Fascinating and sobering post-mortem on how a country can rapidly go from powerful to impotent, while having no clue, absolutely no clue, it is doing so.
Author Correlli Barnett, writing in 1972, couldn't have possibly intended it, but this book on England is a near-perfect pre-mortem for the current collapse of US power.
The parallels are astonishing. In the early 1900s, England outsourced its industrial base and much of its technology leadership to Germany (of all countries!); the USA would later do the same with China. England strained to hold on to a global colonial empire for decades longer than it could afford to; the USA clings tenuously to a pseudo-empire of military bases all over the world that it can no longer afford. Separated by a little over a century, these two nations are on the same collapse roadmap.
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It gets worse. England's leadership and government/civil service culture went soft too, devolving from the great men who built the empire into weak men, "neighbourly and guileless" leaders as Barnett puts it, worrying more about what other countries thought of Britain than about addressing the country's rapidly deteriorating economic and geopolitical situation.
The USA's leadership class has devolved too, but to a far greater extent. Our Senators are so old and sclerotic that a probability-defying three were hospitalized for strokes just in 2022, while our Senate majority leader began having repeated brain freezes mid-press conference. A president with blatantly obvious cognition problems stays in office until the regime no longer needs him.
At the bureaucratic level the USA's leadership in many ways even worse: it features soulless ghouls like Anthony Blinkin or self-evidently unhealthy health secretaries like Rachel Levine. And among the rank and file of civil servants we see things like:
Department of Energy deputy Sam Brinton, known dress thief
One brief criticism of an otherwise excellent book. Barnett ignores the deliberate contraction of the English money supply after World War I as England attempted to return to the gold standard. This was a critically important event--likely the most important event of all---driving England's economic weakness in the 1920s. The author skips over it totally. Instead he confines his criticisms of British industry to inefficiencies, trade unionism, and "falling behind" technologically, and never considers the impact of British monetary policy at all, a significant oversight. For more on this, see Liaquat Ahamed's book Lords of Finance.
That said, Barnett is an exceptional writer with a wonderful turn of phrase. This is uncommon among historians, and he keeps the reader engrossed and grateful. Barnett also takes great pleasure in exploding many of the government-inspired pseudo-narratives many of us hold, unquestioningly, about England's history. One example of many would be how Neville Chamberlain was made the scapegoat for "appeasing" the Nazi regime. This chewable narrative made for an easy way to pin blame on one man for England's catastrophic position of weakness in 1940. But in reality, Chamberlain was stuck with an already pathetically weak England, suffering from years of "self-imposed gunshot wounds" due to decades of foolish, enervating policies. Dig deep enough, and you begin to realize almost nothing you believe about anything is actually true.
[Readers, as always, read no further. Life is short! What follows are just my notes and reactions to the book, all of which are just to help me order and remember what I read. It's unbelievably long: so long that even skimming the bolded parts is likely a waste of your time.]
Notes:
Author's Preface
xi "This book does not seek to narrate the decline in Fall of the British Empire, but to explain the collapse of British power--an entirely different and far more important question."
Part I: The Audit of War
5 "Chamberlain had fallen not because of his policy, but his leadership. British Grand strategy remained unchanged by Churchill's accession to power. The key to the strategy, laid down in April 1939 and confirmed by the allied supreme war council in September 1939, was faith in the French army." [Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.]
5-6 "English newspapers and the new illustrated war magazines constantly carried features and pictures displaying the French armies tough, brilliant leaders and its splendid equipment." [Interesting rhyming here with modern war propaganda as our regime media two years ago assured us that Russia was about to run out of bullets, that our Abrams tanks totally don't have problems at all, they work great; that our Patriot missile systems are flawless, etc. One significant takeaway here is you can go back and now easy identify which media are propaganda instruments!]
6ff Readable, quick history here of the quick collapse of the Low Countries and French/English front against Germany and then the total collapse of France within 6 weeks. "In the course of just six weeks the western front, the French army and the French alliance had all ceased to exist--and with them the very foundations of British grand strategy." Basically something happened that no one expected (a total French collapse) and then England was left with the post facto reality that they had deliberately put themselves in a position where they were totally dependent on France actually still being there, fighting. And France wasn't there.
9ff Discussion of the unbelievable unpreparedness of England throughout all of its colonies too: basically they were dependent on still more "contingencies" throughout the Suez Canal, across North Africa and Egypt (where they were outnumbered by the Italian military); tremendous inadequacy all over Asia, especially if Japan got involved. What's worse, they weren't even unified in their command organizations. "The British Empire was not only ill-armed, but ill-organized." The colonies were a liability not an asset in terms of defense, India for example required a net positive number of British troops to maintain internal security there. "Thus in the summer crisis of 1940 the British Empire proved strategically a net liability to Britain rather than an asset, and a heavy liability at that."
11 Fascinating also to think about how England sourced its raw materials from the continent rather than from its own colonies because the shipping was cheaper. And then after Scandinavia and France's collapse Britain was cut off from European supplies; worse, any natural resources England sourced from its colonies still had to pass through the industrial base of the British isles to be turned into any kind of industrial resources; thus it was more system of contingencies rather than a supply system: during wartime it was a liability: England was fragile and centralized rather than robust and decentralized. India for example was wholly dependent on British industry to be equipped so that it also was a liability that actually drained rather than adding to British industrial capacity!
12ff That wasn't even the worst of it: England wasn't even able to arm itself without technology, equipment and materiel from the United States; its military technology had become antiquated and it depended on American industry when it began to rearm during the 1930s. Not only were they purchasing aircraft and equipment, but also were dependent on American steel as well as machine tools needed to make military equipment. [Exactly like what the US has done as we've outsourced our industrial base to Asia, and specifically China, and now NATO doesn't have the ability to mass produce ships, tanks, equipment, material, etc.]. Worse still, England didn't have the economic reserves (and certainly did not have enough gold) to maintain this trade imbalance with the United States, especially if they accelerated it to rearm more aggressively.
14 "In that summer of heroic attitudes [1940], therefore, when the English scanned the skies for the Luftwaffe and the sea for the German army, and thrilled to Churchillian rhetoric on the wireless, England's existence as an independent, self-sustaining power was reckoned by the Government to have just four months to run."
15 "Yet only sixty years earlier Britain had been the richest country in the world; she had been 'the Workshop of the World'... The plight of the summer of 1940 therefore marked the consummation of an astonishing decline in British fortunes. The British invested their feebleness and isolation with romantic glamour--they saw themselves as latter-day Spartans, under their own Leonidas, holding the pass for the civilised world. In fact it was a sorry and contemptible plight for a great power, and it derived neither from bad luck, nor from the failures of others. It had been brought down upon the British by themselves."
II All That Is Noble and Good
19 On the search for scapegoats: Chamberlain scapegoated for "appeasement," MacDonald and Baldwin scapegoated for "failing to arm early enough," etc. "So well propagated was it [the appeasement/failing to rearm myths] that the national folk-memory has accepted it as the true explanation for the plight of 1940." The author makes a good point here: all these partial explanations and propaganda reasons do not explain why "a particular stamp of men" came to hold power in British politics in the years leading up to this, why British public opinion was pacifistic, why appeasement was what people wanted and "why the British permitted the catastrophic decline of their industrial power." [A thought here about scapegoating and how a search for scapegoats always seems to come first before a country can adapt and take a new path. Imagine the time and lives that could be saved if there were no scapegoating instinct in times of crisis!]
20ff The author compares England's 18th century ruling classes ("men hard of mind and hard of will"), men who faced and accepted the reality of England's situation, and, despite losing their American colony, under these men England grew from a second rank nation to a great power between 1689 and 1815; then when Wellington routed the French at Waterloo in 1815 this essentially marked the end of centuries of English struggle with European great powers. "The British Empire was at last supreme and safe." [They felt too safe and they went soft!]
21 The author discusses what he calls a moral revolution over the course of the 1800s: "a peculiarly English manifestation of the romantic movement common to all Western Europe" which the author believes meant pivoting from mere material interests to fidelity to high principles; this began to manifest itself in politics by the early part of George III's reign when politicians like Burke argued against war with the American colonies for example; Burke was so high-minded that "he was known as the dinner bell, his rising to speak being the signal for men to depart the chamber in search of mutton chops." [First, I can't help but cite the peculiar English skill at insult: some of the best most annihilating insults come from this culture! Second, essentially here we have a collapse from an orientation towards reality (the prior leadership class of the late 1700s) to a delusionally romantic orientation towards idealism at the expense of reality (under Burke and later leaders); think of it as a nation-state level example of feelz before realz.]
22ff The author also cites religion here: the founders of Methodism, various evangelists, etc., gave this romantic movement a form of moralistic force; see also the open-air religious gatherings with their "mass-hysteria" which per the author became "the archetypes of the mass-meetings of future democracy and its political demagoguery." [Very interesting.] Also on the "pew-hard certainty" [great phrase] that they were right. "Traditional English pragmatism was therefore threatened by the onset of a rigid concern for doctrinaire principle." On a "new middle-class sentimentality that Dickens both tapped and stimulated." "International relations were no longer seen as being governed primarily by strategy, but by morality." [For a metaphor for US history, think replacing Nixon with Carter and all that resulted from it.]
24ff On changes in the English public school system, which remade the English "middle classes and the old upper classes alike according to its ideal of a Christian gentleman." On educator Dr. Thomas Arnold who was "decisive" in this public school evolution, making it more religious, more moral; Arnold "was troubled by Shakespeare's apparent inability to create good men." Arnold propagating through education what grew into a sort of guilt-induced attitude to world affairs that became common later; see for example his comments on the Opium War in China and how much "dreadful guilt we are incurring," etc. [Again, rhyme: US public school education became "guilt-based" in the 70s and of course the entire university system has been consumed by it.]
27ff On the "early Victorian preoccupation with morality" and romantic idealism that "inspired the English public school until well into the twentieth century."
29ff On Edward Thring, a "towering" reforming headmaster of the 19th century, also John Ruskin; the author criticizes all of these educators (and the schools they influenced) for ignoring the business of life, ignoring the technical and geopolitical needs of England in the generations to follow; see the criticisms from Herbert Spencer in 1861 for example, criticizing England's educational system as "it neglects the plant for the sake of the flower." He "pleaded for science as the foundation of education."
32ff "The late nineteenth century was a time of intense scientific progress and intellectual speculation--a time of colossal industrial developments and social change. All of this bore crucially on the future of Britain and the British empire. Awareness of little or none of it penetrated into the public schools." Other examples here of how public school became increasingly divorced from reality, created a conformity and orthodoxy among students, featured headmasters who the author would consider simple and naive, cloistered, oblivious to the real world.
34 On how children's lives were filled up with activities, each school had petty ritual privileges, all of which "symbolised a hierarchy of submission, obedience and authority."
36 "These boys were in fact the first future ruling class in British history to be subjected to a powerful and uniform moulding process at all. This in itself was of the utmost significance, dooming the variety, spontaneity and open-mindedness that had hitherto been the saving grace of the British upper classes..."
40ff Discussion here of the class one examinations for the civil service, and how they also were somewhat delusionally academic and ignored current realities. "It was not until 1906--too late for the generation of senior administrators of British power in the 1920s and 1930s--that political science, psychology and economic history were included. Understanding of the contemporary world was even now seen as a matter outside formal education." Little testing on or discussion of recent history, economic matters, foreign relations, etc.
43 The British governing class of the 1920s and 1930s "took it for granted the British Empire was the greatest and richest power in the world, indeed in history. It had not yet occurred to them that the foundations of British power might be rotting, or that the splendid structure might seriously be threatened by other powers, such as imperial Germany. They assumed--for scepticism about fundamentals had hardly been encouraged--that the Empire would just go on and on much as it was. They saw the Empire romantically has a great instrument of civilisation and enlightenment, a successor to Greece and Rome... Such qualities were however ill-suited to leading the empire, a great business and strategic enterprise, through drastic internal re-organisations and against ferocious and unscrupulous competition. Indeed other characteristics fostered by Victorian education--conservatism, doctrinaire orthodoxy, rigidity, inertia and unbounded complacency--are the classic attributes of an army about to suffer a catastrophic defeat." [What's interesting here is at the same time you could have someone like Aldous Huxley in 1932 writing Brave New World with a completely different vision and impression of things.]
43 On the enfranchising of the urban lower middle and respectable working classes due to the Reform Act of 1867.
44 A good example here of a "prototype" of the English political response to foreign affairs is the Balkan situation in 1876, where Gladstone used sort of an emotional appeal to moral indignation to rouse English support against Turkey for a massacre of Bulgarian Christians, when competent geopolitics would have indicated England should have supported Turkey against Russian pressure.
45 On the Labour Party as "less a body for the seizing and wielding of political power than a pseudo-religion."
45ff Other delusional beliefs that took root in England at this time: believing "that the world was well on the way to becoming one highly moral society--like Britain itself." That mankind was "essentially good and kind and rational." And that any greed or violence was due to evil governments and evil social systems. "Once these were removed, harmony and love would prevail."
46ff On Imperialism: A Study, an extremely influential book by J.A. Hobson [this book sounds like something analogous to Howard Zinn's infamous book A People's History of the United States], arguing that imperialism was immoral; Hobson and his intellectual peers were delusionally idealistic about things like world courts, and faith in the League of Nations and in other global organizations that would be inherently good and fair [like Starfleet!]. The author points out that Hobson wrote his book just after a full century of wars between "civilized" European States; whatever his idealisms were "they hardly squared with a political facts of Hobson's own era." See also the American Civil War which was by far the bloodiest and longest war of the century and it was fought inside a democracy! He was "typical in being unable to accept that human disputes could be irreconcilable, and therefore only to be resolved in violent conflict." [It's one thing to resolve your side of a conflict without violence, but it's another error entirely to assume the other guy won't use violence at all, and not be ready if he does. This is a type of solipsism that can be deadly to a country.]
48 Norman Angell and his influential work The Great Illusion, assuming the modern world was already united by trade, industry, finance, communications; thus nationalism was an absurd anachronism and war could profit no one. [Note that The Great Illusion came out in 1910: it would be hard to find a more anti-predictive book!] "Angell's book illustrates a general proneness within the intellectual, or rational, strain of internationalist idealism to feel that once something has been demonstrated to be absurd or self-destructive it is as good as written off." [Again another error of geopolitical solipsism: you think something is so self-evidently "dumb" or "absurd" that you also assume no one else would ever think otherwise.]
49ff On that era's intellectuals celebrating free trade at the very time when British industry was less and less competitive, especially compared to the US and Germany in the latter half of the 19th century. At this time many countries became much more protectionist, so Britain's idealized "free trade" occured only in one direction: the "other great powers did not see the world as one great human society" and didn't play along.
53 "There was a curious--and ever-present--paradox in the temperament of romantic internationalists; while emotionally they were in the thick of the fight against evil, intellectually they might have been surveying the European scene from the basket of a balloon." On the idea that England's leadership at the time didn't understand what was really needed, like a strong military, a strong Navy, a "big stick" (in the Teddy Roosevelt sense) and a strong industrial base underlying it all.
