienna undoubtedly secured in a far greater degree than the most sanguine of the publicist of the time dare to hope."
165ff On the idea that as a reaction to a single power dominating Europe, the principle of a "balance of power" was a completely reasonable motive. Comments here on a key failure of the Congress, which was a failure to support, in fact an overt discouragement of, the various self-government movements Europe at the time, this is one of the key reasons posterity has criticized the Congress of Vienna. The author notes that the conception of "democracy" meaning nothing but "anarchy and revolution" to these statesmen [they were after all "elites"]. Finally, the author comments here that these statesmen secured for Europe a "breathing-space of peace." [Not to be a pedant, but it was nearly 40 years of peace until the Crimean War broke out, and you could argue a full century before another full scale Europe-wide war broke out].
Appendices
168ff What follows here are a series of "despatches" and memoranda from the Congress of Vienna. First there's a letter from Castlereagh to the Prime Minister Liverpool explaining some of the nitty-gritty of what was decided early on, like who should be included beyond "the six Powers of the first order," who gets to sit and deliberate, who gets to petition and negotiate, debates about what the Congress actually should be doing from England's standpoint, and how overt the six Powers should be in terms of releasing to the public what they decide. Then, memoranda from Castlereagh back home about measures preparatory to the meeting and other minutia about the opening, the formalities, and how the Congress will actually proceed.
173 Note the comments here of Castlereagh with his mode of treating the minor countries "with early and becoming respect" while keeping the power in the hands of the Great Powers: "You obtain a sort of sanction from them for what you are determined at all events to do, which they cannot well withhold." [This sounds a little like the Millennial generation's code of behavior: do what you're going to do but at least be nice about it.] Also note this striking comment on the idea to be clear about this power arrangement early on, so if there's any ill-temper among the minor countries "it should be compelled to show itself openly in order that it may be met and suppressed at the outset." [Heavy.]
175ff A set of recommendations here for how to conduct the Congress from Baron Humboldt, who represented Prussia. [This document is in French so my ability to read it is limited, but it basically explains what his desired purposes are, why there is a conference, a brief history of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, and various questions on managing the balance of power after the Napoleonic era, how to handle the division of territory of Poland, Germany and Italy, dealing with the internal dissensions in Switzerland, etc.]
186ff More memoranda from Castlereagh, discussing the census to be taken of the various countries before the land is divided up; finally, a memorandum from Castlereagh stating the purposes of the Treaties of 1814 and 1815 at the 1818 conference, going over elements of each. [This document, even though it is in English, is almost unreadable, it's written in diplomatic-speak and says very little with a lot of words. I can't imagine anyone who values his time actually bothering to decipher this.]
198ff General observations on the Congress of Vienna and the applicability of its history to the present time, August 1918: [this section is the author's own attempt to have some influence on the post World War I order.] On the Congress of Vienna as "the only precedent for a similar assembly today." Comments on the presence of the United States at this Congress whose interests "are not European in the sense that Great Britain's then were." [If they only knew what was coming: the USA in the coming decades would escalate its meddling in European affairs beyond any of these WWI statesmen's wildest nightmares...]
200ff Comments on how the different powers were instructive in how they secured (or failed to secure) their various interests before the Congress even met; Great Britain was the only country fully successful in this in the sense that its maritime and colonial questions were excluded from discussion and settled ahead of time; Webster argues that this made it possible for Great Britain to assume the role of mediator. "To obtain special consideration for its own interests, in preference to submitting them to the decision of an assembly, must always be one of the principal objects of every party to a combination." [Harry Browne would be proud of this clear examples of direct action rather than indirect action.]
202ff Comments here on how the division of territory in Europe and many other issues had not been settled before the Congress met: "So uncertain was the position that none of the powers could disarm; and they had even to sign a special treaty by which troops were kept on a war footing until the final decision should be made." The author's solution here is to avoid this kind of near-war footing among the Powers by having the enemy sign a term of peace while the military situation is still a dominant factor. [Note that what the US did after World War II was simply demand "unconditional surrender," which takes care of things more expediently: of course the 20th century wars were a different order of magnitude compared to the previous centuries of "cabinet"-style war.]
203 Webster also notes here that because the Four Powers couldn't come to certain agreements, this was what let Talleyrand get his foot in the door and become admitted to the council. Thus territorial distribution was settled by Five Powers, thanks to the Four Powers' dissension.
204ff Comments on the small powers and their limited influence on the Congress of Vienna, and the similarities today [in post WWI-era] with a number of small powers in The Alliance likewise with their exact relations to the great Powers undefined. "It is essential, above all, that no opportunity to be given to Germany to imitate the role of Talleyrand, and, by championing the rights of small nations, to create discontent and even open protests, which she can exploit for her own purposes."
206ff On the number of new peoples liberated from Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which means the creation of new governments in new states; Webster makes suggestions for the current era including 1) that the enemy should be required to cede all rights over these populations the same way France did in 1814, and 2) a committee of the Great Powers should be set up to adjudicate the claims of these states and governments.
207 Comments of the importance of a statistical committee: note that at Vienna the concern was really only population, and the Congress neglected national and religious characteristics but "they found great difficulty in making their statistics agree." The statistical community then harmonized the figures produced by the Great Powers and succeeded admirably; the author thinks similar committee would be valuable now, and it would be best to set such a committee up as soon as possible, such that an agreement on the issue could be made before the Congress actually meets. "Protracted negotiations will also give an opportunity for manoeuvers resembling those by which Talleyrand and others endeavored to influence the decisions of the Vienna Congress."
208 Comments on how Castlereagh did not have an adequate military staff to keep him apprised properly of the strategic and military situation with Napoleon, and thus he had to depend on the military opinions of his allies.
209 Finally here comments about the elaborate system of espionage used by the Austrians at the Congress of Vienna, and the success of the British in defeating attempts at penetration of their secrets. "Similar precautions will no doubt be equally necessary today."
Vocab:
sympathetic ink: invisible ink
sine quibus non: [lit: "without which [there are] none"] the plural form of the Latin phrase sine qua non. It refers to multiple, indispensable, and essential conditions or ingredients without which something else is impossible or cannot happen
To Read:
Sir Charles Webster: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh
Sir Charles Webster: The Foreign Policy of Palmerston
F.S. Marston: The Peace Conference of 1919
E.F.H. Münster: Political Sketches of the State of Europe, 1814-1867
***C.A. Fyffe: A History of Modern Europe, 1792-1878 [public domain link]
H. von Treitschke: History of Germany
***Bertier de Sauvigny: Metternich and His Times (trans. Peter Ryde)
L.I. Stakhovsky: Alexander I
Philip Alan Reynolds: The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 1939-1946