54ff On the outbreak in 1914 of World War I "Moral law was demonstrated to carry less weight than a military railway time table." The romantic internationalists "awoke very late to awareness that Britain was likely to be caught up in a general European war." [Another irony on top of an irony here is that had England stayed out of World War I--even if this does seem like an unrealistic thing--England would have ended up like the US after World War II: completely dominant economically, wealthy, with a dominant industrial base etc, it would have totally changed England's history, forever.]
56 The author cites that England's entry into World War I was only a temporary defeat of the romantic internationalists, as the romantic internationalists turned defeat into victory and took over the war they previously condemned, turning it into a crusade, making it a sort of ideological expression.
58 On the birth of the League of Nations, another instrument of delusional internationalism: basically a Starfleet-type organization, which was only amplified as Woodrow Wilson took up its cause after the US entered World War I. Then, after the war, the English and American atmosphere "was refulgent with liberal-evangelical aspirations of peace, democracy, justice and community between peoples" even to the point of squeezing Germany "because it was clearly right to punish evil."
59 "Against all logic, therefore, moralising internationalism emerged into the post-war era more influential, more certain in its righteousness, than at any time."
62ff On this era's English intellectuals and intelligentsia: E.M. Forster, Bertrand Russell, Keynes, Virginia and Leonard Woolf, who the author calls "the exhausted rearguard of Victorian romanticism. They sought refuge from an industrialised and ugly world." The author describes this group "leisured," shuttling from country house to country cottage, full of witty chat, a "flimsy and precious people, of whom Lady Ottoline Morrell was perhaps the manliest." [hahahaha ouch!] This intellectual collective as a group was uninterested in industrial and strategic power [although note the author doesn't mention Keynes's work about the costly post-war peace with Germany, The Economic Consequences of the Peace].
62ff On the absurd sense of guilt that drove this era' mindset, with foreigners, with the colonies; on "a compassion for the underdog and a sympathy for failure, and a corresponding suspicion of ability and success" that characterized English culture and made the country delusionally unprepared for what was to come. "Appeasement indeed had become a conditioned reflex of the British middle and upper classes."
63ff "Yet it was exactly because British life itself was now so orderly, gentle, docile, safe and law-abiding, so decent, so founded on mutual trust that the British were less fitted to survive as a nation than their ancestors, whose characters had been formed in a course, tough and brutal society." The author goes on to describe various statesmen of this era, ranging from politically naive, frail, of a sweet and Christian nature, etc., criticizing everyone from Lord Halifax to Neville Chamberlain to the pacifist Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Lionel Curtis, Clifford Allen, etc., and then an extended portrait of 1920s-era Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin as the apogee of this type of character. [I have to confess, it's quite depressing to read the author's portrait of a very sincere and pious and moral man, and yet agree with the author that this kind of guy has no business running a real country up against other real countries; what's depressing is to conclude that international geopolitics is no place for an earnest, pious man like this, at least if that country wants to not totally give away its vigor and primacy.]
III The Greatest Power in the World
71ff On a sort of collective delusion that Britain was the greatest power in the world after its victory in World War I; on the 1919 victory parade where soldiers from all over the Commonwealth marched; the "popular myth" of British power; "The empire's boundaries were set wider yet" after requiring Iraq, Palestine; the experiences of the Great War demonstrated alleged British strength, however, the underlying reality was quite different.
74ff On how the British Empire in 1914 was "the random debris of successive historical episodes." "...a rummage-bag of an empire" without structural or administrative or cultural unity, and drawing very little economic benefit from its empire as well. There was very little manpower benefit during the war and de minimis contribution economically, with the exception of India which had a significant influence, however it also gave them a frontier of thousands of miles to defend, gave them Russia as an enemy, and gave them a number of other regional countries to worry about and deal with, as well as the requirement to maintain a vast security system to secure routes to India.
77ff The author makes an argument here that India actually added very little to the Empire, and certainly no industrial capacity whatsoever; with few exceptions (chromium, manganese and jute) it provided very little strategic raw materials; "...there was nothing remotely to justify the unique and immense diplomatic and strategic responsibilities that India entailed."
79ff Comments here on the 1.4 million soldiers in the army from India for the Great War, all volunteers; the author argues, however, that their value was limited, hardly any actually went to the decisive front in France, just 89k, and that was offset by the 15,000 troops required to stay in India for internal order; the author concludes their military contribution was "negligible."
80 "The whole British position in the Middle East and Southern Asia was in fact a classic, and gigantic, example of strategic over-extension."
80ff The author comments on how even the developed/"white empire" (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) of Britain wasn't that great an asset; it was far flung all over the world, required tremendous sea power resources to connect and link up these countries, and Britain contributed almost all of the ships, men and money to do so; the author calls the expeditionary forces "wartime improvisations"; note here the author talks about Japan, which assisted Dominion troop transports in the Great War, but obviously did the exact opposite in World War II creating a tremendous weakness and fragility for England.
82ff Discussion here of yet another fragility, that of oil, where 80% came from the USA, and England had to waste more military energy extracting or exploiting oil resources in Egypt or Trinidad or elsewhere. None of these were nearby sources; note that in contrast Germany established quick control of the oil resources in Hungary and Romania to meet its needs for WWII.
84ff [The level of industrial dependence on Germany, a country that would turn out to be their enemy, is shocking. It is astounding how this parallels the USA's industrial dependence on China.]
"England by 1914 was well on the way to becoming a technological colony of the United States and Germany." This was discovered by the government when it attempted to convert British industrial capacity to munitions production [this is exactly what all the NATO countries are discovering right now about their own industrial production which they lost and thus there's no industrial base to convert to munitions production at all, to the point where all of Europe can't even match munitions production of even tiny countries like North Korea]. England's steel output was barely half of Germany's, plus they were poor at making high-end, high-quality steel; on the munitions crisis of 1914-16, which uncovered a completely undeveloped machine tool industry that would produce machines for the new production lines; the modern machine tools had been imported from Germany and the US before the war and this was "particularly appalling" because every aspect of modern large-scale production depended on this sort of equipment; likewise crippled from a lack of ball-bearing manufacturing. "The twentieth century runs on ball-bearings." And yet England almost exclusively relied on Germany for its ball bearing supply [!], it was then forced to turn to Sweden and Switzerland after 1914; likewise magneto production, aircraft engines, internal combustion engines, industrial gauges and instruments, small precision measuring tools, optical glass, etc.
87 At the same time Germany could easily take their huge chemical and coal tar industry and reallocate it to the production of high explosives; England had to create its own chemical industry from scratch.
88 What was worse is in general the English capitalists and managers didn't know that they sucked. They thought their methods and their plants were great [!] and they were in reality preposterously surpassed by the highly-organized industrial installations of Germany in the USA. They were still stuck in 1845, making small batches of tools when these things could be done in an automated way using unskilled labor on a much larger scale.
89 Also British industry was limited by various labor rules and customs; essentially the British skilled laborers were acting like millennials. "The contrast with the situation and state of mind of British industry one hundred years earlier, during the Napoleonic Wars, was somber and striking. Then it was other countries who were held back by rigid and outmoded internal demarcations, divisions and privileges in trade and industry--entrepreneurs and engineers who were untrammelled, free to carry forward the Industrial Revolution how they liked... Then it was Britain's enemy, France, who depended on British products even in wartime; now it was Britain who was dependent on others."
90 It gets worse: because their agricultural industry was also "decrepit" (Britain had done the easy thing and imported cheaper food rather than growing and improving their domestic ag supply); they had basically ruined British farms through underinvestment over time.
91ff The author goes into a discussion of the doctrine of liberalism which was essentially the root philosophical cause of the hollowing out of Britain's industry and agriculture, the increase in its dependency on other countries, etc. [This is exactly what the United States is doing today as neoliberalism/neoglobalism caused us to offshore our industrial capacity, and so we just import cheap stuff from wherever, and we are forget how to make the things we used to make. Except in those days the "neoliberal ideal" was that the state should dwindle away into maybe just a policeman, today the state is growing into a monster apparatus.] "...Free trade, keystone of liberalism, which was to exercise a long lived and as painful effect on British power" as anything else pretty much, the belief here was anti-mercantilist, a big shift from Britain's prior history, also there was an underlying assumption that comparative advantage was a thing to be submitted to. "In any event, Adam Smith erected a 'scientific' theory out of the passing circumstances of his own era. He could not foresee that national defence would come to depend not just on seamen and naval stores but on total industrial and economic capability... to give one small example, he believed that free trade could not ruin British cattle-raising because it was impossible to transport enough meat on the hoof into the country. Yet one hundred years after this confident judgment refrigerated steamships began to bring in meat in immense quantities from all over the world."
93 One rather ironic thing here is how the author is criticizing (traditional) small-government liberalism as a doctrine, and how the English had "nourished deep suspicion of the state" and obviously implicit here is the author's view that the state in England's case ought to be much larger: dictating ag policy, directing and protecting important industries, making decisions on imports and exports, and of course this decidedlely non-liberal (again, using the traditional 19th century definition of "liberal" here) position means you need a bigger state and a bigger government. But the problem is that bigger nation-states with big governments get involved in wars, big centralized nation-states abrogate the rights of their people, are much less answerable to the people, they grow huge faceless Kafkaesque bureaucracies, etc. It's a paradox and an insoluble problem.
94 Yet another form of arrogance in English culture at the time: there was a generally-held idea that the British were innately better engineers and businessmen; again this rhymes with modern Americans thinking that they're better at an entrepreneurship (actually they think they're basically better at everything).
97 "The decade of the 1860s marked a great watershed in the fortunes of British industry. In 1860 Italy was unified into a nation state. In 1865 the United States emerged from the Civil War and embarked on an enormous industrial expansion. In 1868 Japan began her astonishing leap from the Middle Ages to modernity. In 1870 Prussia beat France, a victory leading in 1871 to the unification of Germany under Prussia's formidable leadership. This was the most ominous development of them all." The author goes on to discuss Prussia's benefits from the German university system, its significantly better-educated populace compared to England; at the same time England was resting on its laurels after completing maybe the first couple innings of industrialization, at the vary time it was getting lapped by all these countries. Note also that the so-called "captains" of British industry were basically losers: the main companies were led by sons or grandsons of the "ruthless" founders, these generations were complacent and "constipated with inherited wealth." [What a wonderful phrase!] Thus the liberal doctrine that "the entrepreneur would respond to competition" fell flat because these constipatedly wealthy men actually were not entrepreneurs, they were just smug boardroom dwellers.
98ff Extended discussion here of England's education level compared to the Continental education systems across various classes and various layers of the labor force.
102ff Also on the liabilities of being a wealthy country, having past wealth rather than building new wealth. "The international wealth accumulated earlier in the century also helped to cushion the British from the realities of their industrial decline. This wealth, more of it invested abroad than at home, was multiplying itself. The British grew richer while their industrial capabilities grew poorer--a gruesome paradox." [Again, this should sound eerily familiar to any objective observer of the modern American economy.]
103ff There's a genuinely gross blurb here on the level of health of English pupils at elementary schools: on how dirty they were as characterized by surveys/reports on how many had hair infested with nits, how many had decayed teeth, etc. The author talks about this being the primary education of the people who'd be leading Britain a generation later, and their future workers, etc. "British educational neglect in the nineteenth century artificially created (as had been predicted) a stupid, lethargic, unambitious, unenterprising people for the twentieth century. The consequences were insidiously to affect many fields of national performance." [Once again, one can't help but think about the average American student, ill-read, innumerate, bereft of critical thinking skills, etc.]
105 It was only in 1902 that a coherent national system of education was put into place, a system that roughly approximated what Germany had already done.
106 On the growing alarm in England about the strides Germany was making and a desire to copy aspects of it and let go of British liberal individualism. "Though Bismarkian Germany was the evident model, there was a great English precedent for the aims of imperialism and national efficiency in the mercantilist state of Elizabeth I and Cromwell."
107ff Discussion of a highly predictive book from J.R. Seeley in 1884, The Expansion of England, where he saw the fact that Germany and France were surpassing England, but saw likewise that Russia and the United States would surpass England even more so; likewise he foresaw the idea that India actually increased Britain's "dangers and responsibilities" rather than increasing its power or security. This book actually proposed the idea of creating a federal state of all the British empire, at least the developed/white colonies. But the author says the idea was "politically impracticable." The serious colonies were becoming nations on their own and unlikely to join an imperial union. Likewise there was no political will domestically to put something like this into place.
111 Discussion here of the Fabian socialists Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb, who saw a choice between two possible outcomes: "Britain as a great world-empire of the future or as two islands in the North Sea."
112ff "Even under German gunfire the British Awakening proved slow and reluctant." Basically the leadership of the country had no idea about anything of the nature of modern industrial operations, were delusional about Britain's place and "It was not until June 1915, ten months after the outbreak of war, that the government finally assumed responsibility for organizing and directing the whole industrial and economic life of the country... When British guns on the Western Front had to be rationed to four rounds each a day, it had last became clear that liberal individualism would not suffice." The author then describes a great contrast in mobilization of England going forward, essentially a second industrial revolution. "Gone was the smugness and lethargy." English electrical generating capacity doubled between 1914 and 1918, a great British chemical industry was created, many other examples: ball bearing production doubled during the war, electric bulb production quadrupled, optical glass production increased 60 times etc., There were also significant improvements in medical care and housing for employees, sports clubs, etc., basically living standards got much better. [This is yet another awful paradox of modern war: it's like civilizations get into a state of decay, then they erupt into international conflict between each other and then somehow manage to capture certain scale benefits from various wartime inventions or economic growth during that war that end up helping the society afterwards, it's a strange paradox and maybe "a feature not a bug" of human civilization]
120 "And the British and imperial effort in the Great War had not at all altered the fundamental anomalies and weaknesses in British power. The empire remained, on balance, a colossal burden: there was India and the strategic overextension it involved; there was the colonial empire, small return for much responsibility; there were the 'white' dominions, incapable of their own defence and yet contributing per head a fraction of what the British paid out to defend everybody under the Union flag... It all came to this: British responsibilities vastly exceeded British strength. This was not power but weakness."
IV An Imperial Commonwealth
123ff Section starts with a quote from Sir John Seeley from 1883 asking if the Empire is "a mischievous encumbrance" and how would we deal with "the problem of getting rid of it"... The author follows up by saying no one seriously entertained the idea of getting rid of parts of the Empire, or any part of the empire between the wars for sure, even the Liberal and Labour parties thought this way. [It's worth realizing that no nation-state ever willingly gives up territory unless it has, to it's not in the nature of a state]; on the Empire as a trust rather than "a mere source of wealth and power as our ancestors had seen it." The author compares the "cheerfully rapacious colonial past" to the current post-Evangelical "twinge of guilt" leaving England with a responsibility to make amends; with this kind of overall mindset the idea of dismantling the Empire on purpose occurred to no one. It was like an unquestioned inherited family estate. "Yet however admirable the British respect for the cultures and personalities of the peoples under their rule, however Christian the British Spirit of guardianship, British colonial policy was an absurdity when considered in terms of British power."
125ff The author contrasts British policy with French, Dutch and Belgian colonial policy, which was to prioritize making the imperial power richer and stronger.
132ff "In the 20 years which divided the world wars, the British therefore, failed to make the colonial empire much more of an asset than it had been in 1918." Some statistics here from the English colony of Nigeria, where the government refused to sanction a plantation system, and palm oil exports doubled from 1906 to 1936, while in the Belgian Congo they rose 10x from 1909 to 1928, and then tripled again in the next eight years; other examples, like Malaya which produced enormous amounts of tin and rubber, yet England "neglected" it, whereas the Chinese and Japanese extracted far more of the region's resources. Likewise other examples: Trinidad for raw materials like petroleum; interesting here also how the author addresses the strategies of Germany to penetrate bordering countries like the Balkans, thereby enjoying far more resources than anything England managed to get from their colonial resources.
133ff Note that the colonies collectively used more than a sixth of the British Army in garrison duties (!) and nearly a third of the British army was garrisoned in India in peacetime. Upgrading India would have been a colossal task and England had limited powers to bring it about; the Indian Mutiny showed that it was dangerous interfering with an entrenched culture; "it took the power and ruthlessness of the 18th century landowners in England or the Soviet regime in Russia" to manage and organize large-scale agriculture, control the peasantry, etc. "even "die-hard opponents of Indian self-government like Churchill" knew India "was more of a burden than an asset." "The British thought perhaps even less clearly about India than about their other problems." They still thought of it as "the key to Britain's place as a world power." Churchill himself thought this way. The author describes India as a keystone of an imperial arch "that existed solely in order to support the keystone," basically little more than an obligation to fulfill.
138ff On the myth and romantic aspects of India that captured British imagination; the writings of Rudyard Kipling and George Alfred Henty [see reading suggestions at the bottom of this post], also India was a significant avenue of opportunity and social advancement for English officers, clergy, and also the staffs of the various businesses there. "Everybody in the British governing classes had a friend or a relative who had been in India, was in India, or was going to India."
139ff On the 1935 parliamentary debate on the Government of India bill where the Labour party advocated Independence for India; Churchill was seen at the time as a wild man, radically far to the right, as he argued that Indian welfare required more honest British autocracy there, and also arguing that it would be for the good of India for the British to stay there. Basically nobody was thinking of British interests at all there, not even Churchill!
140ff Interesting passage here where the author criticizes the English education system put in place for Indians in India, because it created an intelligentsia class which then unified at the Indian National Congress in Calcutta: this gave the intelligentsia something to do: to talk about independence. The irony was that the vast majority of the population was ignorant of any of these issues, the people were notother politically minded at all, most Indians had no idea even what elections were, and as a people they were accustomed to autocracy. Thus what happened was the English Liberal party essentially created its own problem, a problem that should have never existed in the first place.
146ff In 1917 an error in British policy under Montagu, to make a statement regarding granting India some future self-government at some future date as yet unstated, which was "a revolutionary change in English policy." It also ended up undermining the English in India who lost authority as a result; it created a so-called halfway or quarterway house between autocracy and self-government; just the fact of openly talking about the process made it accelerate and happen faster than you want it to, because it led to a wave of political violence and subversion from 1918 to 1920, insurrections in the Punjab (which "were smashed in a few weeks"), but then when Reginald Dyer made his decision to fire on a hostile mob (the Jallianwallah Bagh incident), this led to a whole chain of events: denunciations from England, it gave the India Congress Party led by Gandhi a big spark to begin an unrelenting political war against the British (it was "heaven-sent ammunition"), Gandhi launches his strategy of non-cooperation, etc.
152 "Indeed the history of the French, Habsburg and Russian monarchies showed clearly enough that there could be no half-way or quarter-way houses between total autocracy and total abdication. If an autocracy can no longer rule by force of will and force of guns, concessions cannot preserve it, but only determine the manner of its extinction." [Legit realtalk here from the author.] Criticizing here how the English pursued the "liberal fantasy" in India. Note that Dyer was sacked and disgraced, his senior officers did not back him up, and this had a huge effect throughout the whole British structure in India. Suddenly keeping order was not the first object anymore, and Britain basically abased itself in front of India on some level; also Britain made naive attempts to appease India's Congress Party. Note also that the English in India lost total confidence in their home government and would not have their sons come out to earn a living or participate in Indian civil service anymore: "India is no longer a place for a white man to live" the Prince of Wales wrote to Montagu after a major tour and official visit to India. [This has interesting parallels to the American military, which has lost the confidence of its usual "warrior class" from the southern United States, alienating them thanks to mandated mRNA vaxes, aggressive woke policies, etc.]
154ff Another terrible irony is that this new policy of leniency actually cost more lives: the rebellion of 1920 took more than a year to be suppressed at the cost of 2000 casualties as well as thousands of Hindu casualties after Muslims reprisal attacks; compare this to the 1919 Punjab Rebellion which was ended in a few weeks at a cost of 500 lives. This also changed England's situation in India: "they no longer stood there with the assured ease of the conqueror, but stuck like a gum-boot in a bog." Basically they couldn't let go of India anyway, but in the meantime all they did was give more oxygen, pointlessly, to Indian nationalism. Essentially it was just another policy of appeasement, but with cycles of temporary firmness whenever cycles of subversion and rioting increased in India.
156 Quoting the Secretary of State for India saying it is "inconceivable" that India will ever self-govern, per the author, "an opinion upon which history is still in the course of delivering its verdict." [This is a rather condescending comment from the author right here about India, although given what was going on when this book came out in 1972 perhaps he is describing the India of his day fairly. Today India appears to be showing much more stability and statesmanship.]
158ff Further examples here of England using a policy of goodwill but then finding that it caused the Indians just to escalate their demands.
161-2 Another striking quote here, from Edward Thompson in 1932, citing Asiatic countries, that when facing any internal political activity, even if totally mild and constitutional, "promptly shoot and hang it out of existence, and inform the outside world that it was 'communism'. If you call a thing communism, you can do what you like to it, and get away with it." [Not unlike what the United States did throughout Latin America from the 1950s onward, starting with Arbenz in Guatemala...]
162 The author talks about here how British control of India went from more or less private agreements between the British government and the Viceroy and a few Indian politicians, and then morphed into sort of an open arena with much more publicity, and then also in the face of much more world public opinion. Unfortunately, if you want to have successful regime, it needs to be secret, invisible, behind the scenes, etc., you want to misdirect everybody, get them looking at the wrong thing.
162ff More comments here about romantic liberal idealism and its "naive trust in human nature"; its appeasement and the "disastrous and inevitable results" when it tries "to bring about the impossible." But then even when the Conservative government took over for Labour in 1931 it continued with appeasement and "the brave search for Indian goodwill."
165 Very harsh quote here about British administration of India in the 1930s: "In India, the British administrators hung on, doing the routine duty, caretakers without a purpose or a future, awaiting that unspecified day when the Indians would take possession. And the caution, the moral defensiveness, the pettifogging regard for legal and departmental precedent that now permeated the machinery of British administration from India Office in London to Delhi and beyond marked in themselves a senile weakening from the 'fierce nervous energy' that had once created the British Empire in India. Men like those who had conquered and ruled the Punjab in the 1840s and 1850s... were not exactly characteristic of the cumbersome, slow-moving and pedantic bureaucracy or the snobbery in etiquette of the social hierarchy of British India in the 1930s."
165 Also note that after 1934 when it was obvious that Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan represented dangers, India remained a liability, mostly set up to defend the Northwest Frontier, and still requiring a British Garrison equal to a third of the British army.
168ff So if England couldn't make much out of its Indian properties (or other non-white colonies), now the author moves on to England finding potential in its "white" Empire as a permanently functioning alliance; at least Canada and South Africa didn't need to be defended, but they resented the role Britain played in their affairs, not to mention the French speaking settlers of Canada resented the British Crown even more. Also, South Africa had 900,000 Boers to 300,000 people of British stock; "...the conquest of the Boers, completed only in 1902, was a fresh raw wound on their independence and pride of race." In any event England's gave South Africa self-government in 1909. This turned out to be a great act of statesmanship, but even so South Africa and Canada had misgivings about being locked into a collective with England.
172ff Australia and New Zealand by contrast were homogeneous populations almost entirely of British descent and much more tightly tied to the mother country, but also totally dependent on British protection, and separated by tremendous geographical distance. "The 'white' empire was indeed strategically absurd." There was no way even to communicate, air travel would only be for the future, radio telephony was in its infancy, etc.
179ff And then this white Empire, after at least having some harmony during this 1921 conference, practically detonated when the British Empire seemed about to go to war in Turkey, as Kemal Ataturk threw the Greeks out of Asia Minor and recovered much of their territory in the region. England fired off cables to the various dominions under Churchill's dictation asking them for armed assistance, assuming they would obediently respond. New Zealand pledged to help, Australia "returned a tepid assurance of support," South Africa and Canada reacted differently: after World War I, Canada was more determined to stay out of European troubles in wars in the future, and the Canadian leaders at that time had deep suspicion of British policy. Thus Canada, at least in terms of public opinion, was against sending troops. Mackenzie King, prime minister of Canada at the time: "...if membership of the British Empire meant dominions being involved in any and every British war without advance agreement, he could 'see no hope for an enduring relationship'." Note also this Turkish crisis was resolved with the Treaty of Lausanne in a peaceful settlement, but because the British delegation didn't include any of these Commonwealth States, they were considered basically as a single state, diplomatically speaking, no invitations were sent out to the other dominions, none of them actually signed the treaty, and this further justified the frustrations of these various states.
184ff December 1921: England concludes a treaty with the Catholic/Irish rebels, giving 26 counties of southern Ireland self-government as a dominion; this is a precedent of "utmost significance to the future of British power." Note that Ireland was a back door to England where England could be outflanked; see attacks by the Spaniards in 1600; also a French army in 1689 and again in 1797 attacked this way. The author describes how England was defeated in their own public forum and in their own Parliament by wanting to stand on principle; thus Lloyd George's government made a peace offer with the Irish "out of humanitarian qualms as yet rare in a barbarous world. Yet this was a demonstration that the British ruling classes and British public opinion after the Great War were ill-suited to the preservation of their imperial inheritance... If the British would not hold Ireland, what would they hold?"
186 Lloyd George subverted by his own conservative rank and file; steps down from being prime minister, is succeeded by Bonar Law, who retired due to ill health; and then replaced by Stanley Baldwin, leading a government that was naive, cautious and represented the triumph of "liberal moralism" with an "instinct to appease."
186ff An autopsy of the 1923 Imperial Conference with Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and Ireland, trying to work out what kind of collective agreement they might have, what commitments the countries would make to defense, and what kinds of conflicts they'd be willing get involved in, etc., Canada under Prime Minister Mackenzie King was the most intransigent of the countries, the conference was a failure on a bunch of levels. "The English cabinet had chosen to preserve the facade of an Empire entire and intact, at the cost of allowing the structure behind it to fall apart." Basically England can't go to a meeting of the League of Nations and say Great Britain has a policy, because they haven't been able to meet with and unify the views of all the other governments of the Empire, thus they essentially can't do anything diplomatic.
198ff Now moving on to the 1926 Imperial Conference: in South Africa Jan Smuts had been voted out of office by J.B.M Hertzog, who lacked Smuts' affection for Britain; Hertzog's goal was the right of secession and much more self-government, so he became an even more intransigent member of this so-called coalition. Ireland naturally took South Africa's side, and then the author writes, witheringly: "Here was a notable achievement of past liberal English statecraft: that two former imperial enemies should be collaborating inside of British imperial conference to break up the legal unity of the British Empire." This most recent conference left England as if it possessed no Empire at all, it was on its own at least far as events in Europe were concerned. "Yet at the same time she still retained an unlimited obligation outside Europe to protect the empire."
207ff "The Commonwealth had now become just a sentimental association of sovereign states under one Crown, somewhat akin to the old Holy Roman Empire." What was worse still was that the dominions--when there was advantage to be gained--would take it, thus the dominions enjoyed the best of both worlds; but Britain has suffered the worst of both worlds as it was funding a military for everyone and not getting any mutual benefit from it.
211ff "No imperial conference was held between 1930 and 1937" during a period of Japanese expansion, aggressive policies of Italy and the rise of Nazi Germany. "England failed even to evolve a smaller alliance with Australia and New Zealand, dominions which shared her concern for the defence of the Far East."
213ff On England letting the air transport industry slip through their fingers, after having created an aircraft industry in World War I and at the end of World War I holding the largest air force in the world; and also having the ability to use aircraft to bring Britain and the Far East and Pacific within days of each other instead of weeks; England allowed it to slip through their fingers during peacetime, and by the 1930s British aircraft "were backward in design and construction." Various other examples of England's losing ground in the civil air industry, allowing it to be dominated by Germany, the United States and France in route miles, even regular commercial flights from Great Britain to Australia via India didn't start until 1938.
215 Also interesting to see how Australia's government knew what time it was: they knew they couldn't depend on British statesmen to send a force to Australia's aid, "that Australia must look to her own security."
217ff Another point here: because the Commonwealth didn't have any kind of collective will or unity, England could not show a strong hand in preventing a war, even though it might actually be true that these other countries would come to its aid if it were directly attacked; but even then the dominions disarmed even more than England had since World War I; New Zealand and Australia for example at this time had hardly anything in terms of naval strength, very few soldiers, etc. Canada's total army was 3,600 men (!), South Africa didn't have any ships, etc, "hardly much of an asset to England" even if she could freely use it.
219ff Another twist: expert opinion now assumed German bombers would flatten British industry and so then it started to become more important by the late 1930s that England distribute its industrial base geographically across its dominion, in Canada for example. It was also becoming clear at this time that the Japanese military was a direct threat to Australia and New Zealand, thus a 1937 Imperial Conference took on more "awareness of crowding dangers" and yet the English even seem to shrink from what obligations they might face on behalf of their Pacific based dominions, maintaining an approach of "ingratiation and propitiation, like timid wives in the face of drunken or bullying husbands." [Again, the author has a withering pen.]
223ff The 1937 conference turned out to break down into factions: Australia and New Zealand versus Canada and South Africa, with England acting as referee. Canada's Mackenzie King didn't even want to make any resolutions at all because it would alarm his people back home that Canada had reached some kind of collective decision in the first place. "The conference ended; the delegates went home; an England was left as alone and unsupported as ever."
229ff A year after the imperial conference of 1937 came the 1938 Munich crisis, with German demands on Czechoslovakia; here Chamberlain negotiated only on behalf of England, while the dominions "were happily seated in the back seat, refusing to take responsibility for the policy" and not giving any strategic weight whatsoever to back it up; even Australia said that was never on the hook for any troops; this was "fresh proof that the British Commonwealth did not exist as a factor in international relations in times of peace." And of course with the Czechoslovakia appeasement all this was really starting to matter at this time; what was worse was at the same time that England found itself basically on its own with no help or commitments made by its dominions, dominions like Australian and New Zealand were not even paying per capita anything near what England was spending for military, and England was their only source of potential survival: they were utterly reliant on English military power with their tiny populations and gigantic land masses, "defenseless against serious attack."
232 In the first year of World War II Britain would supply 90% of the entire empire's munitions.
232 The author concludes here that the white dominions just like India was not an asset but a "predicament" [a wonderful turn of phrase]. "The English and their romantic idealism about the Empire had failed to see it and deal with it in terms of English power. ...a ramshackle, anomalous but immense structure of entanglement."
232ff "...if the Empire itself were to be attacked simultaneously, then its demands would pump away from England the military resources she needed for her own war in Europe. For England was hardly a big enough power to fight one other great nation, let alone two or three. From this it followed that it was vital, absolutely vital, for English statesmanship to avert that contingency which the Empire made so possible--embroilment with more than one first class power in more than one region of the world at a time."
[This chapter could have been made a third as long, for example all the extended discussions about the various Imperial Conferences could have been summarized far more briefly.]
V Covenants Without Swords
238 Examples here of England framing itself as enlightened and holding other countries like Fascist Italy to their standard when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935; On England holding an "idealistic" and "chivalric" view of international geopolitics [Note that the United States is committing the same mistake in the sense that we think we can export democracy to places that don't want it or aren't ready for it, or we commit errors of solipsism and fail to understand the motivations of other countries, confusing their values with our own.]
239ff British diplomacy "had something of the air of a British family motorist of the era proceeding with cautious deliberation and much hand signaling down the middle of the road in one of the under-powered and upright saloons then produced by the British motor industry; and British diplomacy was, like the British driver, apt to be at once bewildered and indignant when cut up by faster operators." They considered propaganda distasteful, got rid of the propagandist activities of the old wartime organization, "there was here neither the cunning and stealth of the Elizabethans nor the peremptory authority of the Commonwealth of England, nor the shrewdness of men of the world like Castlereagh and Wellington, but an essentially naive public-school decency ill-adapted to the unscrupulous self-interest of contemporary foreign diplomacy." "Whereas the pre-Victorian Englishman had been renowned for his quarrelsome temper and his willingness to back his argument with his fists--or his feet--now the modern British, like the elderly, shrank from conflict or unpleasantness of any kind."
241ff Quoting Lord Curzon and others with an idealistic belief of Britain's moral authority, believing for example that when Hitler invaded Austria in 1938 before the Czech crisis that Germany would be impacted by World opinion, that somehow righteous indignation would actually influence geopolitics [we are seeing how effective "righteous indignation" has been at stopping Israeli brutality in Gaza for example, not effective in the least]; also on a "parsonical belief in the powers of moral reprobation" while rejecting actual power. To use actual power was seen as cynical and immoral somehow. The author describes it by writing "This was about as sensible as denouncing aircraft designers who took note of aerodynamics." Also on the "astonishing British faith in treaties" "Faith in parchment, belief in moral force and a denial of the reality of power."
243ff Quoting Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century "Covenants without swords are but words." The author puts this in context of the League of Nations, which was basically a paper agreement with no force behind it, it possessed no "sword" and by default England and France were pretty much were the only forces behind it and they both disarmed after WWI; America refused to join, in reality there were perils to England of membership because there was an implicit obligation to maintain the status quo of the entire world, not just purely looking after English interests, thus England could get caught up fighting with powers with which it had no direct quarrel; finally the League created a sense of security that wasn't really there.
247ff The author discusses the various arguments against the League of Nations from within the British government: most of these arguments were persuasive to the point of being bulletproof, but yet were dismissed by the British government as the world was kind of taken over by this idea that mankind had somehow "repented and begun afresh" after World War I.
248ff On the signing of the treaty of Versailles, British sea power reached its apogee relatively speaking because all of Germany's naval power was eliminated by the treaty; the British Navy was larger than the French and United States Navy together, twice as big as Japan and Italy together; also further discussion here of the total demilitarization of Germany after World War I.
250 On the rise of Japan during since opening to the West in 1868; on the Japanese mentality venerating the warrior, "achieving fulfillment In dying by violence," a mindset that would look at British diplomacy, moralizing and idealism as totally incomprehensible. The other problem here was that England had of all four nations the largest stake in trade and investment in China and also in various other Southeast Asian communities like Indochina, Borneo and other colonies that were rich in raw materials and natural resources, like oil, tin, rice, etc. Thus the dangers of Japanese growing power were obvious.
251ff Note also in 1902 England and Japan had negotiated a formal alliance, due to be renewed in 1922; this was to deal with Russian expansion in the Far East. Ironically it seems that China or America might be the third party that Japan might find itself at war with, and so this was an entanglement that was even worse for England. Note also that Japan behaved honorably during World War I as an ally with England, Australia and New Zealand.
252ff On the decision to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922 when the original reasons went away with Germany and Russia no longer being threats at this time; there were good reasons to renew this alliance but it also "carried with it the certainty of American ill-will." Basically England had to make a hard choice between Japan and the United States.
254ff Interesting discussion here on England's traditional approach to a choice like this, which would be to ally with the weaker team against the stronger, because it prevents the strong from becoming too strong, and it protects England from allying with powers much greater than itself; thus the correct policy would have been to renew the Japanese alliance. It was totally obvious at this point that the United States was going to be the superpower of the future. This is a very interesting discussion here.
255ff More interesting discussion here of "the accumulating pressure of American power against her interests." On the US forcing England to submit to arbitration in a dispute with Venezuela; on the US placing the Panama Canal under its control and fortifying it, which put the entire Caribbean and transit to the Pacific under the control of the US; further US expansion in the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and then by using tariffs the US was able to close these markets to British merchants to the benefit of American companies. It was a "persistent encroachment, little softened by tact or grace." [I did not realize what mercantilist dicks the USA was to England during this period.]
256ff Even more interesting comments here on growing economic might and growing economic encroachments on British markets globally; see for example America's involvement in the First World War where they used the military "as a cloak for pushing American influence and trade" in places like Asia Minor, Iraq. The author also cites widespread ill will towards England among the American people, especially 18 million Americans who were either German or Irish. "In 1900 England was so much hated that it was only by a narrow majority that the annexation of Canada failed to get adopted as a republican plank in the presidential election." (!!!) Also comments here on the events taking place between 1895 and 1902, where England had ignored a "very real collision of interest" and "signed 'what were virtually treaties of surrender'" with the United States. At the same time "the British governing classes were "infatuated" with "a mythical America conjured up by their own romantic vision." [If you look at all this through the lens of the mercantile era, you actually can agree with the author that he makes a surprisingly strong argument that the United States was a bigger threat to Britain and that Britain allied with the wrong team! And then of course to look at what the US has been doing with its massive global influence ever since, it really makes you wonder. All this brings to mind Kissinger's famous dictum, it is dangerous to be an enemy of the United States but it is lethal to be a friend.]
260 Interesting passage here basically about British limousine liberals being exposed to elites of the US East Coast and assuming from this that the two cultures were identical, since the two classes of people had the same Anglo-Saxon roots; see also how American heiresses seemed to marry into English aristocracy: Rudyard Kipling, Winston Churchill's father, even Lord Curzon "were among the influential Englishmen blessed with American wives." [Note that "blessed with American wives" is one of those beautiful sentences that an Englishman will write and an American will read and not know whether it is sarcasm or not. If it is sarcasm this is a hilarious, hilarious sentence, one of the best in the entire book.]
261 "However, outside the ken of statesman, peers, clerics, dons and writers, there was another and more important America--the America of soaring industrial production, of lawlessness and violence; the America of two-thirds of the population who were not of English stock, and for whom the ideas of common history and common cultural inheritance meant nothing whatsoever. This was the America that British businessmen and technologists saw; and they recognized it as the most dangerous of threats to British prosperity and independence--more dangerous than that of Imperial Germany." [Note that one could make a similar error today to assume there is an Anglo-Saxonish or even a broad Europeanish nature to the USA anymore; we have taken on such enormous numbers of non-European immigrants since 1965 that doubtless the culture has changed radically from the pan-European US culture of the early 20th century.]
262 "...the myth of the special family relationship [with the USA] had become part of the furniture of the British mind." [It's worth filing this quote in your mind: it goes towards holding false premise that colors everything about how you think about reality, it misdirects your understanding of reality, and it's done a way that is hard to see; when it's the furniture you don't really notice or pay any attention to it.] {Note also that the USA uses this myth when it suits our needs (see both Iraq wars for example) and not when it doesn't; thus the myth just serves as another "entanglement" for England!]
263 All of these misperceptions of the so-called "our American cousins" view of the United States played a role in the Japanese discussions in 1922.
265 The delegates discussing the Anglo-Japanese treaty renewal are described by the author as in "a state of immobility rather like that of the louse in the experiment, starving to death in a tube half-way between a bright light and its dinner, unable to forgo the attractions of either."
268ff What ultimately emerged was the Washington conference, sort of three-in-one conference of nine powers, four powers and five powers, but the key agreements were between Japan, England and the USA to eliminate naval construction and reduce/limit fortifications in various places in the Pacific; this gave Japan essentially control of the waters of China, and ultimately this was a catastrophe for English power even though this conference saved the English Navy and English government a ton of money from not having to build a bunch of new ships; it was also well-received by the British public and it protected England from having to choose between Japan and America when the Anglo-Japanese treaty was up for renewal, so it solved certain problems; however it essentially formalized a kind of competition between England and Japan.
275 A couple of intriguing quotes here, one from H.G. Wells being oblivious to the likelihood of future war and the assumption that we are entering some kind of new age of reason, and another from Winston Churchill (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) being oblivious at the growing threat of Japan. "A war with Japan! But why should there be a war with Japan? I do not believe there is the slightest chance of it in our lifetime." [It's also really noteworthy here how nobody knew who was going to be on whose side, even as late as the late 1920s: England was concerned about conflict with Japan slightly, as well as conflict with Russia and Germany, but there was even some degree of competition economically with the US although England and the US would probably never come to military conflict; generally though, it wasn't clear who was going to be teaming up against whom.]
277ff On the so-called Ten Year Rule: disarmament eventually led England's Treasure to want to economize, thus it became sort of a guiding principle of British defense policy to assume there will be no major war for ten years, and it "was made self perpetuating in 1928." [As if you could actually know that there would be a perpetual ten year time delay between any conflict and today. And worse that you could always remain ten years away from preparedness!] "The leaders of the armed forces recognized at the time, as have most historians since, that the ten-year-rule was a calamitous act of policy. It took all sense of urgency and reality of purpose from strategic planning and defence policy. It provided the Treasury with a simple and effective weapon for crushing any service demand for funds for research or development. The ten-year-rule was one of Churchill's least happy contributions to English history, and was to be a major cause of his own difficulties as War Premier after 1940."
279 On the broad-based strategy that was based on a naval base built in Singapore with oil storage and a garrison that could theoretically hold its own for weeks or even months before being attacked by an enemy like Japan [ultimately in World War II Japan attacked by surprise and overwhelmed it in very short order].
283 1928: a confab of nations in Paris signed a pact "solemnly renouncing war as an instrument of policy... The League of Nations was now at the height of its prestige" doing things like assuring school children "that there could never be another war because the League would 'stop it'." [Again, delusional faith in a piece of parchment.]
288ff Further agreements to weaken English seapower, culminating in 1930 with the "maiming" of English sea power completed by the Labour government, as England decided to cease work on the new Singapore base for five more years, also discussion and biography of Labor Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, a simple man brought up in poverty in Glasgow who converted to Methodism and who "brought to the corrupt, vicious and power-ridden business of foreign affairs all the decencies of English life in a red brick Victorian suburb; the simplicity, the honesty, the guilelessness, the warmth of heart, the neighbourliness; the complete insularity." He carried around in his pocket a little set of verses addressed to "Mothers of Little Sons".... The author compares this piker of a government figure to giants like Palmerston who occupied the same role for England in the past. Henderson had a tremendous belief in the "parchment" of the League of Nations, and it was "beyond his imagination that men could and would fail to keep their pledged word." [Amazing to read about this guy and his naive, innocent solipsism.]
294 Reference here to "the gigantic arches of Piranesi's imagination" which sent me to a rabbit hole because I first thought of the unusual novel Piranesi by Susanna Clarke, which then showed me Clarke's book was an interesting reference to the architect Giovanni Battista Piranesi, who was famous for his theoretical, imaginary architectural images. The author is talking here about the League of Nations and the fact that British statesmans' belief in it was a structure of fantasy that they confused with a firm foundation.
294 Interesting example of politicians getting the arrow of causality the wrong way: foreign secretary Arthur Henderson "believed that the problem of the power of nation-states and the problem of their mutual fear could both be solved by universal disarmament. Indeed Henderson shared the widespread conviction that it was armaments that caused the fear between nations rather than the fear that led to the armaments. The Great War was now widely if simple-mindedly blamed on 'the armament race', rather than on all the profound and complex social, economic, political and psychological tensions of pre-war Europe."
296ff Now in 1930 and 1931 we have a nearly successful coup d'etat in Japan; Germany's Chancellor begins ruling by emergency decree, and Hitler's Nazi party went from 12 to 107 seats in the German Parliament, becoming the second largest party; at the same time the Labour party running England continue to worship the ten-year rule; at this point the author writes "There were no adequately defended ports in the British Commonwealth." And the British Army and Royal Air Force have been reduced even further.
298ff Money quote here: "Thus by 1931 moralising internationalism had run its full course in disarming England materially and spiritually. It was a course which had completely borne out Sir Maurice Hankey's warning in 1916 that the creation of a League of Nations would lead to 'a sense of security which is wholly fictitious'; that it would lull the country to sleep; that it would put 'a very strong lever in the hands of the well-meaning idealists... who deprecate expenditure on armaments...' it only remained for the final part of Hankey's warning to be fulfilled: his prediction that the creation of a League of Nations would almost certainly result in this country being caught at a disadvantage.
"On the night of 18 September 1931, this omission was repaired. The Japanese Army began to take over the Chinese province of Manchuria by force of arms." Japan then went to attack Shanghai, which was actually a direct broadside against Britain militarily: not only was the "parchment" of the League of Nations under threat but England's own interests likewise were under threat, and this was at a time where England had absolutely zero ability to mount any kind of military resistance to Japan's aggression in the region. Likewise on the international front, the whole idea of the League of Nations was for the law-abiding powers of the world to stand up against a "bandit state" and "to act as policemen. Unfortunately the policeman had been persuaded to give up their truncheons."
301 First the cabinet agrees to rescind the ten-year-rule (!) although Neville Chamberlain, at the time Chancellor of the Exchequer, opposed this "on the grounds that the country could not afford it." "All this offered a painful and dangerous lesson that it took longer for England to build ships and naval bases than for a foreign country [Japan] to change its government and policy."
301ff Also, ironies of ironies, there was a settlement recommendation from the League of Nations in February 1933, but the Japanese simply ignored it. [!!!] Worse, the United States only offered words and didn't get involved at all, they simply endorsed the League of Nations settlement recommendation that Japan ignored! "The British had sacrificed their alliance with Japan in order to obtain American goodwill; and now that they were face to face with Japan in arms, goodwill was exactly what they got from America." Ironically what followed was some of the statesman realized that the League of Nations itself was impotent, and even worse, Britain was completely impotent militarily, and Britain and France had no ability to persuade all the other members of the League of Nations to act as a policeman; the organization was worthless, but England's government did not dare reveal this to the public in England, even less to reveal the same impotence in the British Commonwealth as well. The author frames this as the government being afraid of the "romantic prejudices of public opinion, even when they did not share these prejudices themselves." Meaning the government was actually starting to understand what time it was, but they weren't willing to tell the time to the people: they'd rather maintain the illusion that things were totally, completely, absolutely under control.
304ff Britain doofed out even more here with the decision to reprove Japan in public for their aggression, this was unacceptable to the Japanese sense of honor and face. This was in 1933 when "the German danger began to stalk again in Europe."
305ff On the fact that England tends to forget how close geopolitically they are to Europe and on how easily English governments "succumb to the delusion that it was possible to remain safely and tranquilly insulated from the troubles of Europe." On Britain's general heuristic to make sure that there was always an equilibrium between the great powers of Europe and no single state could dominate the continent. Also on the 45-year period of the "Concert of Europe" after the 1815 defeat of Napoleon, "forty-five years in which Europe was free of the incubus of a super-power." Then in 1871 Bismarck unified Germany under Prussian leadership, and Germany economically and demographically became dominant in Europe. Obviously this climaxed with World War I where "Germany came within an ace of defeating the French and British armies in the field before the United States Army could decisively intervene." England had to get involved because it could not just stand by and let France go down as well as allow the Low Countries to be overrun as Germany violated their neutrality.
308ff Good postmortem on France's perspective on Germany after World War I, wanting to permanently limit Germany's capacity "to disturb the equilibrium of Europe."
310 Quite a strikingly (and unintentionally) predictive comment from Balfour here articulating what he thought were the paranoid views of the French about Germany: "They [the French] draw a lurid picture of Franco-German relations. They assume that the German people will always far outnumber the French; that as soon as the first shock of defeat has passed away, Germany will organize herself for revenge; that all our attempts to limit armaments will be unsuccessful; that the League of Nations will be impotent; and, consequently, that the invasion of France, which was fully accomplished in 1870, and partially accomplished in the recent War, will be renewed with every prospect of success." What's fascinating here is Balfour was mocking the French paranoia of their worldview of their relations and cycles of history with Germany but it turned out this mocking comment was unbelievably predictive more than anybody would ever guess... and it was made in 1919!
312ff Discussion of Germany's war guilt after World War I, the requirement to pay reparations, the desire to extradite and even hang emperor Wilhelm, although he had fled to Holland; these were all new things to be done after a war; also on the elimination of the German monarchy, all the related princes also stepped down, this kind of destroyed the center of gravity of German culture. Also in defiance of France's wish to physically take over the Rhineland and the Saar coal region, they were talked down to more of a compromise to have the Rhineland as a buffer state garrisoned by allied troops until 1935; also the in the Saar France would only receive ownership of the coal mines, not the land itself; it was more in the East where Germany lost more territory, by losing Silesia and Poznan, which were given to the new state of Poland, as well as the Polish corridor so that Poland would have access to the sea (this split up the land between Germany and East Prussia); also Danzig (now Gdansk) became a free city, Czechoslovakia was formed as a new state, etc., see photo:
315ff Comments here on the relative impotence even of the winning side of World War I because their population wanted them to demobilize as fast as possible.
316 Note that the redrawing of Europe, especially of Eastern Europe, made it so that "Germany now faced only states very much smaller and weaker than herself; states whose German minorities and former German territories offered her the liveliest possible incentive for renewed expansion in the future." [One thought that strikes me about this book is that it's almost too easy for the author to criticize every decision in retrospect, while knowing exactly what happened afterwards. We all know that everybody did everything wrong leading up to WWII and Hitler, Hitler, Hitler. A more fair analysis would be to distinguish between what was known at the time and what could not have been known at the time, and what could have been done given that specific epistemic circumstance.]
318ff Other aspects of a proto-appeasement policy towards Germany in the early 1920s was an understanding that you needed Germany to be a buffer for Communism, that the now that Germany's monarchy was gone and its military was permanently weakened, maybe we can dial back the harshness of our treaty so that Germany wouldn't be resentful in the future.
319ff On Anglo-French animosity after World War I, where the French lived in terror of Germany going to war against her again whereas England seemed to instantly forget World War I and wish for reconciliation and a renewal of friendship; see even Churchill's comments on this at the Imperial Conference of 1921. Also there was a sort of "Dickensian sentimentality" for supporting the underdog now that Germany was in ruins. The French also couldn't help notice that the Junkers still dominated the military, the industrialists who were behind Germany's pre-war policies were still in control of German industry, etc., yet the British, with "characteristically naive optimism" saw the Weimar Republic as a "successful new achievement of liberalism."
323 Interesting allegations here that the British knew the Germany was concealing its military strength and rebuilding efforts and was not ignorant of it but willfully muffled reports on it; as early as 1928 Germany had army strength of two million men instead of the 100,000 allowed under the treaty of Versailles. England was solicitous and appeasing towards Germany throughout the 1920s and later this gave initiative to Germany, "enabling her to fight diplomatically from the strongest of positions, strategically offensive, tactically defensive. This initiative was ruthlessly and successfully exploited by German governments from 1920 through to 1938."
325ff On great friction between England and France when France proposed occupying the Ruhr industrial region in 1923, in order to punish Germany for evading reparations payments; the English denounced this, but France saw it as a final opportunity to split up Germany: Note that at the same time there were separatist movements in Saxony and Bavaria, there were communist and nationalist putsches in the country, etc. Interesting: this actually might have worked out to limit German dominance going forward, but Britain stood against it. Note that the following year, in 1924 the French government changed, switching to a left-wing government which began the road to reconciliation with Germany.
327ff On The Little Entente: France's efforts to form alliances with the smaller states of Eastern Europe like Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; this was understandable in order to counter German power, but at the same time looked a lot like British alliances with her dominion allies: in other words, France believed that these smaller countries increased her strength, but in reality "they weakened her by burdening her with the obligation to protect them."
329 Cute quote here describing the English foreign secretary Austin Chamberlain (older half brother of Neville Chamberlain by the way) from 1924-9: "Coldly handsome, distinguished by eyeglass and orchid" [what??]. Also: "It was cruelly said of Austin Chamberlain that he always played the game and always lost it."
Good show old bean, jolly good show!
331 On the 1925 treaty of Locarno which the author witheringly describes as "a collective act of escapism...but as a folio of parchment the treaty was handsome enough." [Again, belief in parchment, in ignorance of reality.]
334 "The skill of German diplomacy in harping on a grievance and exploiting tender Anglo-Saxon consciences, a scale equaled perhaps only by Gandhi, succeeded in getting both the total of reparations and the pace of payment reduced in 1924 and again in 1929." Note also American loans to Germany enabled these sums to be paid, in fact the loans were triple any reparations paid by Germany during the 1920s and the author claims "the difference went largely into creating Germany's new industrial power."
335ff 1930: the official end of military presence in the Rhineland which was part of the agreement at The Hague the prior year, this was yet another renegotiation of Versailles more or less, but the author considers The Hague agreement to be a "strategic catastrophe" because now the demilitarization of the Rhine was dependent only on Germany's good faith or the willingness of the French to turn out invading German forces all over again; this was "a calamitous weakening of France's defensive position." Germany responded ("like good troops" as the author phrases it) by pushing for more: withdrawal from the Saar region, discussions on the Polish corridor, etc. At this point also the Nazi party went from 12 seats to 107 seats, became the number two party under a stated policy of totally destroying the Versailles Treaty; likewise in 1930 there's clear evidence that Germany was "evading the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty."
337ff At this point the author argues that British continued with a policy of appeasement and reconciliation, but furthermore the British government was influenced more by fear, recognizing that the European situation was worsening and Germany was representing more of a menace, and their response was to accommodate, concede and cringe even more.
342ff Discussion here of the British Chiefs of staff, in their annual review of 1932, "a relentless analysis" given various changes in the world situation in June 1931: economic slump, the pound dropping off the gold standard, Japan in Manchuria, recognizing the tremendous lack of military readiness in England, citing that while other countries inculcated defense of their country as the first duty of their citizens, in England the state was encouraging intense propaganda throughout schools, churches, the press, radio for ignoring this important role. The cabinet responded by ending the ten-year-rule but only after much debate. "Nothing was actually set in motion to repair the weaknesses the Chiefs of Staff had catalogued." The government took it for granted that England could play "the headmasters role in world affairs" and yet "they still saw no necessary connection between strategic power and policy."
344 Five separate elections in nine months in Germany, and by 1932 the Nazis became the largest party with 230 seats, doubling their positon over 1930; yet they were still short of an absolute majority to make Hitler Chancellor. But in January 1933 with a backroom deal, Hitler then became Chancellor. Next, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations.
345ff At this point England's strategic predicament was dissected by the British Chiefs of Staff with a 1934 subcommittee report that recognized that Japan was a more immediate threat than Germany, but that it would probably be a second-order threat after some danger occurred to England from Germany; in other words there were people in the government that understood the likely future dynamic. This report also urged cultivating better relations with Japan and interfering in any rapprochement between Japan and Germany, it also noted that "our subservience to the United States of America in past years has been one of the principal factors in the deterioration of our former good relations with Japan."
350 "As they [the British Chiefs of Staff] rather wistfully, and, in the circumstances, naively put it: 'That we should be called upon to fight Germany and Japan simultaneously without Allies is a state of affairs to the prevention of which our diplomacy would naturally be directed.'" [!!!] [The phrasing is so indirect as to be effeminate, but at least the top military guys appeared to understand who they were up against and what the actual circumstances were.]
350ff Now England finds itself with a new enemy, Italy, which was clearly already appearing to want to conquer Abyssinia (the author parenthetically describes it as "A primitive African state which counted slavery among its institutions") as early as 1933. By 1935 Italy became a clear threat to international peace. "Here was an affair which in former times would have concerned only Italy and the Abyssinians. By 3 January 1935, however, Haile Selassie, the emperor of Abyssinia, had appealed to the Council of the League of Nations to safeguard peace; i.e. to preserve Abyssinia." [The idea here is of course that your celebrated "parchment" automatically causes any kind of conflict to scale up into potential global crisis, in other words it's the same problem as the alliance is leading up to World War I. Once again, your alliances aren't really alliances, they are entanglements, they are a source of fragility.] The author also quotes a letter of Lord Allen, the pacifist, writing to his young daughter Polly, where he articulates how the League of Nations works in a situation like this: the letter is quite striking to read, it's sort of an infantile and naive idea written to a young daughter so it's rhetorically pretty powerful, but the idea that cold, clear-eyes statesmen would actually believe this stuff and base policy on it; worse that they thought England somehow had a place in imposing any sense of righteousness or justice on Italy, when it absolutely couldn't afford to antagonize Italy at all! If anything Italy was already a friendly country to England and France even after the advent of Mussolini, and neither country could afford to antagonize it.
354ff The author goes through various strategically sound (although somewhat cynical) solutions that would have easily worked to solve and or defuse the Italy problem; England actually proposes to give up a port in British Somaliland to compensate the Emperor of Abyssinia for territory that they hoped he would cede to Italy. [!!!] "...the records suggest that the minds of the Cabinet and the Foreign Office were happier with such petty detail than with broad questions of world strategy." [A reader versed in history should already be able to see where all this is going: It shows weakness, it shows that the League of Nations, along with England and France, would do nothing to punish Italy for its actions, in fact they would give away stuff to Italy's victim to try and smooth over the situation, and it likely just gave Hitler even more license to try and get away with way more, which he soon did.]
359 Hilarious quote here on England in the context of Italy and Abyssinia: "the British government had come to enjoy all the comfort and freedom of manoeuvre of a man on the rack."
362ff What's totally screwed up about all this is that England actually seriously talked about militarily engaging with Italy; at this point they had no business even thinking about such a thing. The English were also being snotty about and disgusted with the French for being lukewarm about engaging with Italy when it was quite obviously not only not in France' interests either.
369 Italy invades Abyssinia, October 3rd 1935, and Britain finds that it's more or less alone as the policeman of the League of Nations; no one else wanted to get involved in a direct conflict with Italy that might lead to war; even the internationalist-type people in England were unwilling to start a war with Italy over this. The most anybody wanted to do was to place sanctions, and maybe close the Suez Canal to Italy. Ultimately a whole collection of sanctions was enacted, embargoing imports and exports from Italy, the one thing left out was oil, which Italy was desperately short of and would need to execute her invasion in the first place. Thus the sanctions were deliberately toothless.
372ff With sanctions having basically no effect on Mussolini, England wanted to go forward and embargo oil, but France refused, knowing for sure it would lead to war; Germany would violate such a embargo, America would not enforce it, France didn't want to be anywhere near going to war with Italy, etc.
375ff Interesting point here about the modern (read: 1930s) media environment compared to centuries ago: "But this was 1935, not 1835 or 1735. English foreign policy was no longer a matter simply for the foreign secretary or even the Cabinet." The author here is referring to the fact that the government is much more reliant/dependent on public opinion and exposed to much wider voter participation because of the mid 1800s expansion of the voter franchise across English culture; thus less could be done behind the scenes, quietly, like in prior centuries. When news leaked out of the quiet deal that basically gave away Abyssinia to Italy there was a huge burst of "moral indignation" once details of the proposals leaked out to the press. "Now however public opinion took over the making of policy altogether." The author talks about how the upwelling of public sentiment was tremendous, across the whole soul of the British culture, while at the same time there was absolutely no military potential for any enforcement at all; it would depend only on English sea power and would have no cooperation from any other country. "As a democratic government must, the government proceeded to defer to public emotion rather than to those strategic realities which it itself now well knew, but which it lacked the political courage to communicate to the nation." Of course they couldn't do the latter because it would make it obvious to both their own people and the whole world that "Britain was living strategically and politically beyond her means, and in this way destroy[ed] her precarious credit as a world power."
377ff Defense secretary Hoare and Chamberlain had to face the truth that no other country would back up England in enforcing sanctions, no one wanted to face any possible military consequences, thus England was on its own but yet it was disarmed. [You can see how England got a lot of "early practice" here in 1935 with appeasement behavior: it was all they could do and I could see with practice it could come naturally against a real opponent like Hitler, with a real military, with a real country.] Next Hoare resigned and Eden took his place as Foreign Secretary, to the author this meant "British policy veered back again to romantic chivalry." All the while "Italian forces continued to knock over the ill-armed savages of Haile Selassie's 'army'." [Ouch]
379ff "Gradually, in the spring and summer of 1936, reality finally laid its bony fingers on the cabinet, even on Eden himself." Abyssinia was a lost cause, England had actually harmed itself with the sanctions--particularly the South Wales coal industry, and this harm was probably permanent now that Germany had taken over that coal market share. And then in May of 1936 Abyssinia's emperor Haile Selassie fled to London, becoming "England's only visible gain from her quixotry on his behalf." [Ouch!!] Then sanctions were lifted by June of 1936. "The Abyssinian adventure was over" but "a restoration of the traditional friendship and cooperation between Italy and England was out of the question after all that had passed." Basically England had alienated an important ally, perhaps permanently. And now it would have three enemies, Japan, Germany and Italy, distributed absolutely inconveniently across the globe. And those shaping British policy were slow to recognize this, and what's worse was the fact that it was "the utterly needless creation of the British themselves."
382ff Germany marches into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, a flagrant breach of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the Locarno Treaty (which Germany signed willingly). They did it early on a Saturday morning, when they knew England's government would be in their country houses, England and France then had to waste time in "agitated communication as to what ought to be done" as the German army marched in unopposed. England had no military might to do anything and in fact they ended up working to convince the French to not take military action. (!!) "The League itself proved instantly useless." France also had an election coming up, thus "each country gratefully responded to the other's backsliding." Germany remained in military possession of the Rhineland, while England and France were "contenting themselves with bleats of formal protest and regret." "The Rhineland could henceforward be used for its traditional purpose of providing the assembly area for great armies intended for the invasion of France and the Low Countries." France and England were back to the situation of before 1914. "For this reason the unopposed German re-occupation of the Rhineland has been regarded as a turning-point in the history of Europe between the world wars. It has been further argued that this was the last occasion when France and England could have met a German violation of a treaty or an open aggression with superior force..." Note however that Barnett considers this argument fallacious because while France did have stronger fighting power than Germany at this time it lacked any nerve or determination to use it.
386ff Wonderful paragraph here on a "tragedy of misunderstanding" between English romanticism for brotherhood, peace and compassion, versus German romanticism for race, nationhood and violence. "Such a confrontation could only end in a tragedy of misunderstanding." And England even had accurate information about Hitler and his nature, thanks to "constant, detailed and perceptive reports" from Sir Horace Rumbold the English ambassador in Berlin, back back even from before he came to power. [Note here also a reference to cartoonist James Gillray, worth looking into his works.] The flow of accurate information continued under Rumbold's successor Sir Eric Phipps: "...he [Hitler] will become strong by the simplest and most direct methods. The mere fact that he is making himself unpopular abroad will not deter him, for, as he said in a recent speech, it is better to be respected and disliked than to be weak and liked." [This is about the most exact description of the difference between England and Germany at this time]
388ff "The claim sometimes made by apologists for the British statesmen of the 1930s, that they did not--could not--really know the kind of regime or man they were dealing with until it was too late is without validity. They knew; yet they ignored what they knew." [Again, it's worth noting how easy it can be to go back and quote mine all the people that predicted what later happened and say that all that information was there right there to be found, but in order to bolster this assertion you then also have to quote mine all the people who thought otherwise. With any crisis, 9/11, the GFC, Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor, whatever, there is always an after-the-fact search for what people said leading up to it, as well as a re-appraisal of all the information with the extra retrospective knowledge of what happened; so the Monday morning quarterbacks can all blame people in the situation for not knowing what was going to happen.] In any event re-arming "was rendered entirely out of court by British public opinion." Worse, British opinion in general sympathized with Germany and was hostile to France by the mid 1930s. (!!!) [You can clearly see here that distributed democracy doesn't work very well, especially at historical or geopolitical inflection points.]
389ff On how England tried to see the other man's side in the context of public opinion, feeling even guilty for how the Germans had suffered, and that the "very existence of Nazi Germany must be our own fault, though even more the fault of the French." (hahaha) See also here Keynes's book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which had "an immense and far-reaching influence; indeed eventually largely to determine the British governing classes' view of the treaty [of Versailles]." The author describes Keynes as "an economist of genius, but also very much a precious intellectual typical of the period... a conscientious objector during the war, a liberal, a man of spinsterish personality." [I can't think of a worse insult than a man calling another man "spinsterish."] Keynes' book blamed Clemenceau for extracting "a Carthaginian peace" from Germany. The author makes an interesting and persuasive argument here: that from the standpoint of French interests and reducing German military power, the peace was "not Carthaginian enough"; first it matched more or less what Germany expected to impose on the allies were she to win WWI; and second, it matched the precise peace that Germany imposed on Russia in the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk "which the Allies, in their own peace-making, had had before them as an example." By this treaty "Germany deprived Russia of a third of her population, half her industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of her coal mines, and imposed an indemnity of six thousand million marks."
392ff "However it was in the very shortcomings of Keynes's book--its sentimentality, its moral indignation its sense of guilt, its lack of strategic comprehension--that lay its particular appeal and guaranteed its immense, far-reaching and catastrophic success. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s other influential voices in Britain continue to regurgitate its contents." "For by the early 1930s the Keynesian view of the Versailles Treaty had become to seem the only one an educated, intelligent, liberal-minded man could possibly hold... Such was the intellectual foundation of 'appeasement', in the narrow sense of British policy towards Nazi Germany in the 1930s." "Thus it was that the kind of policy towards Nazi Germany demanded by the facts so fully documented by Sir Horace Rumbold and Sir Eric Phipps in their despatches from Berlin ran contrary to all the strongly felt prejudices of national opinion--prejudices common, naturally enough, to the majority of the Cabinet itself."
395ff On examples of English government diplomatic communications via the Berlin diplomatic office directly to Hitler, which the author characterizes as "anxious and old-womanly communications" that did nothing but embolden the Germans and make them lose even more respect for the English. Likewise on the "absurd situation" of "Germany, who was violating a key provision of the 1919 peace settlement and thereby offering an immense--and recognized--threat for the future, was being asked by England to be so kind as voluntarily to limit the extent of her violation." England's mild statements to the Germans were interpreted "as tantamount to a legalization of the re-armament."
399 "Thus it was that the British answer to the most crucial single question of foreign policy to arise since 1918, the British decision at this point of strategic no-return, was weakly to surrender to the insolence of a past and potential enemy, and toughly to bully a past and potential ally." Basically England wanted to persuade France to let the current status quo remain with Germany in its position at the Rhine, with its current armaments, have them return to the League of Nations, etc., and, somehow, to persuade the French that this was all going to be okay, all of which was totally in opposition to France's security.
402ff And then further insult: Germany took strong objection to a whitepaper in which England talked about rearmament on a cautious level in keeping with the Versailles Treaty; Hitler saw it and when British diplomats arrived to meet with him for a scheduled meeting on March 6th, 1935, he suddenly became "indisposed" and blew them off. Then, Hitler rescheduled the meeting to later in the month, and then, on March 9th, he announced the existence of the Luftwaffe, the introduction of conscription and the creation of an army of 36 divisions--all incredible breaches of the Versailles Treaty. "It was a sign of how completely the Germans felt that they now possessed the psychological initiative. It was the moment when England and France, if they wished to regain that initiative, must act boldly and resolutely." This was "the culmination of two years of diplomacy in which England had consistently represented herself to Hitler as a timid, apprehensive and feebly well-meaning old woman."
406 Hitler later followed up with a new speech "aimed with psychological cunning at the yearnings and prejudices of the British public" giving assurances that German rearmament offered no threat to world peace, holding out hope that Germany might return to the League of Nations, etc. "The innocent face of British opinion shown with pleasure at this revelation of the German dictator's goodness." (!!!)
407 Another example of Germany extracting concessions from England was at an Anglo-German naval conference in London, again in 1935, where Ribbentrop required England as a condition for them even remaining at the conference to formally recognize a 35% ratio of naval strength between Germany and Britain, otherwise the Germans would go home. England caved.
407 "Thus by the middle of 1935, long before Hitler had achieved military ascendancy in Europe, England and France had lost a decisive struggle with Nazi Germany, a struggle in which the English indeed had never attempted to engage; never even realized was taking place... Like a commander in battle who divines that he now dominates his opponent's mind and will, Hitler felt able to act boldly, to take great risks, even in the face of superior power."
409ff March 1936: Germany marches into the Rhineland, Hitler had guessed England and France would do nothing, and he was right. "Soon Germany was to enjoy military as well as moral ascendancy."
411ff See also the fact that England lost air superiority during these three years 1935-37; but then the author goes through several serious warnings and issues dating back to 1931 when Germany was lying about its professional air force training as "amateurs" that they were training pilots in Russia etc., the author argues that in 1933 it was already publicly known in the media that Germany was leading in air supremacy, and at this point the author writes, witheringly, that this is the first time actually that the British government took action, and "it appointed a committee." Also even five years after the obsolescence and deficiencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force had been made clear, only then did the government get to a stage of "beginning to formulate detailed proposals" to remedy the situation, and then only by 1936 was there "a comprehensive scheme of large-scale re-armament." [As the author lists all this clear evidence of Germany's rearmament, and the minimal, if any, action England took in response, it sounds like this might be a category error of assuming that once a person or institution has made up it mind that it would change its mind based on more information. As we all know, typically this does not happen. And then think about after World War 1, how an entire generation never wanted to go back to war, and never thought such a war would happen again. It had made up its mind! See below on page 419 where the author tacitly shows England's lack of agility of mind on this problem.]
415ff The author explains the reasons for the "staggering delays and immense inadequacies" of the British response, including governmental "ponderousness and torpor," over 100 committees, leisurely investigations, months taken to compose simple reports, etc.; also the people on top of the government like Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, were opposed to rearmament anyway, arguing in his case that England couldn't afford it.
418 [It's worth thinking about another problem here with early re-armament, let's say England really woke up and decided to re-arm in 1933 or 1934, all they would do is build up a military with completely obsolete equipment five or six years later, certainly obsolete by eight or nine years later! The author sort of indirectly talks about this, saying that in 1934-5 an expansion of the air force "could only have lumbered the RAF with obsolescent, indeed obsolete, types of aircraft; slow biplanes of wood and fabric."]
418ff Also on the difference between having enough armed forces to wage war versus large enough armed forces to brandish in support of an expansionist foreign policy; these are not the same. The first can be done much more quickly, and this is actually what Hitler was doing in the early 1930s; the English government didn't see it this way, they didn't think of military forces as an instrument of diplomacy in the same way the Germans did. Instead they saw it as a de facto decision "to take the road to another great war" while also thinking of it in terms of the cost burden/taxation burden.
419ff "The truth was that the scale and the pace of Germany's military growth after January 1933 demanded of the British government that it should reverse course from disarmament to re-armament with an abruptness utterly beyond the agility of its own mind, let alone the mind of the British public. For by tragic coincidence the first two years of the Nazi dictatorship and its military expansion witnessed the rise of pacifistic emotion in Britain to its very climax." The author describes pages of various pacifistic comments made in the media here, "preached with ever more frantic ardour in the years 1933-5, as the world situation worsened." Also it became an element of political power in England as well, thus Parliament became more and more pacifistic thanks to pressure from voters. "For a candidate to stand for 'peace' was to ensure himself victory" in parliamentary elections in 1934-5, Labour won a majority away from the conservatives. [Here we again have an obvious structural problem of democracy: the people are very easily wrongfooted, and are always fighting the last war metaphorically, preparing for things that have already happened, not for what's going to happen.]
424 On the roots of British public opinion for pacifism; on the mood in the 1930s being much "different from the hopeful, optimistic internationalism of the 1920s"; "an intense dread of war"; a perception that all the sacrifices of the Great War were futile and it was a horror almost beyond imagination," etc. Also per the author "a national myth had arisen according to which it was the Great War which was responsible for Britain's present decadence and decline. By the early 1930s the Great War had become the great British excuse."
424ff The author here argues that WWI was not economically damaging, nor was there even a lost generation: "Yet in objective truth the Great War in no way inflicted economic damage on Britain." "...the legend of 'the Lost Generation'--is unjustified by the facts." [When he goes through the numbers, note that England lost 700,000 men, this argument does not carry very much weight, in fact the author looks at it in percentage rate per population, and he compares it to other countries which had worse losses--this is not an argument! you can't argue that something isn't bad just because it was worse for other countries. And then he compares this to the ratio of American losses on both sides during the Civil War, saying UK deaths were comparatively less proportionally; this is again a pathetic argument. Then he switches to officers to make the same weak argument.] "The truth was that the Great War crippled the British psychologically but in no other way."
426ff In the pages to follow there's a discussion of the arising of the "Lost Generation" legend, why it's unjustified etc., basically the author goes through how many of the same names keep showing up and he agures that there was a romantic elite class who was over-represented among the army, and it just seemed like everyone had multiple family members who were wounded or killed; furthermore they all seem to write in romantic language about the people who were lost; he also describes the way they described the people who were lost and argues that these are traits they weren't even going to serve the needs of the coming era, as if they were the wrong kind of people. "The British governing classes made the unconsciously arrogant, if understandable, mistakes of thinking that the virtues they admired were necessarily those the future required; and that because their own small circle had been decimated, the vitality of the British Nation had been critically impaired." Next he goes into how it was that this governing class legend was adapted by Britain across the British middle classes as well, how everyone "came to accept the myth that Britain had undergone crippling damage in the Great War... as if Britain had suffered on the French or German scale." He furthermore argues that this mental picture of the Great War came from best-selling memoirs and novels about life on the Western Front, "the great bull market for trench memoirs opened in 1927" [another wonderful turn of phrase from the author here]; the author writes that these were basically all written by sheltered, idealistic war writers with an unbalanced and subjective version both of the Western front experience and the British army's reaction to it; they were "flowers of English liberalism and romanticism" with "delicate emotional responses... Hence army and trench life--quite apart from the hazards and horrors of war itself--was often their first real introduction to the world of struggle and hardship, as most mankind knew it." The author argues that a third of the British Nation lived in conditions "which remarkably echo those of living conditions in the trenches." [This is an intricate but interesting argument he's making here, it's fairly persuasive.] The author compares Siegfried Sassoon's book Memoirs of an Infantry Officer and his comments on Liverpool with his own comments of the trench zone, and then compares those to a social investigator writer describing the city of Manchester in those days, all of which seemed about the same in terms of squalor and misery. (!!!) "It may be wondered what kind of books writers like Siegfried Sassoon would have written after four years of working in such a place... Many of the rank-and-file were in fact better off in the trenches than at home. The troops themselves therefore were cheerful and stoical rather than outraged and introspective, a fact which deeply puzzled the war writers." [I was able to partially scratch at and see this idea when I read the book Storm of Steel, a positive memoir of World War I written by a genuine warrior.]
433ff Another interesting comparison here where the author compares Siegfried Sassoon's "savage indignation and hysterical horror and outrage" to reactions to nearly identical things in another working class private soldier (writer Frank Richards) which "provoked no more than a laconic comment or a cynical witticism." And then the author makes a further case that none of these trench memoirists ever talked about the greater context of the strategy and politics of the war that drove the conflict in the first place. "The war writers therefore shirked the fundamental political military problems presented by the war; instead they were content to express their emotional revulsion, although with enormous power and cumulative effect." And the middle class reading public swallowed it whole more or less; worst of all, these books began to appear in 1928-29, an unlucky coincidence of historical timing because they straddle the very turning point of the interwar period, the time when England had a chance to get its head out of its ass.
436ff On the British obsession and terror of the modern bomber from the 1930s onward and Bertrand Russell's brilliant use of quotations from various war ministers to use this as ammunition for the pacifist movement; Churchill gave a speech in the House of Commons in 1934 to try to stir up rearmament by describing an image of the bombing attack on London, all of these things simply "helped to stir up the nation's terror of another war" ... Collectively the leading circles of British life succeeded only "in breaking their own nerve."
438 Here the author goes through some examples of disingenuous rhetoric and disingenuous quotes from Churchill and Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, arguing in 1936, retrospectively, about rearmament mistakes made in the early 30s. [Everyone of course wants to blame everyone else but themselves!]
440ff On the Japanese threat: basically it was about sending a battle fleet to Singapore in time to relieve the garrison after a Japanese attack, but Japan ultimately surprised the English by attacking Singapore overland through the Malayan peninsula, and although this approach vector had already been discussed as early as 1937 among the Chiefs of Staff in a memo, "its existence demolishes the post-1942 legend that the British armed forces had never thought in terms of a Japanese attack on Singapore overland through Malaya." On discussions of England's military and economic weakness compared to Germany; also its lower level of self-sufficiency, etc. "England had not had to face so overwhelming a combination of potential enemies with such inadequate resources since the American War of Independence, when, without an ally, she had fought Spain and France as well as the rebellious colonies."
444ff Discussion of Neville Chamberlain who "was a mind clearer and harder than those of most other senior Cabinet ministers of the era." He already could see by 1934 that it was impossible to fight both Germany and Japan, he pursued the possibility of an alliance or at least an understanding with Japan but this was "no more possible in 1937-9 then in 1934-5" partly because Japan at this point was controlled by a militarist government, it had embarked on an invasion of China in 1937 and had no interest in any understanding with the "feeble" British. [Another alpha regime that smelled and was disgusted by weakness, and took advantage of it, just like Hitler.] Also Chamberlain was likewise unrealistic politically with his rapprochement policy with Italy. There was nothing England could have offered Italy in the late 1930s that would have made a difference to Mussolini, or that would have made up for what England did against Italy in the Abyssinian controversy. In any case he was cozying up to Hitler at this point and could care less about England. [Yet another alpha regime that smelled weakness and was disgusted by it.] Note also the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936 and this was sort of a proxy war between Russia, Germany and Italy; England took a non-interventionist position but ended up intervening with shipping as Italy attacked shipping to Spanish Republican (this was the red/left/communist side) ports. "There was nothing whatever to induce Mussolini to switch friendships."
448ff Now the author goes into detail on Germany, and shows how the British embassy staff clearly documented Hitler's motivation and tendencies; it was impossible by 1936 for the British government "to remain under any illusions about Nazi Germany. Nor were they." Comments here on the birth of "the appeasement solution" to handle Germany diplomatically, working out cooperation and consent with Nazi Germany for problems in Europe rather than directly pursuing an anti-German alliance to produce a more equal balance of power, or worse, return to armed diplomacy. "Nothing could be more in the romantic tradition than so to reject what was dictated by knowledge and commonsense, and instead pursue impossible but ideal."
451 Note also that "the creation of alliance lay under a special taboo" because it was blamed for bringing about the Great War, as if "the game [of employing alliances] had caused the injury rather than the way it had been played. In view of their terror at the prospect of another war, it was a game which they were resolved never to play again. And so, even while their intellects acknowledged the truth about Nazi Germany, everything in their characters and upbringing prompted them to flinch from its implications, and urged them instead to seek escape and fantasies. [PM Stanley] Baldwin could, at one and the same time, state that dictators only understood the language of force, and yet preside over a government long committed to addressing them with the language of goodwill and sweet reason." "If Germany could be appeased England's strength would then suffice against Italy or Japan."
454 Midsummer 1936: Germany was digesting the Rhineland and was offering "vague but alluring" offers of pacts and treaties; also the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin were happening, Britain seem to lose its sense of urgency at this point. Also a really harsh comment here about Germany "conquering Olympic medals as if they were provinces" while "the British team walked in clad in blazers and trilby hats, all too appropriately the epitome of genteel suburban weekend amateurism, and their performance did no more then bear out their appearance." What's worse here is various distinguished English visitors came to visit Hitler that summer "and came away completely taken in" as the intelligentsia of England believed "Germany would settle down as a good neighbour" somehow.
455 Sidebar here about how Stanley Baldwin was now old, tired, in poor health, and was much preoccupied with the "constitutionally critical business of Edward VIII 'swish to marry an inappropriate American woman" in yet another example of England fiddling while Europe smolders. Also, it's worth listening here to Edward VII's abdication speech, in all of its pathetic, dainty glory. [This also was a bit of a rabbit hole, as Edward VII stepped down and handed over power to his brother.] And then, worse, the Spanish Civil War broke out in July of 1936 and of course idealists from England political left supported the Republican (communist/leftist) government and of course they were idealists who failed to see this was just "a front for a communist apparatus." [And if you read The God That Failed, you'll find out that a lot of the people who went to Spain to "help" ended up murdered/disappeared in Russia shortly thereafter.]
455ff Now on to 1937: a new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain: "energetic, brisk, businesslike, and determined to settle the affairs of Europe once and for all" coupled with "the onward march of German ambition." On Chamberlain's background and nature, his "corvine" profile, the various failures and bullying he experienced in life, including what sounds like comparisonitis with both his father and step-brother; on the pride that he may have had wiping out the failures of the past and having risen higher than anyone in the government. And then applying his very Victorian nature and his post-Great War pacifism towards a sort of high-minded "appeasement of the whole world." Unfortunately, he came into contact with an adversary, Hitler, who was not in any way high-minded or sensitive, and certainly not a product of Victorian pacifism. "In the circumstances, Chamberlain's virtues could serve only to betray him. In particular, the simplicity that belongs to integrity could too easily become the credulity that belongs to the dupe." [Another good quote from the author here.]
461ff On Nevile Henderson, chosen by Eden as ambassador to Berlin, a naive and earnest person convinced to see the best of others and "a living caricature" of the English governing classes; he had read Mein Kampf but still believed that Hitler would see reason once he sat down with the English. He really, really wanted to see things through German eyes and understand, "came to mean in practice that Henderson represented German interests in London far more eloquently and determinedly than he ever represented English interests in Berlin."
462 Going back a bit to the 1936 heightening of tensions over Czechoslovakia, on indications that Germany would want to expand there, on disquiet from the German minority in Czechoslovakia about alleged unfair treatment, etc., and then the 1937 concerns that Germany would absorb Austria. Note also that England had a dislike of aspects of the 1919 peace treaty, in particular the German-Polish border which they thought was unfair and racially unjust to Germany; likewise they had concerns about Czechoslovakia, which was "another weak new creation" deliberately constructed with a German-speaking former Austrian populace, basically it was a bunch of small states with a lot of "Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land." [Although, holy cow, if you know what happened in these regions as WWII wound down and afterward, you'll know there weren't too many Germans left in these regions by then: see Keith Lowe's readable book Savage Continent for more on this.] England thus began to sort of abdicate their responsibility for the Eastern European aspects of the Versailles Treaty. This sets the stage for them totally caving on it as World War II approached, and also they had the impression that this would turn German policy toward eastward and away from France and the Low Countries (and therefore England). Plus of course England couldn't intervene there anyway! But by 1937, "it did not seem quite so right and easy just to sit back and let it [German expansion in Eastern Europe] happen." Also what would happen after they expanded Eastward? What if they turned westward again?
468ff England basically signaled pretty directly to Hitler that they would be fine with Germany expanding by any means except by using force or the threat of force; if Germany intervened in Czechoslovakia for example, they knew there was no way of preventing it and they kind of showed their cards early on to Hitler in 1937: it "had come to mean in practice that England was content to acquiesce in Germany's expansion to the east so long as the process was decently garbed into legal form. By this means would be avoided such acts of open aggression as would be publicly embarrassing to the English conscience and might drag England into a war. It made a perfect solution to the English dilemma, but for the fact that it wholly ignored the equilibrium of power in Europe."
470 Chamberlain follows up with a plan to repartition Africa to give territory to Germany.
471 On a mistaken impression that when Eden resigned from Chamberlain's government it was because they disagreed on the appeasement policy; in reality they both saw things the very same way with regard to Germany; it was over "the appeasement of Mussolini that Eden and Chamberlain fell out."
472 March 12, 1938: invasion of Austria by the German army; Hitler's triumphant entry into Vienna; the Germans already knew thanks to comment signal by Chamberlain through Halifax that this would "arouse no English wrath"; "Since France and England contented themselves once again with whinnies of protest and disapproval, Hitler had now discovered that, apparently, he could get away even with open invasion of a neighbouring state and the destruction of its independence." Further, when it became obvious that Germany had further designs on Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain just appeased harder.
474ff Extended discussion here of "the pitiable state of the British armed forces" at the time; on the running down of specialized industrial resources and skilled manpower for making things like naval guns, mountings, armor plate, etc. Also a tremendous production bottleneck thanks to a lack of skilled labor (draftsman, production engineers, managers, all of which are common to any modern industry) across many industrial industries; this could only be fixed by going to a centralized war organization of the economy which was impossible in a democracy (especially when England was not at war, obviously). Thus any British efforts at rearmament were always behind schedule and slower than expected. They ended up having to buy arms from Sweden and the United States. Note also [this was mentioned above, earlier in the book] Britain failed to put together a civil aviation industry like Germany or the United States. Likewise repeating the errors of World War I where the British machine tool industry had relapsed, to where it was yet another bottleneck for any kind of mass production of anything. The bottom line from all this is that Britain's entire industrial sector had a huge dependency on foreign technology.
484 "Even the production and installation of radar, a British invention later to take its place in the national folk-myth as a proof of British technological leadership, was delayed because of a bottleneck in production of valves, which Britain was forced to consider buying instead from America."
485ff The author throws up his hands here, wondering how England could be so incompetent and have declined so far down from what they had rebounded to in 1918. Just twenty years later they had to relearn the same lessons and yet they had the same "appalling deficiencies"; "When the guns ceased to fire on 11 November 1918 it was for Britain what the stroke of midnight was for Cinderella." Next a series of criticisms of the psychological attitude of British businessman: how they clung to old methods, the companies were two gentlemanly to really try to compete; also on the trade unions, which restricted the amount of skilled labor and used other policies to limit industrial modernization. These were basic findings of the 1929 Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade that were thus known years ago. The authors points out the irony that the committee itself had conservative habits of mind, they weren't Victorian individualists, they weren't fans of laissez-faire; the author implicitly suggests here that the state needs to get far more involved in driving industry forward. [It's very ironic that he wrote this book in 1972, exactly when England was enjoying industrial collapse all over again thanks to state involvement in industry. I wonder if the author saw that irony, or if he thought it was altogether fitting that the state control industry?] The author puts it this way: "For believers in laissez-faire economic orthodoxy, the plight of British industry presented indeed a baffling conundrum. What did you do when private enterprise simply refused to display enterprise?"
492 On the Labour party and its religious fascination with idea of "nationalisation" as if "like baptism" it would confirm some sort of State of Grace and conversion upon British industry. "The two political cries of 'nationalisation' and 'private enterprise' between the world wars therefore served only to transform into emotional questions of ideology what ought to have been pragmatic questions of functional organization of industry; it was not the least contribution of party politics to British decline." The author argues that Baldwin's government could have compelled much more modernization but it "was inhibited solely by taboo"; he then cites the one isolated example of major government intervention in industry: expansion of the electrical grid, showing that this was a positive domain of government intervention. The author then obviously cites the German counterexample where the state "was co-operating with its industrialists in colossal reorganizations and re-equipment of German industry."
494ff Back to the modern day: March 1938 at the opening of the Czechoslovakia crisis and why "England had only two ill-equipped divisions" in their army at the time, and why the Army was a bad third priority behind the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy; on England's obsession with air power and bombing and the vulnerability of London, etc. How an Air Force was sort of a cut-price solution: it could offer France the aid of an airstrike force instead of an army; it would be a better deterrent for a German attack than an actual field army.
502ff On Liddell Hart, who in 1937 "became the decisive intellectual influence on British grand strategy"; his book Europe in Arms; his influence over Chamberlain; the basic idea here was that "the commitment of a great army to the continent in the Great War had been a terrible mistake and that historically 'the British way in warfare' was to leave European land battles to allies, and, by means of seapower, employ the British army to fight isolated enemy forces away from the principal front." "Yet this was not Liddell Hart's--or Chamberlain's--only contribution to the unpreparedness of the British Army in 1938" as both men "remained obsessed" with aerial dangers to the UK. On Chamberlain's pursuit of policies of "disengagement and defensive isolationism", "contrary policies" per the author; "As it happens, the British Government finally washed its hands strategically of Europe on the very eve of the crisis over Czechoslovakia, in which crisis it confidently proposed to play a leading diplomatic role."
505ff Discussion here of the relative weakness of French military power, likewise the Czechoslovakian army's relative weakness; other strategic considerations, like Czech's economic dependency on Germany, the fact the naval power was useless unless it was a very long war, and the idea of the impossible to geographically aid Czechoslovakia directly; also the French and British military were both defensive in nature at this point, even in the air it would be impossible to help Czechoslovakia because of the distances involved. The Chiefs of Staff believed "that there was virtually nothing militarily effective, direct or indirect, that the Allies could do to help Czechoslovakia" and then the "lugubrious" report concluded "we are not yet ready for a war." Note that this reached conclusions the "Cabinet had already decided to pursue" while providing "a future reference work with which to confound any Cabinet member who might have the hardihood to question the prime minister's wisdom." [This is standard savvy political practice: you hire McKinsey to write a report that rubber stamps whatever you think should be done, direct any criticisms to that report, and if the plan doesn't work out you can always blame it on the consultants... after all, it was their idea!]
510ff The author now goes into a critical examination of the Chiefs of Staff 1938 report; note first the report didn't address the strategic question of what would be the balance of power in Europe after Germany achieved dominion over Czechoslovakia; the report was overly pessimistic; it overstated German military preparedness. Interestingly, at the same time there was a German report to Germany's armed forces general staff also dwelling on Germany's military weakness and her unreadiness for war over Czechoslovakia.
514 On Chamberlain and his cabinet, trying to achieve some sort of utopian, just solution for Czechoslovakia just like they pursued over Manchuria and Abyssinia; on their failure to understand that the Germanic people's grievances in the Sudetenland were simply a pretext for a greater power gambit in Europe. "Lacking the advantage of such cynical mistrust, Chamberlain and his closest colleagues utterly mistook the nature of the business into which they were venturing." See also the "liberal-minded intelligentsia" who were quick to see the Sudeten-Germans' point of view; the French actually saw what Germany's game plan was but it still failed to lead them "to an appropriately resolute policy." Basically they gave Chamberlain free license to handle the negotiation as a way to escape their treaty obligations to the Czechs. This put Chamberlain in a "diplomatic role of such preeminence as his brother had never enjoyed--as indeed even Palmerston or Castlereagh had never enjoyed. For the destiny of Europe lay between him and one other man."
516ff Interesting how Germany amped up its military fortifications on the French border and did various other things to ramp up what look like military concentration in Czechoslovakia, and this turned on the psychological pressure on the British and French governments, and it worked. Germany diplomatically was acting like this was a matter of genuine dispute between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans but at the same time they were acting as if they would make this a much larger military-type conflict over this regional issue, and this made Chamberlain more concerned about the untrustworthiness of the German government; they were up against an unpredictable adversary and they were already rattled in the first place...
519ff On the various critical cabinet meetings in August of 1938, which the author describes as "a tide of pusillanimity": England essentially decides to do nothing to stop Hitler [although note that lot of these conclusions are arguing in retrospect, because it wasn't known at that time that Germany was in a weaker bargaining position that it was, it isn't clear that England and France would have had any better luck if they were more aggressive and even declared war on Germany at this time, I think this looks a lot like retrospective post-dicting by the author]. Nevertheless it is clear that the cabinet was unsure of itself and didn't know what to do. [Then again, who would?]
522ff The author argues that in the September 12th cabinet meeting of 1938 the English government threw away "their one chance" because the author thinks that had England been firm and declared war, Hitler's generals would have turned on Hitler. [This is an extreme stretch, it seems highly implausible.]
524ff In the face of significant riots in the Sudetenland and clear likelihood Germany would enter Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain appealed to Hitler, came to Germany to negotiate and signaled in advance (by suggesting a plebiscite in the Sudetenland) that it was obvious that Germany could take over this territory; Chamberlain was also unaware that this region was crucial to Czech frontier defenses, he was totally oblivious to a critically important military fact. The author argues that the cabinet welcomed Chamberlain's plan with "adulation and sycophancy." Here's a great quote: "Kingsley Wood, the Secretary of State for Air, who was good at both..."
527ff Chamberlain arrives in Munich on September 15th 1938, he believes Hitler, is taken in by him essentially, he gives up the Sudetenland, and when Chamberlain returned to sell the idea to his government it was "a shifty performance for an honorable man." Likewise he paid no attention to the general strategic circumstances: Czechoslovakia would be destroyed "as a efficient, if only second-class, military power" and this would negatively affect the balance of power on the continent. France and England work out a deal; Chamberlain then goes to meet Hitler again on 22 September 1938, and Hitler, instead of offering gratitude, pushes for even more, he starts talking about Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia: "[t]o this outrageous speech, Chamberlain replied in hurt reproach rather than with the anger which it merited." The whole time Chamberlain failed to realize he was being "cynically played for a dupe."
535 "This Lear-like self-delusion not only marked the tragic decline of Chamberlain's own character, but also the climax of the whole tragedy of the England whose virtues Chamberlain so well represented, virtues which he was now misapplying to the conduct of foreign affairs more catastrophically than any English statesman before him. The tragedy was all the more poignant because, while Chamberlain still embodied the virtues of liberal England, he no longer reflected its present state of mind. Chamberlain was himself clinging to illusions and hopes from which British opinion, right and left, was fast awakening under the sting of Hitler's gangster diplomacy at Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg."
536ff Discussion here of the change in public opinion, as well as in the Labour party, towards military buildup and against pacifism; even the conservative party was beginning to develop a dissenting minority that was less "limitlessly loyal" to Chamberlain. The author here disputes the argument that Chamberlain's and his apologists' claims afterwards that threatening Germany with war was impossible politically and totally unpopular; also on the delusional claim Chamberlain made that "there was a possibility of a turning-point in Anglo-German relations" at this point. Then on 25 September 1938, the British cabinet met again, the author goes through everyone's specific opinions, the cabinet was evenly and deeply divided; Czechoslovakia rejected Hitler's additional proposals, now it seemed nearly certain that Germany would invade Czechoslovakia; the cabinet seems to come to non-decisions repeatedly here. Chamberlain then writes to Hitler to suggest a four-power conference, including France and Italy. This is in the face of the September 28th ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, and Hitler stayed his troops for 24 hours in order to give time for a conference; Chamberlain announced this to the House of Commons to "hysterical cheers of relief from all parts of the House."
546 The author harshes on Chamberlain here again, citing how he quotes Harry Hotspur in Henry IV ("out of this nettle danger, we plucked this flower, safety") while forgetting the quote which immediately follows "this purpose you undertake is dangerous; the friends you have named uncertain; the time itself unsorted; and your whole plot too light for the counterpoise so great an opposition."
550 "But it was Churchill, that ignored, scorned figure on the Conservative back benches, who almost alone perceived what was really important about the Munich agreement." And then quotes from his speech: "We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude." Also on "the total contempt in which Hitler now held Chamberlain." Hitler: "If ever that silly old man comes interfering here again with his umbrella, I'll kick him downstairs and jump on his stomach in front of the photographers."
552ff Late 1938 into 1939: England attempts to rearm but with balance of payments problems because they have to import so much technology; France, realizing they can't go it alone and would need help, debates about a British Expeditionary Force on the continent; more information about the contempt the Germans held for the English for their "gentleness"; debates among the English Chiefs of Staff about what they would do in defense of Holland if it were attacked; basically it was the same question 20 years later: to defend Europe or the Empire?
556ff All of this worrying and dithering in England was interrupted when Germany invaded what was left of Czechoslovakia, and thus 40 divisions of the Czech army disappeared from one side of the ledger and instead became equipment for 40 new German divisions, "It was a turnover of eighty divisions in Germany's favour; equivalent as General Baeufre points out, to the army of France." "The German occupation of Czechoslovakia finally shook English opinion awake from its beautiful twenty-year-old dream that the world was governed by morality and goodwill, and not by power and ambition." Even Chamberlain totally changed his mind here and recognized the score.
558ff March 1939: Germany then occupies Memel, then part of Lithuania; then under fear that Germany would invade either Romania or Poland, England then cautiously offers a full alliance with Poland if invaded, "so fateful a guarantee" to show the Chamberlain and England finally understood "what kind of game they were playing, it did not follow that they could play it very well." [Ouch!] April 1939: Italy invades Albania, swiftly conquering it. England at this point considering various pointless alliances and coalitions with Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, etc., all fantasies because France and Britain had nothing to offer these countries by aid or protection.
562ff Data here on the military inferiority of England and France versus the Axis powers; on the utter inability of England or France to engage in any kind of protracted war; "the British could only hope to win a long war, they could only afford a short one."
565ff Debates on whether or not to have an alliance with Russia; Chamberlain was against it, Churchill and Lloyd George as well as France were for it; then in May 1939: Italy and Germany sign an alliance: "...payment of the penultimate installment of the price for British high-mindedness over Abyssinia."
567ff And then Japanese troops violated the British concession area in Tientsin, China; England couldn't really do anything about it without exposing itself even more in Europe, they can only seek a peaceful settlement.
569ff Germany uses the Nazi presence in Danzig to create a false flag event; things get increasingly upside-down for England as they get involved in more entanglements for deterrent reasons while they want even less than ever to have to be entering a war because of their military weakness, their general strategy is ass-backwards.
571ff England, France and Russia were negotiating arrangements for mutual defense, but were unable to answer important Russian questions about access to Poland and Romania; then on August 23, 1939, exactly while England and France were dithering in the face of Russia's direct questions, Germany and Russia signed their non-aggression pact, and it gave Russia everything France and England had dithered over: recognition as part of Russia's sphere of expansion both the Baltics and eastern Poland.
572ff September 1st 1939, Germany invades Poland; "Britain's guarantee to Poland had entirely failed of its deterrent purpose. Was it therefore still in England's interest to fulfill it?" Here the author goes over various Machiavellian options--like leaving Poland to its fate just as they had with Czechoslovakia--that Chamberlain and English government would never have chosen, thus England was wrongfooted by history yet again in the worst way.
574ff England sends an ultimatum to Germany which "flabbergasted Hitler"; the author quotes Neville Henderson's memoirs saying Hitler's "great mistake was his failure to understand the inherent British sense of morality, humanity, and freedom." And for once something actually went right for England, at least for the next several months during the so-called "Phoney War" of the winter of 1939-40: Japan stayed put, Germany didn't expand its conflict beyond Poland, and Italy also did nothing. However "England was quietly bleeding to death" economically because of their economic condition and inability to fund and finance a legitimate military buildup.
577 April 7th 1940: Germany occupies Denmark, invades Norway; England and France went to Norway's aid, but bungled the operation there; this was actually Winston Churchill's responsibility, however, there was enough criticism leveled on Neville Chamberlain that he "became the scapegoat not only for the nation's pre-war illusions and mistakes but also for its present frustrations. On 10 May Chamberlain resigns, the very day that Germany began its offensive in the west, "a coincidence of events which fittingly closed the era of covenants without swords."
VI Victory at All Costs
581ff Discussion of the various troop sizes of both sides on the Western front upon Germany's attack in 1940; note that of the 10 Panzer divisions Germany used four of them were furnished by "Czech tanks which fell into their hands in March 1939." The battle opened on May 10th 1940; by May 15th the Dutch surrendered, the English expeditionary force of 330,000 had to be evacuated at Dunkirk back to England; on June 11th Italy declared war, on June 14th Paris fell; on June 17th France sued for an armistice. The author throws in a rare purple sentence here: "France had come down like a rotten elm, and England was left without shelter from the gale."
583ff England then "reverted of a sudden to its eighteenth century character" with the Battle of Britain (July-October 1940), which England won, barely; this was supposed to pave the way for German invasion, "an operation which Germany was only able to contemplate at all because the Allies had lost the land battle in Europe."
584ff December 7th 1941: the beginning of Japan's war in the Far East, and this coincided with England already being involved in war with Italy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; England quickly lost two new battleships in Singapore and had nothing else to supply over there; the author even describes how the war with Italy was fought in defense of Imperial rather than English interests, note in any case the Mediterranean route to India couldn't be used anyway.
586ff Economic collapse and weak long term strategic prospects "might have seemed to point to one answer: to accept that Germany now dominated Europe, and make the best possible peace with her." This was unthinkable in part because the English people still thought they were rich and technologically advanced nation and they could think of nothing but crushing Hitler; Churchill himself "expressed this national temper." England could have basically hoped "that if they simply kept the war alive, other and greater powers might eventually be drawn in." But even this choice, a sort of Machiavellian type of half measure, didn't occur to Churchill or the English either! "Instead they opted to wage war on a scale far, far beyond British economic resources. They opted to mobilize the entire nation and the entire economy for purposes of war." This was basically the same decision Hindenburg and Ludendorff made in Germany in 1916-17, based on the idea that they could make a short-term increase in military strength, but it ultimately caused Germany's total collapse. [The author is basically expecting something totally impossible, that England would fight aggressively and then suddenly decide okay we're going to make peace with Germany make the best of it, this is not how the English operate, any Englishman should know better.]
587ff It's worth noting the author's point here that defeat of Germany was not necessarily synonymous with the preservation of British power: England could defeat Germany and still lose all of its power, England could also not defeat Germany and maintain its power, etc., Further, the author argues that "Churchill failed to understand this until too late" with his obsession with victory at all costs. "Stalin made no such mistake. Cold realist that he was, he recognized that the defeat of Germany was not an end, but a means." The author then compares Stalin, thinking about the post-world settlement of Europe in 1941 when Germany was outside Moscow's suburbs [!], to Churchill, who didn't begin seriously to look beyond victory until late 1943 or even 1944. England was playing a short game, not the long game.
588 On how all this benefited the United States enormously: "England's plight and profligacy was America's prosperity."
589ff On Churchill's naive romantic belief in the "Anglo-American cousinhood" idea when the United States was motivated by a desire to promote its own interests; there's a wild anecdote here where England, desperate for ships in 1940, was subjected to a horrendous hard bargain from the United States where we provided 50 World War I-era destroyers at the cost of all the naval and air bases that England had in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, etc. then the Lend-Lease bill passed in the United States in March 1941: a misleading name "represented as an act of unparalleled generosity" by which American weapons were carried into battle by English men, [You could maybe call this the USA's first proxy war (!) in a long list ending in Ukraine. The US was fighting England to the last man...]. Also Lend-Lease had strings attached: England could not resell or even export related goods or anything related to anything the US transferred to them; this consummated the process of "transforming England into an American satellite warrior-state," basically a literal vassal state of the American Empire. By contrast Russia "took all they could [from the USA] by way of aid without surrendering a jot of their independence."
592-3: "Thus the British and Imperial armies which marched and conquered in the latter half of the war, in North Africa, in Italy, in Burma, in Normandy and north-west Europe; forces which smashed and burnt German cities; the Navy which defeated the U-boat; these were not manifestations of British imperial power at a new zenith, as the British believed at the time and long afterward, but only the illusion of it. They were instead manifestations of American power--and of the decline of England into a warrior satellite of the United States. Thus the 'victory' of 1945 itself was, so far as the British were concerned, partly illusion too; for although Germany had been defeated, England was not, of her own right and resources, a victor. She emerged into the post-war era with the foundations of her former independent national power as completely destroyed as those of France or Germany, but with the extra, and calamitous drawback that, as a victor, she failed to realize it." [It's absolutely heavy to read this quote. By "winning" you lose. You lose everything.]
To Read:
Novels of George Alfred Henty: The Dragon & The Raven (1886), For The Temple (1888), Under Drake's Flag (1883) and In Freedom's Cause (1885)
Caricatures of James Gillray
A.E. Campbell: Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903
L. Macneill Weir: The Tragedy of Ramsay Macdonald
Richard Storry: A History of Modern Japan
***General André Baufre: 1940: The Fall of France (see chapter 6)
John Maynard Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace
Duff Cooper: Old Men Forget
***Richard Aldington: Death of a Hero [World War I memoir]
Frank Richards: Old Soldiers Never Die
Stephen Henry Roberts: The House that Hitler Built
Corelli Barnett: Britain and Her Army 1509-1970